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From the Editor
Our Autumn issue opens with a special commentary by Patricia
Shields, whose “Limits of Negative Peace, Faces of Positive Peace”
questions whether we have thought through the ramifications of the
quality of the peace we seem to have, when indeed we have peace at all.
In our first forum, A Wake for Counterinsurgency? Steven Metz’s
“Abandoning Counterinsurgency: Reviving Antiterrorism Strategy”
asks whether we ought to admit that strategies based on the principles
of counterinsurgency have proven too costly for the United States, and
whether we might be better served to approach such problems from a
more counterterroristic perspective. Jacqueline L. Hazelton’s “Insurgent
Defectors in Counterinsurgencies” underscores the value of using
defectors to offset weaknesses in a counterinsurgency effort, which in
turn reinforces the conventional wisdom that such efforts are in fact
more political than military in nature.
Our second forum, War among (& for) the People, takes up the argument
of Rupert Smith who claimed modern wars are now invariably waged
among civilian noncombatants. Along those lines, Sten Rynning’s
“Rethinking NATO Policy on the Protection of Civilians” discusses the
strengths and weaknesses of international efforts to safeguard people
unwillingly affected by conflict. In “Military Force and Mass Migration
in Europe,” Matthew Metzel and John Lorenzen argue policymakers
would do well to look to prior American interventions for insights into
handling the complex issue of mass migration.
The third forum, War and Social Perception, concerns the public’s
perceptions of warriors and war. In “Casualties of Their Own Success:
The 2011 Urination Incident in Afghanistan,” Paolo Tripodi and
David Todd examine the ethical context in which US Marine snipers
urinated on Taliban corpses. The authors conclude a strong command
climate is the most important influence behind ethical behavior. In
“Third-Force Influences: Hollywood’s War Films,” John Chapin,
Marissa Mendoza-Burcham, and Mari Pierce discuss the role of movie
images in influencing the public’s perceptions of US service members.
Our second installment on Army Expansibility features two
contributions on the the US Army’s ability to expand in the event of a
great power war. Esli Pitts offers a model for transitioning the current
Army into a force approximately twice as large in “Expanding Brigade
Combat Teams: Is the Training Base Adequate?” Robb Mitchell’s “Rapid
Expansion and the Army’s Matériel: Is There Enough?” examines the
matériel challenges the US Army might encounter if it were required to
double in size on short notice. ~AJE

Special commentary

Limits of Negative Peace,
Faces of Positive Peace
Patricia M. Shields
©2017 Patricia M. Shields

ABSTRACT: This commentary reminds policymakers of the
opposing forces of positive and negative peace within the sphere
of national defense. Lest leaders balance the dominate strategy of
active defense with the state of positive peace, the world is destined
to repeat such a negative peace as the Pax Romana.

C

learly some notion of peace is implicit in national security and
peace. The absence of war is the predominant conceptualization
of peace within the security community. This designation, also
known as negative peace, has many pitfalls; its dominance is being
questioned by leaders in international security.1 This commentary
examines the limitations of negative peace and explores the contested
and complicated notion of positive peace. In a world where militaries
are called upon to intervene directly and indirectly in contentious and
violent civil wars, such as those in Syria and Libya, or to engage in
lengthy, volatile postwar stabilization, such as that occurring in Iraq and
Afghanistan, both negative and positive peace can, and should, be useful
conceptual tools. Army leaders can use them to craft short-term and
long-term strategy as well as to advise civilian leaders.
An Army rightly focuses on preparing for war; at the same time,
its leaders have a vested interest in peace and are often cautious about
moving toward the use of force. General Colin Powell illustrated this in
his memoir My American Journey. Here he recounts a conversation with
Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the United Nations, during a
briefing on the crisis in Bosnia. She was incredulous about the options
he laid forth asking, “What is the use of having this superb military that
you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”2 This prompted a “near
aneurysm.” His soldiers were not toys to be brought out to solve the
latest international crisis, they were human beings to be deployed only
when absolutely necessary. General Powell clearly revealed a strong and
visceral vested interest in peace!
The roots of negative peace’s dominance are easy to trace.
Historically, war was about conquest or defending one’s boarders.
Peace such as, Pax Romana, was a military peace, one with the goal
of growing an empire, reaping its bounty, and maintaining order. This
was, of course, a brutal negative peace where threats, like the Jewish
rebellion at Masada, were violently suppressed. In a world where slaves
1 Paul F. Diehl, “Exploring Peace: Looking Beyond War and Negative Peace,” International Studies
Quarterly 60, no. 1 (March 2016): 1–10, doi:10.1093/isq/sqw005; Paul F. Diehl, “Thinking about
Peace: Negative Terms versus Positive Outcomes,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 10, no. 1 (Spring 2016):
3–9; and Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl, and Alexandru Balas, The Puzzle of Peace: The Evolution of Peace
in the International System (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
2 Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine, 2003), 576.
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were commonplace, militaries had free reign to use any means necessary
to ensure order—the absence of war.3 Concerns and constraints about
human rights and social justice were millennia away. Peace, in Western
society, was experienced as the order that accompanied the end of a war.
Negative peace also aligns well with the Hobbesian notion that men are,
by their nature, warlike. Peace is the anomaly. Realism, the underlying
theoretical framework used to draft our security policy, traces its roots
to Thomas Hobbes.
The young fields of peace studies and peace research have come to
be dominated by negative peace. Scholars, well-schooled in statistical
methods, develop and use sophisticated data bases where war and peace
are a single variable with the values of zero and one. Over time, the study
of peace and war often became conflated as if mirror images of each
other. The Journal of Peace Research noted this irony through a meta study
with the remarkable title, “Peace Research: Just the Study of War?”4
Although it certainly may not feel like it, interstate war has been on
the decline since the end of World War II.5 Nevertheless, it certainly does
not appear we are in a comfortable state of peace. There is a growing
recognition that the singular dominance of negative peace limits how
national security is conceptualized and has perverse outcomes for
policymaking.6 This is not to say negative peace should be discarded.
Rather, the limits of negative peace should be understood, and more
comprehensive notions of peace should be acknowledged and used in
national security discourse.

Limitations of Negative Peace

“Peace is not merely the inverse of war” and therefore requires a
different theoretical orientation and place in military strategy.7 Negative
peace uses a short-term time horizon, which reinforces a tendency to see
the job as complete once the fighting stops. It undermines efforts for
a broader peace by freezing the status quo, and it potentially leaves the
door open for human rights abuses to continue unabated.
Militaries are often intimately associated with decisions made at
that nexus of conflict and its cessation. These decisions should take into
account the longer-term horizon of a sustained peace. By signaling an
end, negative peace shifts focus away from the hard work of putting
mechanisms in place that can repair fractured relationships as well as
nurture resilient and just institutions. These efforts are not about explicit
nation-building but rather a recognition that choices about institutional
structures and personnel can have long-term consequences. Choices
informed by an implicit short-term horizon can undermine a healthy
sustained peace, which is a long-term goal. President George W. Bush
proudly claimed “mission accomplished” at the end of the hot war with

3 Brad Highum and Lynnae Sorensen, “The Peace of God in Its Fullness,” Global Virtue Ethics
Review 7, no. 3 (2016): 14–20.
4 Nils Petter Gleditsch, Jonas Nordkvelle, and Havard Strand, “Peace Research—Just the Study
of War?,” Peace Research 51, no. 2 (March 2014): 145–58, doi:10.1177/0022343313514074.
5 Goertz, Diehl, and Balas, Puzzle of Peace, 1.
6 Diehl, “Thinking about Peace”; and Patricia M. Shields and Joseph L. Soeters, “Peaceweaving:
Jane Addams, Positive Peace, and Public Administration,” American Review of Public Administration 47,
no. 3 (April 2017): 323–39, doi:10.1177/0275074015589629.
7 Diehl, “Exploring Peace,” 8.
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Iraq.8 This moment of victory quickly lost its luster as the situation on
the ground deteriorated. Clearer acknowledgement that the complicated
road to sustained peace was yet ahead would have been helpful.
The negative definition of peace is less compatible with the postCold War, post-September 11, 2011, postmodern security environment.
Here “the very tools of war are slipping out of [the] control of nation
states as the employment of organized violence becomes more and
more characteristic of terrorists, armed bands, and gangsters.”9 At the
same time, national hostilities, and even the tools of aggression, such as
Facebook and Twitter, have changed. The Clausewitzian assumptions
about war are replaced by a world with blurred distinctions.10 The
one-size-fits-all nature of negative peace is ill-suited for the fractured
postmodern security environment.
Negative peace fits neatly into our natural tendency to frame security
threats in absolute terms. Winning is the goal, the enemy is wrong and
evil. During World War I, the Sedition Act reinforced this impulse. This
frame of reference may be effective at generating support for the war
effort, but it can also undermine the peace. Dichotomies like friend/
enemy, victory/defeat, and war/peace oversimplify the postmodern
security environment.11 Defining peace as the inverse of war enshrines
absolute thinking, making it difficult to form or to change damaged
relationships undermining the cooperative potential of human nature.12
Militaries and soldiers prepare for war knowing armed combat
requires strength, courage, valor, and self-sacrifice. If peace is viewed
as the inverse of war, it becomes associated with weakness, cowardice,
spinelessness, and self-serving behavior. Why would a soldier seriously
identify with this concept? This tension can create an unnecessary usversus-them mindset, and negative stereotyping, on both sides. The
likely possibility that the military and peace advocates share long-term
goals is lost in their inflexible belief systems.
American Nobel Peace Prize winner, Jane Addams recognized this
problem in Newer Ideals of Peace.13 She argues dedication to peace can
also involve self-sacrifice, tenacity, and courage without diminishing the
valor of the soldier. Addams emphasized that promoting peace often
took courage. Particularly during war, peace advocates can be viewed
as traitors or as warped and twisted sentimentalists.14 Israel’s honored
soldier, statesman, prime minister and Nobel Prize winner, Yitzhak
Rabin, embraced the Israeli-Palestine peace process, including the Oslo

8 George W. Bush (speech, USS Abraham Lincoln, near San Diego, California, May, 1, 2003).
9 Charles C. Moskos, “Towards a Postmodern Military?,” in Democratic Societies and Their Armed
Forces: Israel in Comparative Context, ed. Stuart A. Cohen (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 4.
10 Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, David R. Segal, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces
after the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3.
11 Patricia M. Shields and Donald S. Travis, “Achieving Organizational Flexibility through
Ambidexterity,” Parameters 47, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 65–76.
12 Maurice Hamington, The Social Philosophy of Jane Addams (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 2009), 106. Indeed, polarized, rigid belief systems can lead to internal conflicts. Witness the
resources Russia used to reinforce belief systems during the 2016 presidential election.
13 Jane Addams, Newer Ideals of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1907).
14 Patricia M. Shields, “Jane Addams: Peace Activist and Peace Theorist,” in Jane Addams:
Progressive Pioneer of Peace, Philosophy, Sociology, Social Work and Public Administration, ed. Patricia M.
Shields (New York: Springer, 2017), 31–42.
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Accords, and paid dearly for his decision. His death is a tragic reminder
of the cost of courage in promoting peace.
A single nation cannot be an island at peace. Peace is about the
quality of relationships, which are ideally friendly, between nations
or groups. By not taking into account the relational nature of peace,
negative peace can lead to absurdities. Although none are at war, can
one really say the United States and North Korea or Israel and Iran
are at peace? In addition, peace as the absence of war provides little
guidance about approaches for identifying or for building support
structures that strengthen and solidify shaky relationships that might be
headed toward conflict.15

Complications with Positive Peace

The straightforward concept of negative peace has many limitations.
A more organic, diverse, and dynamic sense of positive peace exists
alongside the dominant negative version. These positive visions of peace
incorporate a host of concepts and values such as justice, democracy,
sympathy, cooperation, effectiveness, freedom, engagement, order,
harmony, and collaboration. Positive peace can also have religious origins
and overtones, such as “blessed are the peacemakers.”16 Unlike negative
peace, which has a simple definition, there are many inconsistent voices
examining the nature of positive peace. While these disparities make it
more difficult to make sense quickly of positive peace, it also provides
the postmodern security environment with useful tools.17
Most cultures have a concept of peace that goes well beyond the
absence of war. These conceptualizations vary widely. Santi (Indian—
to maintain a tranquil mindset even in suffering or conflict), ahimsa
(Indian—to kill no living creature), heiwa (Japanese—aligning oneself
to the common good and social order), eirene (Greek—prosperity and
order), and al-Islam (Arabic—to be at peace in alignment with the will of
Allah) illustrate the variety of meanings across cultures.18
Shalom, the Hebrew word for peace, is translated as prosperity and as
a sense of wholeness. A society is whole when it is rich in righteousness
and justice. Or as Enns writes, “Shalom is the integrity, wholeness and
well-being that arise from justice. . . . In short, shalom means a full life,
in life-enhancing relationships.”19 The intimate relationship between
justice and peace found in Shalom is demonstrated in Psalm 85:10 of the
Living Bible, “Justice and peace have kissed.” One needs only look at
the words of Martin Luther King Jr. to see the profound influence of the
Hebrew bible on our understanding of positive peace: “Without justice
there can be no peace.”20
15 Diehl, “Thinking about Peace.”
16 Mathew 5:9 (King James Version).
17 Grant Rissler and Patricia M. Shields, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Positive Peace—A Missing
Critical Immeasurable in PA Theory” (paper presentation, annual meeting of the Public
Administration Theory Network, San Antonio, TX, May 20–22, 2016).
18 Takeshi Ishida, “Beyond the Traditional Concepts of Peace in Different Cultures,” Peace
Research 6, no. 2 (1969): 133–45.
19 Fernando Enns, “The International Ecumenical Peace Convocation: Towards an
Ecumenical Theology of Just Peace?,” Ecumenical Review 63, no. 1 (March 2011): 44–53.
doi:10.1111/j.1758-6623.2010.00092.x.
20 Michael Floyd, “Peace in Its Fullness: Biblical Perspectives on Aspects of Peace,” Global
Virtue Ethics Review 7, no. 3 (2016): 44–51.
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Twenty-five years after World War II, Japanese scholar Takeshi Ishida
considers the paradoxes of positive peace. As noted above, the Hebrew
notion of Shalom connects peace and justice. Paradoxically, this very
connection justifies violence when encountering injustice. The Japanese
and other Eastern concepts of peace emphasize harmony in community
or “peace in the village,” which have a puzzling implications. In this
case, the overriding goal of harmony can be so strong that injustice
is tolerated as a way to secure peace in the village. Ishida notes the
creativity that both King and Gandhi brought to these challenging
paradoxes. King incorporated the Eastern tradition of nonviolence as
he used direct action to counter the injustice of racism. Gandhi, used
traditional nonviolent sensibilities and direct action to challenge the
injustice of colonialism. These cases show the importance of creativity
in the application of peace concepts and that cultural norms shape the
ideas of positive peace.21
Although notions of positive peace have been around for millennia,
Johan Galtung, a noted peace scholar, is credited with bringing the
distinction between positive and negative peace to prominence in the
first issue of the Journal of Peace Research. He defined positive peace as “the
integration of human society.” He also emphasized that positive and
negative peace “should be conceived as separate dimensions. One can
have one without the other.”22
Most contemporary definitions of positive peace echo these ancient
themes. All of the definitions, however, include a long-term perspective.
Anderson Royce sees positive peace as an ongoing and challenging
process. It is also a “condition in which individuals, families, groups,
communities, and/or nations experience low levels of violence and
engage in mutually harmonious relationships.”23 The Institute for
Economics and Peace defines positive peace as “the attitudes, institutions
and structures which create and sustain peaceful societies.”24 Fischer
defines positive peace as “an unfolding worldwide process, which
nurtures human life and promotes social justice.”25 Galtung expands
on his definition noting structural positive peace substitutes “freedom
for repression and equity for exploitation,” and then reinforces them
with dialogue.26 These long-term perspectives can be in tension with an
immediate goal of ending conflict.
Jane Addams includes perplexity and sympathetic understanding
in her conceptualization of peace. Sympathetic understanding, or the
willingness to put oneself in another person’s shoes, is a way to overcome
the rigid moralisms that facilitate conflict. These rigid moralisms are
undermined by perplexity. Perplexity allows the questioning of personal
belief systems without abandoning them, which cultivates sympathetic
21 Ishida, “Beyond Traditional Concepts.”
22 Johan Galtung, “An Editorial,” Journal of Peace Research 1, no. 1 (March 1964): 2.
23 Anderson Royce, “A Definition of Peace,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 10, no.
2 (2004): 103, doi:10.1207/s15327949pac1002_2.
24 Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), Positive Peace Report: Conceptualising and Measuring the
Attitudes, Institutions, and Structures That Build a More Peaceful Society (Sydney: IEP, 2015), 4.
25 Marilyn Fischer, “The Conceptual Scaffolding of Newer Ideals of Peace,” in Jane Addams
and the Practice of Democracy, ed. Marilyn Fischer, Carol Nackenoff, and Wendy Chmielewski (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2009), 175.
26 Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996), 32.
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understanding.27 Perplexity and sympathetic understanding do not
mean adopting the position of an adversary; rather, they open space for
productive dialogue, relationship building, and creative problem-solving.
To distinguish positive peace as unique, some practitioners include
“just” as a modifier of the word peace, parallel to the “just war” concept.28
Just peace recognizes the degree to which a deeper understanding of
peace requires justice in order to be sustainable.29 It also focuses attention
on the welfare of the most vulnerable. This metric, also called lateral
progress, has the potential to get at the root of many causes of conflict.30
Another cultural source for conceptions of positive peace is the
African concept of ubuntu, or humanity toward others. South African
apartheid (1948–91) was a brutal system of institutional racial segregation
and discrimination condemned the world over. Yet, South Africa was
able to end apartheid without descending into a violent, endless, civil
war. Leaders such as P. W. Botha, F.W. de Klerk, Nelsen Mandela, and
Desmond Tutu helped shepherd a transformation in institutions and
attitudes. Nelson Mandela’s message of peace can be summarized as, if
you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your
enemy. Then he becomes your partner.31 The Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, South Africa (TRC), a place where enemies could become
partners, relied on the concept of Ubuntu, according to its chairperson
and Nobel Peace laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu.
“Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language . . .
you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and
compassionate. You share what you have. “A person is a person through
other persons. . . . A person with ubuntu is affirming of others, does
not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a
proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs
in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or
diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed.”32 Ubuntu has a
radically relational basis, asserting not just that individuals should be
aware of the interests of others but that an individual’s existence or
humanity is dependent on how they relate to others.
Like the peace research community, the conflict resolution field was
also largely characterized by the general dominance of a negative peace
framing.33 This focus began to change in the late 1980s and 1990s, when
the field oriented toward a positive peace. This reconceptualization led
to a shift in focus from conflict resolution to conflict transformation
and eventually to peacebuilding. The United Nations picked up these
ideas and responded in 2005 by institutionalizing a peacebuilding
27 Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1902).
28 Robert E. Williams, Jr. and Dan Caldwell, “Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the
Principles of Just Peace,” International Studies Perspectives 7, no. 4 (November 2006): 309–20,
doi:10.1111/j.1528-35852006.00256.x.
29 John P. Lederach, “Justpeace,” University of Vienna, November 15, 2017, http://homepage
.univie.ac.at/silvia.michal-misak/justpeace.htm.
30 Shields and Soeters, “Peaceweaving.”
31 Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela (Boston:
Little Brown, 1994).
32 Desmond Tutu, God Has a Dream: A Vision of Hope for Our Time (New York: Doubleday,
2004), 25–26.
33 Louis Kriesberg, “The Evolution of Conflict Resolution,” The SAGE Handbook of Conflict
Resolution, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. Williams Zartman (London: SAGE, 2009).
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structure alongside its more traditional peacekeeping operations.34 This
reframing is also evident in the Institute of Economics and Peace’s new
index of positive peace measured by elements such as a well-functioning
government, equitable distribution of resources, and acceptance of the
rights of others.35
Conflict resolution was criticized because it was biased toward ending
a given crisis without sufficient focus on deeper long-term structural,
cultural, and relational aspects of conflict.36 Conflict transformation
emerged as an alternative term through a need to identify and mitigate
root causes and to engage multiple levels of society beyond elites.
Strategic models help build a just peace—one where people within a
society are able to participate in shaping systems that meet their needs.
These efforts require a core of cultivated skill sets, including problemsolving, active listening, dialogue, mediation and negotiation skills, as
well as trauma awareness, appreciative inquiry skills, self-reflection, and
cultural competency skills that allow practitioners to understand and
account for their own biases and cultural frames, especially as they work
with others.37
Goertz, Diehl, and Balas have developed a continuum of peace
categorization scheme that focuses on the relationships at the heart of
peace, which includes a continuum of peace states.38 These categories
provide a way to distinguish between different types of peace or
different levels of nonviolent conflict that could lead to war. The stateto-state relationship is the unit of measure. Their framework eliminates
absurdities of the simple definition where similar levels of peace are
credited to the US-Canada relationship and the North Korea-US
relationships. When relationships are terribly deteriorated and on
the brink of a prolonged outbreak of hostilities, the new framework
attributes states of severe and lesser rivalry. Examples might include the
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the
Cold War or Bulgaria and Greece from 1908–13.
The term negative peace is used to describe conditions where the
underlying conflict between the pair of states is somewhat resolved
but tensions still can run high. The current rapport between Israel and
Egypt is illustrative. A warm peace occurs when diplomatic relationships
are well established with highly developed intergovernmental and
transnational ties. Romania and France or Germany since 1995 also fit
here. Finally, strong allies form the security community and include joint
war-planning, diplomatic coordination, and extensive institutionalized
functional agreements. Current relationships between the United States
and Canada and between Denmark and Sweden are examples.
This commentary is not about providing answers but perhaps about
bringing new and more nuanced questions to the table. For positive
peace or a long-term view, leaders should bring vision and wisdom to
the task. To date, the security sector has focused on the shorter decision
34 Rob Jenkins, Peacebuilding: From Concept to Commission (New York: Routledge, 2013).
35 IEP, Positive Peace Report.
36 John P. Lederach, “Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a
Comprehensive Network,” in Conflict Transformation, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (New York: St. Martin’s,
1995), 201.
37 Lisa Schirch, The Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding (New York: Good Books, 2004).
38 Goertz, Diehl, and Balas, Puzzle of Peace.
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calculus. Surely there is room for wisdom. Positive peace, such as that
between the United States and Canada, may be impossible to achieve
globally, but is still worth considering.
Lastly, Abraham Lincoln, in his second inaugural address called for
a positive peace as the Civil War drew to a close. How would our lives be
different today if he had had a chance to implement his vision?
“With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the
right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work
we are in, to bind up the nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have
borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may
achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with
all nations.”39

39 Abraham Lincoln, “Second Inaugural Address” (speech, Washington, DC, March 4, 1865).
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Abandoning Counterinsurgency:
Reviving Antiterrorism Strategy
Steven Metz
ABSTRACT: This article introduces the value of efficiency
in counterterrorism, such as that applied in Israel’s effective
national defense strategy, to resolve the conundrum of eliminating
global terrorism.

O

ver the past fifty years the US military’s interest in counterinsurgency has ebbed and flowed, reflecting broader shifts in
American grand strategy and the global security environment.1
The first US “counterinsurgency era” began in the early 1960s when
policymakers recognized the Soviet Union and China were inspiring or
directly supporting left-leaning insurgencies to weaken the West, and to
do so with less risk than direct military confrontation.2
Southeast Asia soon became the primary laboratory. After the United
States withdrew from Vietnam, the military purged its counterinsurgency
knowledge and capability only to rebuild it partly in the 1980s when
Soviet backed insurgent movements were rising again, most importantly
in El Salvador.3 By the 1990s, the United States again abandoned
counterinsurgency, assuming it was a legacy of the Cold War that would
fade to irrelevance with the demise of the Soviet Union.4 Insurgencies
lingered in the Americas, Africa, and Asia; but without sponsors, most
seemed irrelevant to Washington.5 When the United States military was
deployed to the Balkans, peacekeeping rather than counterinsurgency
became the central component of what was then known as “low intensity
conflict” and later “military operations other than war.”
When the September 11 attacks on the United States and President
George W. Bush’s subsequent Global War on Terrorism led to US
intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency came roaring

1 For a succinct explanation, see Paul B. Rich, “A Historical Overview of US Counter-Insurgency
Policy,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 25, no. 1 (2014): 5–40.
2 See Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the
Present (New York: Free Press, 1977).
3 See Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations
of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991); Max
G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, eds., El Salvador at War—An Oral History of Conflict from the 1979
Insurrection to the Present (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998); and Andrew J.
Bacevich et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador (Washington: PergamonBrassey’s, 1988).
4 For detail, see Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995).
5 One of the rare exceptions was the communist insurgency in Colombia, but US concern was
more about the insurgents’ involvement in narcotrafficking than their dilapidated ideology.
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back, beginning what David Ucko called a “new counterinsurgency era.”6
But this iteration was different. Both Iraq and Afghanistan were initially
intended to be short stabilization operations following the removal
of hostile regimes. They only evolved into counterinsurgency when
opponents of the new, American-backed governments adopted the
techniques of Cold War insurgents.7
From 2003 onward, the US military rediscovered, updated, and
applied Cold War-era counterinsurgency concepts, turned them into
updated Service and Joint doctrine, and developed organizations
and capabilities to implement the new doctrine.8 This approach took
extensive effort since the Army’s inclination after Vietnam was to resist
involvement in counterinsurgency.9 Partly because of this resistance,
the revival of counterinsurgency took several years. Even so, it was the
fastest such adaptation of a conventional force in history.10
During this process, though, the United States never seriously debated
whether Cold War-style counterinsurgency made strategic sense in Iraq
and Afghanistan—whether it was a universal approach or a time- and
situation-specific one. Because extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan were
doing things that looked like twentieth-century insurgency, American
strategists simply dusted off Cold War counterinsurgency and revised
it.11 This worked in Iraq to an extent. After several years of bloody and
expensive fighting, the insurgency was battered to the point the Iraqi
government could have finished it off by institutionalizing political and
economic reform and continuing to professionalize its security forces.12
That the Iraqi government failed to do so hints at deep flaws in the
American approach to counterinsurgency.
The US campaign in Afghanistan was less successful. The conflict
there was a lower priority than that in Iraq, so stabilization and
6 David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009). On the integration of counterinsurgency
into the Global War on Terror, see Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror:
Military Culture and Irregular War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
7 On the initial coalescence of the Iraq insurgency, see Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and
Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); and Hashim, “Insurgency in
Iraq 2003–10,” in The Routledge Handbook to Insurgency and Counter Insurgency, ed. Paul B. Rich and
Isabelle Duyvesteyn (London: Routledge, 2012). On the Afghan insurgency, see Antonio Giustozzi,
“Insurgency in Afghanistan,” in Rich and Duyvesteyn, Routledge Companion; and Giustozzi, Koran,
Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 2007).
8 Unlike the period between Vietnam and the 1980s, or from the early 1990s to 2005, Joint
and service counterinsurgency doctrine continues to be updated on a regular schedule. While
new revisions will be published soon, the current versions are US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2013); and Headquarters, US
Department of the Army (HQDA), Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, Field Manual (FM) 3-24/
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2014).
9 See Fred M. Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013).
10 See Chad C. Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq War (Washington
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011). Other government agencies revived their counterinsurgency concepts as well. See US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Guide to the Analysis of
Insurgency (Washington, DC: US Central Intelligence Agency, 2009); and US Government Interagency
Counterinsurgency Initiative, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington, DC: Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs).
11 Daniel Marston, “Lessons in 21st Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001–2007,”
in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey,
2008); and Carter Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq: May 2003-January 2007,” in Marston and
Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare.
12 See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle For
Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Pantheon, 2012).
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reconstruction programs were underresourced. Afghanistan had a much
weaker national identity and professional class than Iraq, making the
job of supporting counterinsurgency more difficult. And the Afghan
insurgents had two of the things a successful insurgency needs: a
lucrative funding source (opium) and an external sanctuary the United
States has been unable to shut down (Pakistan).13
Today, US involvement in Afghanistan is at a much lower level than
a few years ago. But, there is no sign Kabul will be able to contain, much
less defeat, the insurgents any time soon. Even so, American political
leaders continue to bet on counterinsurgency, apparently believing if
the precise US troop levels and missions are found, it eventually will
work. In reality it will not, mostly because there is a much bigger issue
at play: Afghanistan demonstrates the American conceptualization
of counterinsurgency, born in the Cold War and resuscitated without
a fundamental revision after the September 11 attacks, has reached
the end of its lifespan.14 The Army, the Joint Force, and the rest of
the US government now must do what it failed to do after September
11 and seriously examine the assumptions, conceptual foundations,
and strategic effectiveness of counterinsurgency. This analysis will
demonstrate counterinsurgency is unacceptably inefficient and should
be abandoned in favor of a new method of antiterrorism that better
reflects the domestic political situation and the dynamics of the twentyfirst-century global security environment.

How We Got Here

While the United States has a long tradition of small wars against
irregular opponents and implemented a form of counterinsurgency in
the Philippines between 1899 and 1902, counterinsurgency did not
become central to American grand strategy until the 1960s.15 Worried
by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s January 1961 speech endorsing
“wars of national liberation,” the eroding security situation in Laos
and South Vietnam, the consolidation of Fidel Castro’s regime in
Cuba, the French defeat in Algeria, and the outbreak of communist
insurgencies in Colombia and Venezuela, President John Kennedy
concluded the Soviets were undertaking indirect aggression against the
West using leftist insurgencies. This decision made counterinsurgency
strategically significant.
13 While the “surge” is often credited with breaking the Iraq insurgency (e.g. Kimberly Kagan,
The Surge: A Military History [New York: Encounter, 2009]), it actually took a combination of factors
including some success constricting Syria’s and Iran’s support for the insurgency, the growing
effectiveness of US special operations efforts, and significant improvement in the Iraqi security forces.
Steven Metz, Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Strategic Shift of 2007 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2010). On the special operations campaign, see Sean Naylor, Relentless Strike: The
Secret History of the Joint Special Operations Command (New York: St. Martin’s, 2015); Mark Urban, Task
Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq (New York: St Martin’s, 2012);
and Stanley A. McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Portfolio, 2013).
14 For an elaboration of this argument, see Gian P. Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace
of Counterinsurgency (New York: New Press, 2013), 113–35
15 David E. Johnson, “You Go to COIN with the Military You Have: The United States and
250 Years of Irregular War,” in Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures,
ed. Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). On how
the Philippines affected US thinking about counterinsurgency, see Brian McAllister Linn, The
Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000). For the closest thing to
American counterinsurgency doctrine before the Cold War, see US Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940).
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The rationale for US involvement in counterinsurgency grew
from the “domino theory” and the “death by a thousand small cuts”
notion popular among French strategic theorists.16 Revolutionary war,
this group believed, had become the dominant form of conflict in the
late twentieth-century. Defeats for pro-Western nations, even in places
appearing unimportant, could aggregate into global Soviet victory. With
a military stalemate in Europe and communist expansion checked in
Korea, the Cold War had devolved to a series of Third World skirmishes.
The strategic significance of insurgency was symbolic and perceptual as
an indicator of historic trends.
To respond, Kennedy ordered a wide-ranging expansion of
US counterinsurgency capabilities. He first formed a cabinet level
Interdepartmental Committee on Overseas Internal Defense Policy
to develop a unified counterinsurgency strategy and coordinate
efforts across the government.17 The Pentagon created an Office on
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities headed by Major General
Victor H. Krulak (US Marine Corps), giving him direct access to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.18 The military
services integrated counterinsurgency into their professional educational
systems and established training centers for it. Army Special Forces were
expanded and reoriented toward counterinsurgency assistance.19 Even
the State Department and the Agency for International Development
began to take counterinsurgency seriously, albeit with less enthusiasm
than the military.20
From its inception, though, US thinking about counterinsurgency
had a heterogeneous intellectual foundation. One important element
was the French notion of guerre révolutionnaire, which viewed insurgency
as East-West proxy conflict. A second element was the belief that
counterinsurgency required holistic stabilization and political reform
rather than simply battlefield victory and thus needed a tightly integrated
military, political, informational, economic, intelligence, and law
enforcement effort. This idea came from British pacification campaigns
in Malaya, Kenya, and elsewhere, as well as from French officers who
fought insurgents in Indochina and Algeria.21
The third component of American counterinsurgency was the theory
of modernization borrowed from academia.22 Derived in part from the
16 Peter Paret, “The French Army and La Guerre Révolutionnaire,” Survival 1, no. 1 (1959):
25–32, doi:10.1080/00396335908440119; and Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to
Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine (New York: Praeger, 1964).
17 Charles Maechling Jr., “Counterinsurgency: The First Ordeal by Fire,” in Low Intensity Warfare:
Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties, ed. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh
(New York: Pantheon, 1988), 26–27.
18 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (New York: William Morrow,
1994), 736
19 Army Special Forces were created to undertake unconventional warfare behind Soviet lines
during a major conflict in Europe.
20 U. Alexis Johnson, “Internal Defense and the Foreign Service,” Foreign Service Journal 39, no.
7 (July 1962): 21–22; and Henry C. Ramsey, “The Modernization Process and Insurgency,” Foreign
Service Journal 39, no. 6 (June 1962): 21–23.
21 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 1978); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (New
York: Praeger, 1964); and David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York:
Praeger, 1964.)
22 M. L. R. Smith and David Martin Jones, The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency:
Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 58–68.
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writings of German sociologist Max Weber, modernization theory was
based on the idea that the natural path for developing societies was from
traditional economic, political, and social organizations to “modern”
ones relying on bureaucratic administration with professional credentials
and expertise rather than familial or traditional authorities.
As Americans grappled with insurgency, modernization theory
provided an overarching intellectual framework. Policymakers and
strategists concluded the difficult and complex transition from
traditional to “modern” societies and political systems created tensions
and conflicts. Modernization saw the political awakening of previously
passive segments of society, such as the rural peasantry and marginalized
ethnic, sectarian, or racial groups. Often traditional structures of order
decayed more rapidly than modern ones developed.23 All these factors
provided opportunities for revolutionary movements. If revolutionaries
could not seize power through a Bolshevik-style putsch, one alternative
was a protracted, rural insurgency based on an extensive political
underground, information warfare and propaganda, terrorism, and
guerrilla operations.
Modernization theory told American counterinsurgents that success
was not simply defeating insurgent units but expanding the state’s
capacity to govern and secure its territory—in other words to do the
things modernization theory says “modern” states should do. Until a
nation became modern, it could not use political institutions to reconcile
divergences among its population or have its security forces prevent
or defeat organized insurgency. Thus, counterinsurgency required
nation-building.
From the beginning, this kludge of very different ideas had internal
tensions. Conceptualizing insurgency as a form of war suggested it
should be military-centric, but if battlefield victory did not equate to
strategic success, the military could only do half the job—and, it was
the easier half. Of course in conventional war, the peace settlement
determines whether battlefield success led to strategic victory, but in
counterinsurgency, what came after battlefield success was even more
difficult to determine.
That conclusion was not the only fissure in the concept. When the
British and French undertook counterinsurgency while decolonizing,
they assumed the authority of the nation where the conflict occurred.
They could impose deep political and economic reforms even if
traditional elites opposed it. Yet things were different for the United
States: it did not undertake counterinsurgency but counterinsurgency
support working through a local partner government. That divergence
means the British and French models, which were part of the intellectual
foundation of American counterinsurgency, were not fully applicable.
Neither those models nor academic modernization theory explains how
to compel a resistant local ally to undertake deep reform. In fact, as the
United States helped a partner nation expand its political, military, law
enforcement, and intelligence capability, Washington’s ability to compel
change declined. The United States never surmounted this leverage dilemma
23 For the most influential analysis of this phenomenon, see Samuel P. Huntington, Political
Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
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in Vietnam or later in Iraq or Afghanistan. Current counterinsurgency
doctrine recognizes this problem but offers no solution.24
Combining academic modernization theory with British and French
notions of counterinsurgency also created organizational problems. The
military dominated America’s counterinsurgency organization even
though the ultimate solution to insurgency was nonmilitary. Despite
creating large embassies in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, either the US
military remained the most important player (Vietnam, Afghanistan) or
the embassy found when most of the US military left and the insurgency
was under control, it could not convince the partner government to
finalize success by continuing deep reform (Iraq).

The Decay of Old Concepts

As American counterinsurgency was revived in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the problematic assumptions and internal tensions
inherent to the concept festered and worsened, becoming less tolerable
as the strategic significance of insurgency declined. For instance, the
architects of post-September 11 counterinsurgency accepted the idea
that it is a type of war; the phrase “counterinsurgency warfare” was
common. While insurgents do use armed action, war is not entirely
military but rather military-centric.25 Insurgency, by contrast, is designed
to diminish the importance of the military realm, primarily because the
state—especially a state that has external counterinsurgency support—
is normally militarily dominant, at least at the very end.
In some ways, insurgency is more akin to premodern fighting where
the primary objective was to demonstrate the bravery of individual
warriors or capture prisoners for ritual sacrifice or slavery than to
impose the political will of one group on another. This means calling
counterinsurgency “war” is using the word euphemistically like the
“war on poverty” or “war on drugs.” This allegory makes sustaining
public support difficult since Americans expect their nation eventually
to “win” in some demonstrable way. Approaching counterinsurgency as
war skews both its organization and its expectations.
The traditional conceptualization of counterinsurgency assumed
partner governments supported the Western-Weberian notion of
modernization and were willing to undertake deep reforms to become
“modern.” All they needed was a boost. Counterinsurgency had “an
ideological dimension imbued with a distinctively American liberal
philosophical and political self-understanding.”26 From this perspective,
all the United States needed to do was provide partner governments the
means to modernize.

24 See, for instance, JCS, Counterinsurgency, VIII-8.
25 Some scholars treat nonviolent strategic social movements as a type of insurgency. See,
for instance, Mark Grimsley, “Why the Civil Rights Movement Was an Insurgency,” HistoryNet,
February 24, 2010, http://www.historynet.com/why-the-civil-rights-movement-was-an-insurgency
.htm. I disagree and consider insurgency a type of strategy, which by definition includes armed force,
whether semiconventional military operations, guerrilla operations, terrorism, or most often, a blend
of them. Insurgency is not military centric but always entails violence. Steven Metz, “Rethinking
Insurgency,” in Rich and Duyvesteyn, Routledge Handbook; and Metz, “Insurgency,” in Conceptualising
Modern War, ed. Karl Erik Haug and Ole Jørgen Maaø (London: Hurst, 2011).
26 Smith and Jones, Political Impossibility, 57.
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This assumption proved accurate in some places like El Salvador,
Colombia, and the Philippines. To the architects of American
counterinsurgency, that success validated the principle, leading them
to draw universal conclusions from culture- and situation-specific
circumstances. Yet in many parts of the world—including those most
prone to insurgency—the state is not a detached reconciler using a rule
set that does not favor any one segment of the society. The body politic is
not designed to balance diverse interests but to formalize and to sustain
the group holding power. Because this motive produces resistance,
Americans encouraged the local elite to transform the political, legal,
and economic systems into something reflecting the Western notion of
fairness or, as it is often phrased, good governance. But, such entreaties
ask elites to alter a system that benefits them, their families, and
their peers.
In other words, the American approach to counterinsurgency is
contingent on partner elites acting irrationally—doing things against
the interests of themselves, their families, and their affiliates. As Joint
counterinsurgency doctrine notes, “US counterinsurgents will often
have to cajole or coerce [host nation] governments and entrenched
elites to recognize the legitimacy of those grievances and address them.
This is especially true where reforms would involve compromising the
political and financial interests of those elites.”27 While accurate, these
elites generally undertake just enough reform to satisfy Washington,
which keeps assistance flowing without fundamentally altering the
beneficial system.
Thus another flaw with the traditional conceptualization of
counterinsurgency appears: the United States seeks the complete
defeat of the insurgents while its local partners often benefit from the
persistence of an insurgency large enough to sustain American interest
and assistance but not powerful enough to overthrow them. Insurgency
keeps aid flowing and gives the political elite an excuse for repression,
exclusion, and holding onto power.28 Imagine, for instance, Afghanistan
with the Taliban defeated: with little interest from the world, the country
would sink back into even more crushing poverty. Without a stream of
external assistance, Afghanistan’s professional class and political elite
would have far fewer economic opportunities. In long running conflicts,
a “war economy” usually emerges, which benefits both the elites that
the United States supports and the insurgent leaders.29 Ultimately, this
rapport means those with the power to end an insurgency—whether
local elites or counterinsurgent leaders—often have little incentive to
do so; while those who suffer the most from the conflict—the local
population—do not have the power to end it.
While US doctrine recognizes the problem, the United States has
never found a way to resolve it.30 To gain the support of the American
public, US political leaders must portray a conflict as one where
supporting the local elite is an important, even vital American interest.
27 JCS, Counterinsurgency, II-19.
28 Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 330–31.
29 See, for instance, Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, The Political Economy of Civil War and
Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005).
30 JCS, Counterinsurgency, III-3.
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This commitment, combined with the fact that many insurgency
movements are, in fact, worse than America’s partners, diminishes US
leverage over its partner elite. Thus, the United States is unable to compel
its partners to undertake the degree of system change that might prevent
future armed resistance but which erodes their own power and wealth.
The United States also is hindered by the idea that the “normal” state
of affairs is for a state to exercise control over all of its national territory.
In many parts of the world—including those prone to insurgency—this
is not the norm. While governments would be happy to do so, they
draw the very rational conclusion that the benefits of exercising full
control over their national territory is not worth the costs. Thus, they
focus on the areas where the elite and its affiliates live, whether regions
or parts of cities, and on the wealth-producing parts of the nation such
as economically robust urban areas, regions with important natural
resources, and transportation corridors. They write off rural hinterlands
dominated by nonelite groups, regions that do not generate wealth,
and increasingly, poorer urban areas. Elites accept these areas are
informally governed, often with little or no presence by the formal state.
The potential for armed conflict emanating from informally governed
regions always exists, but local elites make the rational decision that
tolerating that risk—and living with persistent terrorism—makes more
sense than attempting to exercise full control everywhere.
The traditional notion of counterinsurgency called on the state
to undertake economic development to undercut resentment and
opposition. In other words, the state would provide a better deal to
the population than the insurgents. This idea made sense within the
context of modernization theory as American’s first grappled with
counterinsurgency. It was no coincidence Walt Rostow—the deputy
national security adviser for John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson,
as well as an architect of US involvement in Vietnam—had written a
book linking the “stages” of economic growth with political stability.31
Positing a causal relationship between economic growth and
preventing or quelling insurgency has many problems though. One is
the tendency of populations to grow faster than the creation of jobs.
Many analysts have found a correlation between youth bulges and
youth un- (or under-) employment as well as internal political violence.32
Even states that recognize this interdependence often can do little
about it, particularly in an era of globalization, when the economic
health of a nation is often determined by external factors beyond its
control.33 And, the causal linkage between economic growth and
insurgency oversimplifies the causes for someone creating or joining
an insurgency. Often psychological factors such as personal grievances
or the desire for personal empowerment, heroic status, or simple
31 Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1960).
32 See Lionel Beehner, “The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil Conflicts,” Council on Foreign
Relations, April 13, 2007, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/effects-youth-bulge-civil-conflicts;
Henrik Urdal, The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950–
2000, Social Development Paper 14 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004); and Office of Conflict
Management and Mitigation, Youth Bulges and Conflict, Technical Brief Winter 2010 (Washington, DC:
US Agency for International Development).
33 Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).
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boredom are as, or more, important than political factors or the absence
of economic opportunity.34 Simply creating low status jobs does not
address these psychological factors.
Today changes in the global security environment exacerbate
the flawed assumptions and the internal tensions of the traditional
conceptualization of counterinsurgency and undercut much of its
remaining validity. Take the notion that counterinsurgency requires the
state to create a counternarrative to the one propagated by insurgents.
The counterinsurgency narrative, according to Joint doctrine,
should contextualize what the population experiences, legitimizing
counterinsurgent actions and delegitimizing the insurgency. It is an
interpretive lens designed to help individuals and groups make decisions
in the face of uncertainty where the stakes are perceived as life and
death. The [counterinsurgency] narrative should explain the current
situation and describe how the [host nation] government will defeat the
insurgency. It should invoke relevant cultural and historical references to
both justify the actions of counterinsurgents and make the case that the
government will win.35

Creating a coherent narrative was feasible in the twentiethcentury when the primary means of information propagation other
than interpersonal communication—authoritative written material or
broadcasts—could be controlled, or at least largely controlled, by the
state. In today’s information saturated environment where narratives
can form, grow, go dormant, and be reborn outside the control of the
state, the idea of counterinsurgents agreeing to and implementing a
narrative to influence perceptions of a conflict, as US counterinsurgency
doctrine calls for, is nostalgic at best.36 With radical transparency and
instant connectivity, there is more of a theme and meme swarm than the
development and promulgation of an agreed-upon, coherent narrative.
State sponsorship of insurgency or provision of sanctuary to
insurgents still happens as it did during the Cold War. Think Russia
and Ukraine, Pakistan and Afghanistan, or Iran and Yemen. For the
United States, though, there is no risk of the “death of a thousand small
cuts” as during the Cold War. Insurgency is still using proxy aggression
but is no longer a form of superpower proxy conflict. In general terms,
this application means insurgency is less strategically significant than
it once was.

Where Do We Go Now?

Today insurgency is most common precisely where the flawed
assumptions, conundrums, and internal tensions of the traditional notion
of counterinsurgency are the most pervasive. And, the United States
security policy has entered a time of frugality. America can no longer
lavish security resources with little regard for efficiency. This need for
frugality means counterinsurgency has run its course. With the strategic

34 Steven Metz, “Psychology of Participation in Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal, January 27,
2012, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/psychology-of-participation-in-insurgency.
35 JCS, Counterinsurgency, III-9.
36 For an exploration of this concept, see Steven Metz, “The Internet, New Media, and
the Evolution of Insurgency,” Parameters 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2012): 80–90. For a more expansive
treatment of the broader phenomenon, see James Jay Carafano, Wiki at War: Conflict in a Socially
Networked World (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2012).
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stakes lower, it no longer makes sense for the United States to accept the
gross inefficiency and adverse benefit-cost ratio of counterinsurgency.
America must still counter irregular threats but improve efficiency and
better balance costs and benefits.
The first step is remembering the United States reengaged in
counterinsurgency after the September 11 attacks because policymakers
saw it as part of antiterrorism. Such actions were a way to eliminate
sanctuaries for extremist movements and shrink the pool of terrorist
recruits. But in reality, counterinsurgency support almost never
reaches that end state. Partner governments take American support
and implement enough reforms that the insurgency cannot overthrow
them; then, the partners stop. They tolerate simmering extremism in
the hinterlands or urban slums so long as it does not pose an existential
threat to the regime.
This practice means counterinsurgency may be an effective method
of antiterrorism; however, it is not an efficient one. Today the United
States needs antiterrorism strategies that are acceptably effective but also
affordable and sustainable. To find them, policymakers must remember
the threat of nations ruled by extremists providing bases for terrorists
to attack the United States or its allies. Thus, helping create friendly
governments that rule the way the United States would prefer might be
nice. But, the only necessity is preventing terrorist power projection.
Given that, the United States should shift to something such as
the Israeli approach to extremism and terrorism. After finding out
how difficult and costly traditional pacification and counterinsurgency
is and recognizing it could never “win the hearts and minds” of the
Arab populations in places like southern Lebanon, Gaza, and the West
Bank, Israel concluded it could tolerate extremism but not terrorism,
settling for a realistic, affordable, and sustainable approach that is not
contingent on how neighboring states are ruled. If enemies mobilize
enough strength to threaten Israel directly, it strikes at them with the
most effective combination of air and land based military power. After
weakening the extremists, Israel withdraws, knowing it may have to
repeat offensive operations again if the threat reaches intolerable levels.
This approach, which relies on the time-tested techniques of spoiling
raids and large-scale but limited duration punitive expeditions, might
provide an acceptably effective and sustainable post-counterinsurgency
strategy for the United States.37 Such an avenue clearly would require
some sort of small persistent presence using some combination of the
intelligence community, military special operations forces, overhead
assets (most unmanned), and increasingly, ground-based autonomous
systems. But if al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, or another terrorism-based
extremist movement develops bases and a power projection capability
in a place like Afghanistan, Libya, or Yemen, the United States should
launch a powerful military and interagency strike force. But America
should abandon the idea that the Afghanistans, Yemens, and Libyas of
the world want to, or can become, stable, pro-American nations, or that
trying to transform them is a good use of increasingly scarce security
37 For more on this approach, see Steven Metz, “The Case for a Punitive Expedition against
the Islamic State,” World Politics Review, February 6, 2015, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com
/articles/15031/the-case-for-a-punitive-expedition-against-the-islamic-state.
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resources. So long as transnational terrorists do not plot, train for, and
launch attacks from such nation’s soil, that is enough.
To make this approach work, the US military needs to redesign
its forces and develop strategic concepts and doctrine for limited
duration, large-scale expeditions. The key would be the ability to
project Joint and interagency forces—increasingly ones bolstered by
autonomous systems—over long distances, and repeat as necessary. The
mantra for counterinsurgency has always been “clear, hold, build.” An
expeditionary antiterrorism strategy would accept clearing is necessary,
but holding and building are not worth the costs. Adversaries would
no longer believe they could draw the US military in and wear down
American will over time. Hopefully, opposing forces would be deterred
by knowing the United States could at least “clear” through large-scale
expeditions as many times as necessary, particularly as expeditionary
forces increasingly integrate autonomous systems. Deterrence always
requires capability, credibility, and communications. An antiterrorism
strategy based on limited duration expeditions would be credible in a
way traditional counterinsurgency is not.

Conclusion

Traditional counterinsurgency was seen as a form of war without
all the definitional attributes of war but with a dose of an oldfashioned theory of modernization, which has been superseded in
the academic world. If the concept ever made sense, it no longer does.
Counterinsurgency must be refocused on the core security problem:
transnational terrorism. Counterinsurgency might be a way to address
that problem, but it is immensely inefficient and difficult to sustain
politically. When the United States had a surplus of defense resources
and could garner public support for anything that struck back at
extremism in the emotional years immediately after the September 11
attacks, inefficiency was tolerable. Now, it no longer is.
This turn of events suggests the United States must abandon
counterinsurgency as a tool of antiterrorism. Shifting to a strategy
that contains, weakens, and deters transnational terrorism by strategic
expeditions—large scale punitive raids, repeated if necessary—is a
viable way of meeting the criteria of minimal effectiveness, maximum
efficiency, and political sustainability.
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ABSTRACT: This article identifies the value of insurgent defectors
fighting within counterinsurgencies to offset weaknesses within the
effort and to act as a force multiplier, as long as the counterinsurgent
meets defectors’ shared interests with the government.

W

ith internal conflict comes the question of what to do with
insurgent defectors. In Afghanistan, international actors and
the Afghan government have been intermittently attempting
to reconcile with, or rehabilitate, members of the insurgency. These
efforts have included incorporating defectors into the security forces.1
In Iraq, the government faces major questions about how to handle
Sunnis who fought for the Islamic State and then changed sides. In
Syria, the alignments and realignments of state and nonstate actors have
been dizzying.
As the United States continues supporting other weak, failed,
and unstable states, the question of how to use defectors to achieve
operational goals remains prominent. Furthermore, as the international
community continues efforts to end internal conflicts and integrate
insurgent fighters into national armies, larger questions about assuring
peace after conflict also arise.2
This article analyzes the conditions in which counterinsurgencies
have most effectively used guerrilla defectors in their fighting forces.
Systematic analysis of the Algerian War (1954–62), the insurgency in
Oman (1965–76), the Rhodesian Bush War (1964–79), the civil war
in El Salvador (1979–92), and US operations in Iraq (2003–present)
provide variations in operational and strategic outcomes, types of
counterinsurgencies and insurgencies, and historical contexts to identify
lessons applicable to other campaigns. The lessons learned emphasize
the importance of using defectors for their unique skills and for assuring
a long-term, post-conflict alignment of political interests between
defectors and counterinsurgents.
The exploitation of defectors lends support to the argument that
counterinsurgency is essentially a political struggle, rather than strictly
a military one, and thus political measures taken by counterinsurgents

1 A number of Taliban defectors have been integrated into local security forces in the Afghan
Local Police program, for example, but remain in their own communities. Kevin Baron, “Reintegrated
Taliban Fighters Allowed To Join Local Police Units,” Stars and Stripes, January 4, 2011.
2 Ronald R. Krebs and Roy Licklider, “United They Fall: Why the International Community
Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War,” International Security 40, no. 3 (Winter
2015/2016): 93–138, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00228.
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strongly influence who wins and who loses.3 A counterinsurgent’s ability
to attract elements of the insurgency suggests a broader ability to make
choices that will weaken the political and military challenges posed by
insurgents. Conversely, a counterinsurgency unable, or unwilling, to
provide political accommodations to gain the cooperation of those it
has fought against is unlikely to have the political capabilities necessary
to defeat the insurgency.
Attempts to draw insurgents away from their causes are common in
counterinsurgency campaigns. Discussions of the use of defectors, such
as in pseudo gangs that infiltrate an insurgency, do appear in existing
work on counterinsurgency.4 Using them as fighters is apparently
less common, but there is little research available on this aspect of
counterinsurgency.5 The use of defectors as fighters does not necessarily
win wars, but under certain conditions it can advance political and
military counterinsurgency goals because defectors can act as force
multipliers. Many other questions about defectors are not addressed
here, but are worthy of investigation.

Advancing Counterinsurgent Goals

Counterinsurgencies can reap substantial benefits by using defectors
as fighters to overcome innate areas of weakness such as local knowledge
and irregular fighting ability.6 Defectors can provide operational
and strategic information on the insurgency’s leadership, members,
operations, communications, caches, and support systems; the civilian
population, leaders, and groups including their languages, cultures,
interests, demands, and frustrations; as well as other conditions such
as terrain and weather. Defectors can provide irregular warfare skills to
conventionally trained armies and to armies whose primary role has been
regime protection rather than fighting ability.7 Additionally, defectors
can, on behalf of counterinsurgents, exchange information with other
actors in the conflict, the insurgency, and the populace. Troops from
other areas of the country or foreign forces may not have this ability.
Many, if not all, insurgencies conduct a degree of irregular warfare,
which equips insurgents with greater irregular warfighting skills than
the average soldier in a conventional army.
3 Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1966); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964, 2006); and United States Department of the Army, The U.S. Army/
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual no. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting
Publication no. 3-33.5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
4 Stephen T. Hosmer and Sibylle O. Crane, Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16–20, 1962
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1962); the work of Frank Kitson; Ian F. W. Beckett, “The
Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency, 1972–1979,” part 2, Selous Scouts, September 16, 2007,
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/rhodesian%20army%20coin%2072_79%20part2.htm; Lawrence
E. Cline, Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons From Other Countries (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2005); and Robert M. Cassidy, “The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for
Counterinsurgency,” Parameters 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 47–62.
5 Valuable literature on militias as state proxies is developing, but it does not focus on defectors.
6 For more on the degree to which states can understand communities within their borders,
see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). The Department of Defense (DoD) defines irregular
warfare as “a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the
relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full
range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”
DoD, Irregular Warfare (IW,) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Version 1.0 (Washington: DoD, 2007).
7 Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2015).
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Counterinsurgencies that take advantage of an insurgent’s unique
skill set are likely to benefit more than those that merge insurgents
into regular forces. Effective use of defectors’ knowledge and irregular
fighting abilities requires matching their unit assignments with their
unique skills and giving them a voice in designing operations they
will participate in, which also takes advantage of their high levels of
self-confidence. This factor ties into the need to work according to the
interests of the defectors and the counterinsurgency. Research finds an
increased sense of agency plays a role in individual decisions to become
an insurgent.8 Logically, ex-insurgents would want to retain that sense of
controlling their own destiny in their new roles. Their local knowledge
probably means they have greater insight into the likely political effects
of counterinsurgent choices than government or intervening forces.
Acceptance and cooperation from regular forces is another factor
that contributes to the successful use of defectors. If conventional
forces refuse to cooperate with defectors’ efforts, the defectors’
presence and actions are not force multipliers but sources of division
and resentment within the counterinsurgent force. Defector units must
also be consistently trained and supported to do what they do best,
which is typically small-unit operations such as ambushing, tracking,
and intelligence collection.
For defectors to remain on the counterinsurgency’s side, they must
identify their own interests with the counterinsurgency’s success and
believe their benefits will continue beyond the conflict’s end. Such
interests may range from revenge or personal gain to a desire to be on
the winning side. Any individual defector’s interests are likely to include
a variety of short- and long-term motivations comprised under the rubric
of identifying with the goal of counterinsurgent success. Defectors
are more likely to remain with the counterinsurgency if they left the
insurgency because their interests began to align more closely to those
of the counterinsurgency than defectors motivated by weariness, fear,
or financial gain. This tendency occurs because insurgents, in taking up
arms, reveal their focus on the future and their belief in their ability to
shape it.9

Research Design

The cases examined here were drawn from counterinsurgency
campaigns in which a great power backed a client threatened by an
insurgency. Also for policy relevance, these cases include various degrees
of great power intervention, from occupation by tens of thousands of
combat troops to a small footprint of military advisors. All cases involve
an insurgency fueled at least in part by nationalism.
Some may argue wars for national liberation are an artifact of the
post-World War II breakdown of the colonial order, and thus have
limited relevance in the postcolonial world. However, contemporary
cases of resistance to occupation are similar to anticolonial wars in
the desire of the insurgents, and their civilian supporters, to reduce

8 Scott, Seeing Like a State; DoD, Irregular Warfare; and Talmadge, Dictator’s Army.
9 This focus on the long-term alignment of interests between counterinsurgent and defector
is similar to advice for all sorts of alliances and long-term partnerships, from marriages to business
arrangements to military interactions with other types of actors.
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the influence of the great power backing their government.10 Finally,
cases of counterinsurgency success and failure assist in determining
whether the variables important for the effective use of defectors differ
according to campaign outcomes.11 These variables are, first, how
the counterinsurgency uses defectors as fighters, and second, to what
degree the counterinsurgency assures defectors’ interests. Defectors
who use their unique skills and who expect postwar benefits from
counterinsurgent success are likely to be more effective in advancing
the counterinsurgency’s effort.
Algerian War: Counterinsurgency failure. During the revolutionary war
for national liberation, Algerian insurgents drove the French from
power in what France considered its territory. The insurgents sought
equal rights with and eventually gained independence from the French.
Insurgency in Oman: Counterinsurgency success. The Sultan of Oman and
his British backers countered a broad-based nationalist and Marxist
insurgency in Dhofar, Oman’s southernmost region. Insurgents seeking
greater independence from Britain, and a social and political revolution,
were decisively defeated in the military campaign.
Rhodesian Bush War: Counterinsurgency failure. Black nationalist
insurgents defeated the minority white government in the former British
colony now known as Zimbabwe.
El Salvador’s civil war: Counterinsurgency success. A broad-based
revolutionary insurgency fought to end US domination of the state
and the region and to end military rule. The US-backed incumbent
government remained in power after the peace agreement, but the
military was no longer in control.
US operations in Iraq: Continuing counterinsurgency. After the United
States invaded Iraq in 2003, it toppled the government. Broad-based
insurgencies have fought the US occupation, Sunnis and Shiites waged
civil war, and terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State,
battled for power.

Analysis
Special Skills

Evidence from the civil war in El Salvador and US operations in
Iraq shows the most value is gained when defectors’ strengths offset a
counterinsurgency’s weakness. The evidence from Rhodesia indicates
a lack of attention to defector units’ strengths and weaknesses can
have political costs for the counterinsurgency. To take advantage of
unique skills—such as intelligence and irregular fighting ability as
well as knowledge of the terrain, languages, cultures, population, and
insurgency—counterinsurgents conduct a full assessment of the situation
to take advantage of unique skills, such as intelligence, irregular fighting

10 Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random
House, 2005).
11 Steven Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1997), 21–27.
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ability. If the conflict involves ethnicity, for example, coethnic defectors
are more likely to be effective than cross-ethnic ones.12
In Dhofar, the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) exploited the fighting
ability of the firqats, or militias, formed around defectors with tribal
connections and local knowledge. The firqats knew the ground and
guerrilla tactics; they were good at what the British officers and the other
troops, from such locations as Northern Oman and Pakistan, were bad
at—including reconnaissance, speed of maneuver, and recognizing trails
and individuals in the mountains, where the insurgency was strongest.
The firqats were also better at intelligence collection and, unsurprisingly,
at communicating with other Dhofaris.13 Lacking military discipline,
the firqats patrolled and ambushed in small groups, and held tribal
territory that had been taken in conventional joint operations with the
Sultan’s Armed Forces.14 The firqats were reliable skirmishers against
small numbers of insurgents. But their lack of discipline and refusal
to conduct operations were not of direct benefit to their exasperated
regular SAF officers.15
The firqats were a force multiplier by virtue of the ethnicity they
shared with much of the mountain population: the counterinsurgency’s
use of the coethnic force in these regions was less likely to spark resistance
than punitive operations conducted by non-Dhofari troops. Brigadier
John Graham ordered the Dhofar Brigade to continue punishing
Dhofaris who helped the enemy, using the firqats whenever possible.16
The firqats also made the Sultan’s counterinsurgent force look less like
an army of occupation. The insurgents reportedly considered one firqat
a greater danger than 10 of the Sultan’s regular troops.17
The firqats were a rich source of information.18 During Operation
Husn, the Omani force used firqats to identify individuals trying
to leave the area.19 The defectors were also able to identify insurgent
leaders and supporters, round them up, and encourage them to
repudiate the insurgency publicly.20 The firqats made it possible for the
counterinsurgency to clear insurgents out of the valleys of eastern and
central Dhofar at relatively low cost. Searching the deep, jungled, caveriddled depths required examining every square yard for insurgent arms
12 Jason Lyall, “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second
Chechen War,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 1 (February 2010): 1–20, doi:10.1017
/S0003055409990323.
13 Ian Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency (Barnsley,
South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Military, 2007), 159; Tony Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman (London:
William Kimber, 1983), 231; and John Akehurst, We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman 1965–1975
(Wilton, UK: Michael Russell, 1982), 96.
14 Jeapes, SAS, 123.
15 MG Tony Jeapes, (former commander of 22nd Special Air Regiment during the Dhofar
Rebellion), interview with author, May 15, 2009; and Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 157.
16 Directive for Commander Dhofar for 1972 Update, March 3, 1972, John Graham Collection,
Oman Archive (OA), GB165-0327, Box 2, Folder 3, Middle East Center (MEC), St. Antony’s College
(SAC), Oxford University, UK.
17 Operation Storm Fortnightly Report, May 5, 1971, Graham, OA, GB165-0327, Box 2, Folder
5, MEC, SAC, Oxford.
18 Interview recording, Brigadier John Bryan Akehurst (commander, Dhofar Brigade, 1974–
1976), October 14, 1992, catalog number 11156, reel 2, Imperial War Museum (IWM); and Jeapes,
interview.
19 Ops/2 Confirmatory Notes: Operation Husn, April 7, 1975, Edward Ashley Collection, OA,
GB165-0399, Box 2, Folder 2/3, MEC, SAC, Oxford.
20 Jeapes, SAS, 64–65.
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and supply caches. The Sultan’s troops stayed in the heights while the
firqats and their Special Air Service (SAS) advisors cleared the valleys.
The firqats’ demeanor indicated how dangerous each area was. The
firqats also talked with the populace and returned with the location of
caches. Blind searching in the valleys was a wasted effort.21
In El Salvador, US advisors experimented with the use of defectors’
skills in the field. Some of the success of defector units in El Salvador was
due to support by experienced, individual US Special Forces advisors who
had worked with other non-US troops and in other conflicts involving
irregular warfare.22 In one area, defectors were used in a role similar
to that of a pseudo gang, but they did not masquerade. The defectors,
led by a former insurgent platoon leader, made up the most successful
unit in the 5th Brigade Zone in 1985–86, which once accounted for the
majority of kills in the entire brigade. The unit walked into insurgent
bases and killed or captured everyone present, with Salvadoran special
forces support.23
US advisors in El Salvador also used defectors to identify other
insurgents. In the 4th Brigade Zone in 1989–90, US advisors made a
practice of hiding a defector inside a truck with a hole cut in the canvas
so he could see the villagers who lined up to accept rice, oil, beans, and
other foodstuffs delivered in civic action projects. Anyone the defector
identified could either be quietly picked up outside town or followed
in hopes of finding an insurgent camp.24 Defectors also provided the
insurgency’s communications codes, a great prize given the insurgency’s
highly effective operational security.25
During US operations in Iraq, tribal forces in Anbar turned against
al-Qaeda to side with the US military and joined the Iraqi army and police
while conducting their own operations to raid insurgent caches and safe
houses.26 These independent operations benefited the counterinsurgency
at relatively little cost.
In contrast, the Rhodesian counterinsurgents learned the costs of
using defector units, such as the Selous Scouts, for operations that played
only to their tactical strengths. The Scouts served not only as pseudo
gangs but also as trackers, guides, and hunter-killer teams.27 These
defectors significantly increased the intelligence the counterinsurgency
received through their long-range reconnaissance and surveillance

21 Jeapes, interview.
22 MG Mark Hamilton (USA Retired) (US military group leader in San Salvador during peace
talks), interview with author, April 13, 2010.
23 COL Francisco Pedrozo (USA Retired) (trained first group of Salvadoran cadets at Fort
Benning, GA, in 1982; military advisor in San Vicente 1985–86; and training officer, operations
advisor, deputy commander of the U.S. military group in San Salvador 1989–92), email messages
to author, April 4, 2010. US-advised forces in the Philippines used similar ruses against the Huks.
24 MG Simeon Trombitas (USA Retired) (senior advisor/chief of operations, planning and
training with the 4th Infantry Brigade in Chalatenango, El Salvador, 1989–90), email message to
author, April 4, 2010.
25 CSM Henry Ramirez (USA Retired) (trainer of Salvadoran forces in Panama in 1982,
including the first long range reconnaissance patrol unit in 1982–83, and a military advisor in
Chalatenango 1987–88), interview with author, May 17, 2010.
26 MAJ Niel Smith and COL Sean MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point,” Military
Review 88, no. 2 (March–April 2008): 41–52; and, Akehurst, catalog number 11156, reel 2, IWM.
27 Beckett, “Rhodesian Army.”
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missions. One study credits the Scouts with 68 percent of all insurgent
kills inside Rhodesia.28
However, these defectors also pushed operations into neighboring
states, including mounting assassination attempts and large operations
that hurt the Rhodesian government politically. One egregious case
involved a raid in which unarmed guerrillas were shot as they stood
in a parade formation and all the patients in the camp hospital were
burned alive when Scout fire set the structure alight. The attack drew
international condemnation, which was intensified by the fact that the
camp was a registered UN refugee center.29
The Scouts had the material capability to launch these external
operations but lacked the strategic understanding to recognize the
political implications of their warfighting choices. In addition, their
background and training meant they were not particularly concerned
with the state-to-state relations important to Rhodesia. The Scouts
focused on destroying the insurgency militarily.

Enfranchised Roles, Targeting, and Operations

Evidence from Algeria and Dhofar supports the finding that
defectors are more likely to serve counterinsurgent purposes when they
provide input into their roles, targeting, and operational planning. In
Algeria, the French formed a force of Harkis, who were Arab, Berber,
or Muslim Algerian soldiers rather than French or French Algerian
soldiers, made up of about 1,000 insurgent defectors, keeping each unit
near its home community. The Harkis, reluctant to fight elsewhere due to
fear for their families’ safety, were more effective at hunting insurgents
because they knew the operational areas well.30 Similarly, in al-Anbar
province, the US Army found former insurgents were more likely to join
the Iraqi army if they were assigned to their home area.31 In Dhofar, the
firqats’ insistence on seemingly endless talking over operational plans
maddened the British regular officers, but commanders considered it
was worth the cost because of the military and political gains enabled
by the defectors.32

Organize, Train, and Support

In Dhofar, El Salvador, and Iraq, the counterinsurgencies benefited
by organizing, training, and fully supporting defectors’ operations. The
French failure to do so in Algeria had high costs.
In Dhofar, the SAS began with a determination that units of
defectors would not be used simply as guides; they would be fighters,
properly armed, trained, and supported.33 The SAS trained the firqats
in fire discipline, patrol formations, tactics, and maneuver, as well as
operating as units with machine gun, mortar, artillery, and air support.34
Extending the SAS role from training to accompanying the firqats in
28 Cline, Pseudo Operations, 13.
29 Cline, Pseudo Operations, 12.
30 Cassidy, “Long Small War.”
31 Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens.”
32 Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 157; and MG Ken Perkins (commander of the SAF 1975–77),
interview with author, May 20, 2009.
33 Jeapes, SAS, 48.
34 Jeapes, email message to author, September 11, 2009.
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the field made backing them with direct and indirect fires and air power
possible. This presence also reduced high-level concerns about the
possibility of the firqats returning to the other side, though at a cost.35
The SAS men working with the firqats suffered a casualty rate as high
as 30 percent.36
Local forces in Dhofar who were untrained, poorly armed, and
unsupported were less reliable. Most could stand guard and little more.
Some passed information to the insurgents.37 The Oman Gendarmerie,
who were guarding the fort at Mirbat when insurgents mounted an attack
in July 1972, declined to assist the small number of SAS troops and other
defenders repelling the onslaught.38 In Algeria, the Harkis grew from 18
to 385 village forces, totaling about 60,000 fighters. Their effectiveness,
however, varied significantly with the abilities of the French officers
assigned as area administrators and responsible for training.39
Individual advisors in El Salvador created effective units in their
area of operations even with limited institutional support. One highly
effective unit of defectors was set up quietly, outside US Embassy
oversight, and the troops were paid with Central Intelligence Agency
money.40 This unit was supported by the best troops the US advisors
could find and train, Salvadoran special forces noncommissioned
officers, who also ran the operations. The men got special uniforms and
pay and were exempt from routine duties. The CIA provided a bounty
for captured weapons that could be traced to the insurgency.41
Similarly, efforts to use the local militias, known as Awakening
Councils, against al-Qaeda in Baghdad, Iraq, were more effective when
US troops not only worked closely with militia commanders but also
when operations included militias, Iraqi army troops, and US soldiers
together. Complaints about Iraqi and militia intimidation of civilians
and criminal behavior dropped significantly under these conditions,
a positive indicator as the United States sought popular support for
the counterinsurgency.42
Military support for the Iraqi militias was also important in increasing
their effectiveness. When residents of the Baghdad neighborhood of
Amiriyah decided to challenge al-Qaeda, they faced a hard fight. The
Americans held their fire against the militia when it initiated action and
later sent in two Stryker platoons to stop the insurgents’ advance against
the militia members hard-pressed in their strongholds.43 On an earlier
occasion, US forces quickly blocked an al-Qaeda attack on a tribe in
Anbar that had begun challenging its control the area.44 These US choices
35 Jeapes, SAS, 48.
36 Jeapes, interview. For context, the casualty rate for British Commonwealth troops in World
War II was nearly 11 percent. Thomas Harding and Graeme Wilson, “Afghan Casualty Rate ‘at Level
of Last War,’ ” Telegraph, July 16, 2007.
37 Captured Enemy Documents—Third National Congress of Rakyut June 1971, December
15, 1971, Graham, OA Box 2, Folder 5, MEC, SAC, Oxford.
38 Interview recording, anonymous, October 23, 1992, catalog number 11161, reel 1, IMW.
39 Cassidy, “Long Small War.”
40 Pedrozo, emails.
41 Ibid.
42 LTC Dale Kuehl, “Testing Galula in Ameriyah: The People Are the Key,” Military Review 89,
no. 2 (March–April 2009): 72–80.
43 Kuehl, “Testing Galula.”
44 Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens.”
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prevented the slaughter of new allies and demonstrated commitment
and a willingness to bear the costs of keeping the partnership.
US forces in Iraq also found that paying, equipping, and training
tribal forces was worth the cost. Recruits accepted for training in the
Iraqi police received a payment, and officers who stayed with the police
force for more than three months received a bonus. Training included
urban combat to build the coalition’s small-unit effectiveness.45 Violence
dropped significantly in Anbar once US forces reached a modus vivendi
with the tribes.46

Cooperation within Conventional Forces

In Dhofar and Iraq, defectors were better able to support insurgent
goals when main force troops and officers recognized the value of their
efforts and demonstrated a willingness to cooperate operationally.
Evidence from Algeria, Rhodesia, and El Salvador is insufficient for
affirming a lack of coordination and distrust between irregular and
regular units can lead to bad outcomes such as friendly fire episodes.47
The campaign in Dhofar was based on more extensive use of the
firqats. The strategy was to fight for and hold territory in the eastern
sector of Dhofar and then the central area. The counterinsurgency
targeted areas of weaker support for the insurgency, held the territory,
and eventually pushed insurgents into the more thinly populated west
to destroy them adjacent to their safe haven in Yemen. The firqats were
integral to the plan. They scouted and skirmished, gained targeting
information from friends and family in their home areas, helped the
Sultan’s army take new territory, and then held it with the SAS.
The firqats routinely coordinated with the counterinsurgents in
operations from clearing to eliminating insurgent mortar positions and
searching for arms caches.48 The regular officers found trusting the
firqats difficult, and the risk of friendly fire was high because the firqats
looked and dressed like the insurgents.49 But, when the SAF shunned
the defectors, operations were less successful. Near the end of the war,
one regimental commander refused to work with firqats. Without their
intelligence, he could not locate the last remaining insurgents in the
cleared eastern area. The SAS was reassigned to the area, reestablished
its relationship with the firqats, and began getting the information the
Sultan’s Armed Forces needed to remove the remaining insurgents.50
The SAF complained that the firqats were in touch with the enemy,
but that was part of the point: the firqats were getting information and
trying to win over more defectors.51 The militias were also unpredictable,
and thus frustrating, to regular forces accustomed to orderly, hierarchical
behavior. The defectors were eager to attack, would jump into a flurry
45 Ibid.
46 Austin Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 50, no. 2 (April-May
2008): 67–94, doi:10.1080/00396330802034283.
47 Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 157; and Perkins, interview.
48 Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 140–41; “Notes on Visit to Oman,” COL W. J. Reed, Ministry
of Defence DEFE 25/312, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), Kew, UK;
Akehurst, We Won a War, 77; and Jeapes, SAS 190–91.
49 Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 157; and Perkins, interview.
50 Jeapes, interview.
51 Jeapes, SAS, 76.
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of activity to arrange an operation, then change their minds.52 But, the
SAS, with a background in working with non-European troops and in
irregular warfare could recognize the firqats’ strengths and be patient,
as well as interface with the SAF to facilitate cooperation.53
In Iraq, the United States was also apprehensive about cooperating
with militias and about letting former insurgents into the security forces.
These concerns were allayed in part by educational efforts pressed by a
few US officers. US troops supporting the Awakening educated coalition
forces on the intelligence and local knowledge defectors could offer.
American soldiers also emphasized the increasing alignment of interests
between Sunni fighters and the United States.54

Aligning Interests

Effectively using defectors as fighting forces requires the
counterinsurgency to recognize, and strengthen, aligned interests,
which need not be identical.55 Recognizing intersecting or overlapping
interests requires the counterinsurgency to prioritize its own goals. The
campaign in Dhofar and the early efforts in Iraq support this element,
while evidence from Algeria and a later period in Iraq show the costs of
not seeking or cementing aligned interests.
In Dhofar, the SAS leaders who formed the firqats around defectors
were bitterly disappointed that the units had to be structured around
tribal relationships when they had hoped for a pantribal force based on
their own liberal values. But the first-formed firqat had to be broken up
because of intertribal squabbling.56
Conversely, the effectiveness of the tribally based firqats was
exceptional precisely because of their tribal affiliations. Each unit
operated with their SAS handlers in their own tribal area, refused to
participate in any operation that did not directly benefit them, and refused
to cross tribal boundaries in the mountains, where the insurgency was
strongest. Their stubbornness infuriated the British officers leading the
Sultan’s campaign, but it paid off.57 The firqats influenced cousins and
brothers with the insurgency, when they considered it in their interest
to do so, and collected information from them.58 The firqats warned
52 Jeapes, SAS, 88.
53 Jeapes, interview; Perkins, interview; and MAJ Ian Gordon (former British officer who
served with SAF), interview with author, May 17, 2009. Thomas R. Mockaitis, makes a similar
point about the British imperial experience with non-European troops in British Counterinsurgency
in the Post-Imperial Era (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1995), 93. For more on
the SAS experience with unconventional warfare, see Walter C. Ladwig III, “Supporting Allies in
Counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 1 (March
2008): 62–88, doi:10.1080/09592310801905793.
54 Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens.”
55 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security
9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3–43, doi:10.2307/2538540.
56 Jeapes, interview; and Perkins, interview.
57 Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 157; and Perkins, interview.
58 Perkins, interview; Jeapes, SAS, 78; Akehurst catalog number 11156, reel 2, IWM; Jeapes,
interview; R. A. Lloyd Jones to A. A. Acland, July 1, 1971, DEFE 24/1835, TNA; D.F. Hawley,
October 16, 1972, DEFE 25/294, TNA; Sitrep, December 19, 1972, DEFE 25/368, TNA; Review of
the Military Situation Since the 10th December 1973 to the 23rd January 1974, Commander Sultan’s
Armed Forces MG Timothy Creasey, DEFE 25/312, TNA; The Principles Governing Military
Assistance to Oman, DEFE 25/315, TNA; Civil Administration in Dhofar, Oman, November 4,
1974, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) 8/2216, TNA; and Report Commander Sultan’s
Armed Forces to Chiefs of Staff 28 December 1975, DEFE 11/899, TNA.
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their families that enemy activity near the outposts would mean no
more water in the harsh terrain.59 These outposts also made patrolling
deep into insurgent territory and expanding the network of tracks in the
mountains possible, which also increased military access to the region.60
The firqats safeguarded the interests of their friends and family as
well as their own. One day, mountain herders brought 1,400 goats to
an outpost. The firqats told their SAS handlers that they would not go
on any more operations if the military did not buy the goats. Dhofar’s
governor recognized a test when he heard one. He had the goats flown
down to the plain and purchased.61
In Dhofar, the firqats made sure their interests were known and
met in other ways as well. The firqats were paid regular wages, plus
bonuses for captured enemy weapons.62 Providing employment for and
feeding the families of fighting-age men made the firqats an expensive
insurance policy for the sultan that continued after the conflict in the
form of bounties for insurgents’ weapons and ammunition.63 Between
August 1974 and August 1976 alone, Sultan Qaboos bin Said paid out
nearly a million pounds.64 When the conflict was winding down, the
firqats feared for their livelihood. Their SAS handlers noticed that once
the firqats’ future was assured, the insurgents lurking in the valleys
faded away.65 The firqats were becoming warlords, but the government
remained stable. By conflict’s end, the firqat leaders controlled all
activity in their areas, including the grazing and watering of livestock
and the sale of state food, while staying busy conducting political affairs
in Dhofar’s capital city, Salalah, without challenging the sultan.66
In Anbar, when powerful Sunni tribes stopped fighting the United
States and allied with it against the new dominant local power, al-Qaeda,
then-Colonel Sean B. MacFarland put aside concerns about criminal
activity and potential fickleness on the part of the provinces’ political
leaders. He focused instead on getting what he needed from them as
intelligence sources and fighters. “You don’t get to be a sheik by being
a nice guy. These guys are ruthless characters,” MacFarland said. “That
doesn’t mean they can’t be reliable partners.”67
In Algeria, the French often used force and the threat of force,
including torture and threats against their families, to gain the cooperation
of defectors.68 The French suffered a major setback with Force K, a
Muslim Algerian guerrilla force. Force K turned out to consist largely
of insurgents and men who became insurgents after joining. Once the
deception was discovered, some 600 members of the 1,000-man force
escaped to the insurgency with their weapons and equipment.69
59 Akehurst, August, 13, 2004, catalog number 27184, reel 24, IMW.
60 Akehurst, We Won a War, 77–78.
61 Jeapes, SAS, 139–40.
62 Jeapes, SAS, 59.
63 Akehurst, catalog number 27184, reel 24, IMW.
64 Akehurst, We Won a War, 178.
65 Jeapes, interview.
66 Jeapes, SAS, 163.
67 John A. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” Washington Quarterly 32,
no. 1 (January 2009): 43–59, doi:10.1080/01636600802544905.
68 Cline, Pseudo Operations, 7.
69 Cline, Pseudo Operations, 8.
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In El Salvador, the counterinsurgency had success with its few
attempts to use defectors as fighters. This application may have been
limited because there was little alignment of interests between members
of the insurgency and the government. Many of the insurgents who
defected, including those who surrendered after increased combat
operations dislocated large numbers of civilians, did so out of war
weariness.70 In addition, many defectors were from areas with relatively
weak devotion to the insurgency.71
In Iraq, a key shared interest between the United States and the
sheiks of the Anbar Awakening, which had mixed success, was keeping
the tribal leaders alive. US forces supported and backed tribal operations
against al-Qaeda, and provided security for the sheiks and their families.
Further, the Americans acknowledged the status of the sheiks by
incorporating them into governance structures. When Sheikh Abdul
Sattar Bezia al-Rishawi of the Abu Risha tribe led a campaign against
al-Qaeda, the United States provided security for him, made him the
counterinsurgency coordinator for Anbar, deputized his militias, and
accepted his tribesmen into the Iraqi Police. Similarly, the tribesmen
of the Abu Mahal tribe came to dominate the Iraqi Army brigade in
their area.72
The costs to the counterinsurgency of not seeking to align some
interests with defectors and potential defectors can be high. In Iraq,
the danger of not finding a way to keep defectors’ interests aligned with
those of the government quickly became evident. The United States
initially paid salaries to Awakening members with the expectation that
the Iraqi government would take over in the longer term, providing jobs
that would keep the former insurgents aligned with the government.
After the US drawdown, this modus vivendi fractured. The Iraqi
government hired half or fewer of the fighters, and many of those hired
received menial work rather than positions in the security forces. A
number of defectors returned to fighting the government by aligning
with al-Qaeda, for pay, to avoid attack, or both. Nathum al-Jubouri, a
former Awakening Council leader in Salahuddin province, explained the
group’s uncertainty about “what the government intends for them.” 73
Ultimately, a number of former insurgents and former defectors joined
forces with al-Qaeda’s successor organization, the Islamic State, and
have continued fighting the government and allied foreign forces.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This article has shown that counterinsurgencies get the most out of
using defectors as fighters when that use supports the fighters’ unique
skills and meets their interests.

70 Luis Orlando Rodriguez (government employee, served at US Southern Command 1981–83;
evaluated and advised the El Salvador Armed Forces in Usulutan in the wake of the critical Woerner
Report of 1981; senior member Operational and Planning Training Team 1983–88), interview
with author, April 21, 2010; and John D. Waghelstein, El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in
Counterinsurgency, Individual Study Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1985), 63,
67, Senior Officer Oral History Program, OCLC 24438418, US Army Heritage and Education
Center (AHEC), Carlisle, PA.
71 Waghelstein, El Salvador.
72 Long, “The Anbar Awakening.”
73 Timothy Williams and Duraid Adnan, “Sunnis in Iraq Allied with U.S. Rejoin Rebels,” New
York Times, October 16, 2010.
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In the successful campaigns in Dhofar, El Salvador, and Iraq,
counterinsurgents used defectors’ unique skills for operational success.
In Dhofar, the counterinsurgency also used the firqats for strategic
success. These warlords remain in power and contribute to Oman’s longterm political stability because the government continues to protect their
interests. In Dhofar and Iraq, counterinsurgents also gave defectors a
say in planning operations. In all three successes, defector units were
properly trained and supported and conventional forces cooperated with
them at the tactical and operational levels. In the two cases of failure,
there is limited evidence that counterinsurgents used defectors’ unique
skills, gave them a say, properly supported and cooperated with them,
and met their interests. Further research should determine not only more
about use of defectors in these cases but also examine additional cases.
These findings, while constrained by the limits of the information
available, suggest a counterinsurgency should prioritize its interests to
get the best out of defectors. Its need to defeat the insurgency should be
balanced with its desire to limit the creation of alternate power centers
within the state as well as any hope to retain the moral high ground by
refusing to cooperate with brutal actors. Further, the counterinsurgency
should make an effort to identify and to take advantage of strategically
overlapping interests, such as material rewards or status, with some of
those valued by insurgents.
The counterinsurgency should try to recognize when fissures develop
within the insurgency and seize those opportunities to create incentives
for partnership, rather than considering the insurgency as a unitary
actor with diametrically opposed interests to those of the government.
Counterinsurgents should recognize that insurgent leaders who can, and
will, bring their followers with them when they defect are more valuable
than individual defectors. The counterinsurgency should identify and
act upon ways to cement its alignment of interests with defectors in
the longer term as well as identify and use defectors’ most important
skills for the tasks at hand. This process includes bringing defectors’
knowledge and insights into the planning and targeting process and
using them in cooperation and coordination with conventional forces.
The counterinsurgency should apply the necessary resources to train,
equip, and support defectors properly, which includes assigning task
trainers, handlers, and leaders experienced in irregular warfare and with
non-Western fighters. Effective use of defectors as fighting forces is not
determinative in counterinsurgency, as far as this study can tell, but
it does provide governments and foreign forces with support in areas
where they are likely to be weakest.
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ABSTRACT: This article discusses the role of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization’s policy of “Protection of Civilians” in directing
international efforts to counter adversaries who blur the boundaries
of war during armed conflict.

W

hen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commanded
the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
from 2003 to 2014, NATO allies and partners learned
that protecting civilians was a key parameter of both operational and
strategic success. The allies continuously adapted their campaigns to
focus on mitigating and tracking civilian casualties. Later, at the postISAF Warsaw summit in mid-2016, the allies agreed to a wider policy on
“the protection of civilians” that was explicitly framed as a lesson learned
from Afghanistan.1
Afghanistan was not the first time the allies used armed force in an
operation that fell somewhere between war and peace. In Bosnia and
Kosovo in the 1990s they discovered, in Commanding General Rupert
Smith’s laconic phrase, it was no longer “practical” for politicians and
diplomats to expect the military to solve problems by force, just as it
was no longer “practical” for the military to plan and execute purely
military campaigns.2 Today, security cooperation and stabilization are
essential activities for Western armed forces.3 Still, what was so different
about the Afghanistan mission was the degree to which stabilization
looked and felt like war in terms of its brutality, loss of life, and the level
of ammunition expended. Thus, the Afghan lesson was that defense
forces and allies need to prepare better to navigate the complex gray
zone where war meets crisis management, where humanitarian law (the
law of armed conflict) meets human rights law, and where power and
principle intertwine. This lesson became NATO policy in mid-2016.
Moreover, no sooner had the allies adopted the “Protection of
Civilians” policy than their intent to pursue it appeared questionable.
This skepticism was certainly the case among the personnel interviewed
for this article where the impression is that NATO allies are losing
political interest in their collective policy: they appear content to have
pushed an action plan to military authorities, to have decreased the
International Staff that can otherwise help drive policy, and to turn
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their gaze toward deterrence in Europe.4 The root cause of this shift
is political: Russian policies in Ukraine and along Europe’s eastern rim
have pushed collective defense to NATO’s forefront. Following the
straightforward rules of collective defense (i.e., the law of armed conflict
or humanitarian law) is also comfortable. Political and military leaders
know and understand these laws in detail: military forces can apply
lethal force only in cases of military necessity, they must distinguish
between combatants and noncombatants, and they can only use force
proportional to the objective.5
Issues related to the protection of civilians are, in contrast, quite
complex and politically challenging. If, in war, such protections are
about the principle that harm to civilians must not be disproportionate
to the military advantage sought, then in crisis management they are
about something much broader, namely, upholding human rights
law and good government. The protection of civilians, thus, blends
naturally into a wide and often normative debate about human security
and human development where limiting civilian casualties is just one piece
of a bigger puzzle. The rest is about limiting violence against particularly
vulnerable groups in society, especially women and children, and then
securing access to food, clean water, and public services, and providing
opportunities for economic and social development.
More broadly, the policy is about global governance, a framework in
which NATO plays second fiddle or harmonizes with the UN Security
Council. For armed forces trained for “duels,” Clausewitz’s definition
of war, this human rights terrain, where there is no real enemy but a
public order to build, is difficult. For the political masters of NATO
governments, the policy is fraught with danger. Introducing human
rights on the battlefield is to offer opponents—such as the Taliban
and Russia—an opportunity to link the use of force to human rights
abuse, which however tedious the claim, undermines the legitimacy of
the campaign. Moreover, a tight operational partnership with the UN
stokes normative debates on how outsiders critical of military action and
militarization can best gain control of, or influence over, NATO. These
debates are politically uncomfortable for NATO governments and
unhelpful from the perspective of getting things done on the ground.
Thus, with a certain degree of relief, NATO allies have reduced
their ground engagement in Afghanistan and turned their attention to
the more straightforward challenge of deterring Russia.6 They should,
however, be mindful that a wide gap between defense at home and crisis
management policy in distant and not-so-important theaters will put at
risk their own strategic focus, organizational capability, partnership
engagement, and political legitimacy.
4 Interviews with NATO staff, November–December 2016. With the adoption of the
“Protection of Civilians” policy and an ensuing action plan, NATO replaced all International
Staff with National Voluntary Contributions that rotate much more frequently and thus offer less
continuity and policy-drive.
5 Customary international law and the Geneva Conventions are the sources of the law of
armed conflict.
6 NATO is still in Afghanistan, running the Resolute Support Mission in support of Afghan
authorities, and also the larger US security assistance mission, but NATO’s force contribution has
declined from 40,000 troops (not counting US troops) in 2010 to the current level of 5,000. In
2010, the US force level in ISAF in Afghanistan was 90,000 but in 2017 rose from a low of 8,000
troops to 12,000.
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The allies and partners have an opportunity to stay clear of such
risks, this article argues, if they pursue a pragmatic policy of bridging
military defense and civilian protection where possible. The next section
steps back to the Afghan campaign to expose the political issues that
caused NATO problems regarding protection of civilians, and to
explain, in part, why the Alliance focused on civilian casualties. The
second section turns to the policy adopted in 2016 and explains how
NATO managed to navigate underlying political tensions. The third
and final section considers how the “Protection of Civilians,” in spite
of its political baggage, offers NATO strategic, organizational, and
diplomatic opportunities.

Force in Afghanistan

By mid-2015, NATO’s lessons-learned unit concluded “ISAF did
indeed successfully reduce ISAF-caused [civilian casualties] over the
period 2008 to 2014, and that there is evidence that this reduction was
a result of measures taken by ISAF to do so.” 7 The reduction, which
NATO actively sought on the ground and which UN data confirm, was
hard-won, though, and required political engagement with a number of
fundamental problems.8
The first problem was defining the political purpose of the war and
how to achieve it—the political and operational objectives—following
Clausewitz.9 The initial phase of the war had a clear objective of defeating
the Afghan Taliban regime and the al-Qaeda terrorist organization
it hosted, which amounted to a war of self-defense following the
UN Charter’s article 51 and international humanitarian law. The fall
of the Taliban regime in November 2001, however, complicated the
justification for the continued use of armed force. During Operation
Enduring Freedom, the US-led coalition justified its continued war
against remnants of al-Qaeda on the grounds of self-defense and the
consent of the new Afghan regime.
Still, controversy arose in respect to whether the fairly
straightforward laws of war applied to a conflict between states (the
coalition) and a nonstate actor (al-Qaeda); as well as to how the parallel
stabilization mission (ISAF, of which NATO took command in 2003),
which decidedly was not about self-defense, could operate; and the ends
the mission was ultimately to achieve.10 ISAF’s defined objective was to
build local security forces, which in principle was simple enough, but
the degree to which this gave ISAF ownership of government capacity
7 Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), Protection of Civilians: How ISAF Reduced
Civilian Casualties (Lisbon, Portugal: JALLC, 2015), 1.
8 For NATO’s changing practice see Alon Margalit, “The Duty to Investigate Civilian
Casualties during Armed Conflict and Its Implementation in Practice,” in Yearbook of International
Humanitarian Law, ed. Terry D. Gill et al., vol. 15 (Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012), 155–186.
Civilian deaths and injuries by aerial operations declined from 622 in 2009 to 162 in 2014. UN
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (UNHCR), Afghanistan: Annual Report 2014, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict
(Kabul, Afghanistan: UNAMA / UNHCR, 2015), 94.
9 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1908) 579.
10 For an overview see Ashley S. Deeks, “ ‘Unwilling or Unable’: Toward a Normative
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense,” Virginia Journal of International Law 52, no. 3 (2012):
483–552; and Jelena Pejic, “Extraterritorial Targeting by Means of Armed Drones: Some Legal
Implications,” International Review of the Red Cross 96, no. 893 (March 2014): 67–106, doi:10.1017
/S1816383114000447.
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building was not clear, as was the case with the operational muscle—
military power—ISAF could legitimately apply.
Government capacity building brought tensions with other actors
in this domain, notably the Afghan political authorities and the UN
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and operational conditions varied
greatly depending on insurgent strength in the provinces. Gradually,
it became clear the insurgency was both organized and durable, which
defines a noninternational armed conflict under international humanitarian
law that de facto allows greater use of force against lawful targets.
However, broader human rights concerns, stemming from international
human rights law, continued to be of great concern—the insurgency was
unevenly spread, meaning parts of Afghanistan were at peace (operating
under regular, Afghan criminal law) and human rights issues were at the
heart of the political debate over the purpose of the war.11
The unsettled politics of political and operational purpose directly
impacted the speed with which NATO military authorities could define
and organize the proportional use of force, which happened slowly and
was consistently a focal point of criticism. Initial efforts were made in
2006 and 2007 when ISAF’s campaign had spread to the entire territory
of Afghanistan and had encountered the full force of the insurgency.
At this point, in mid-2007, the UN mission began tracking civilian
casualties and issuing Protection of Civilians reports. General Dan K.
McNeill, commander, ISAF, issued the first tactical directive to limit
civilian casualties; yet, he earned the nickname Bomber McNeill due to
the tendency of the campaign to fall back on excessive air power.12
In 2009, General Stanley A. McChrystal, as commander of ISAF,
placed civilian protection at the heart of his tactical directive, only to ignite
a debate on the appropriateness, or danger to troops, of “courageous
restraint.” McChrystal’s successor, General David H. Petraeus replaced
“restraint” with the “disciplined use of force” as ISAF slowly, but
surely, built a sophisticated framework for “tracking” and “mitigating”
civilian casualties.13 Petraeus’s approach failed to resolve the problem,
and civilian casualties actually increased from 2010 to 2011.14 Thus, in
mid-2012, General John R. Allen simply banned the bombing of civilian
homes under any circumstance except self-defense.15
Political ownership of the international effort to assist the rebuilding
of Afghanistan’s government was likewise a point of contention.
Formally, the United Nations hosted the Bonn Conference (2001)
11 Germany had a big footprint in Afghanistan but did not recognize a state of war (noninternational armed conflict) until November 2009. The United States argued from the outset that war in
ungoverned spaces involved a mix of international humanitarian and international human rights law.
Other allies, such as Canada, were attuned to human rights law but resisted including it in the stability
operation. Christian Schaller, “Military Operations in Afghanistan and International Humanitarian
Law,” SWP Comments 7 (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2010), 1–7;
and Stephen Pomper, “Human Right Obligations, Armed Conflict and Afghanistan,” 525–542 in The
War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis, ed. Michael N. Schmitt (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009).
12 Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), Civilian Harm Tracking: Analysis of ISAF Efforts in
Afghanistan (Washington, DC: CIVIC, 2014).
13 See CIVIC, Civilian Harm Tracking; and Joseph H. Felter and Jacob N. Sharpiro, “Limiting
Civilian Casualties as Part of a Winning Strategy: The Case of Courageous Restraint,” Daedalus 146,
no. 1 (Winter 2017): 44–58, doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00421.
14 UNAMA / UNHCR, Annual Report 2014.
15 Robert Perkins, Air Power in Afghanistan: How NATO Changed the Rules, 2008–2014 (London:
Action on Armed Violence, December 2014).

War among (& for) the people

Rynning

43

that resulted in Afghanistan’s interim government and which invited
the ISAF mission on a UN mandate.16 Moreover, at the request of the
Afghan government, in March 2002 the United Nations organized its
local mission in Afghanistan to lead the international civilian effort to
build Afghan sovereignty and leadership.17 Such moves would seem to
imply the UN would do most of the international stabilization while
ISAF provided security.
As security became the key to the entire campaign, however, and
as the UN mission, the Afghan government, and other civilian agencies
struggled to cohere and to move forward, ISAF easily became the
dominant player. All of the organizations embraced the same theory
of victory—“unity of effort” or “comprehensive approach”—but, in
fact, ISAF was first among equals. This influence caused resentment
and discomfort everywhere: the Kabul government and the UN mission
felt they should be in the lead, and NATO governments did not want
to be responsible for governance and development. Hence, they surged
a larger military force, but did so to achieve security and to manage the
interface to governance and development as opposed to taking charge
of governance and development, or inversely, letting the United Nations
direct their considerable military forces.18
Some proponents of “new wars” theory have argued an alliance such
as NATO was wholly misplaced in Afghanistan, in part militarizing the
conflict, in part tying the hands of the most appropriate regulator of the
conflict—the United Nations.19 Arguments such as these exacerbate the
unease political authorities have with embracing an agenda for protecting
civilians, which inevitably cause the Alliance to question whether it is
de facto buying into a normative agenda that will subordinate it to the
United Nations—as in a tightly regulated “regional arrangement” under
chapter VIII of the UN Charter.20 Making NATO the handmaiden of
UN doctrine would be devastating to the former’s role as a regional
self-defense alliance, offering both Russia and China a greater say in
NATO affairs. It also would be seen as a self-abnegation of the political
responsibility that comes with being the head of state of a NATO nation.
The tension between what the Alliance is willing to do and what one
might normatively expect from it is apparent not only in Afghanistan but
also in other theaters, such as Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), where
NATO has used armed force to help solve crises and advance good
governance. As in Afghanistan, these interventions have generated a
debate on the legality and appropriateness of the Alliance’s actions,
and as in Afghanistan, the debate is rooted in, and fed by, contrasting
interpretations of the primacy of collective defense vis-à-vis collective
16 United Nations, Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment
of Permanent Government Institutions (New York: UN, 2001) http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest
/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
17 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1401, United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan, S/RES/1401 (New York: UN, 2002).
18 Sten Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security
Studies, 2012).
19 Mary Kaldor, Human Security: Reflections on Globilzation and Intervention (Cambridge: Polity,
2007); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity, 2012);
and Astri Suhrke, When More Is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2011).
20 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the UN: A Peculiar Relationship (Columbia: University of
Missouri Press, 2010).
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security.21 The Alliance can and does accommodate the imperative to
use force proportionally—seeking to reduce civilian casualties—but its
discomfort with this underlying debate on broad collective security and
responsibilities is inherent.

NATO Policy

In spite of this level of operational tension and normative
friction, in July 2016 NATO members managed to agree on a policy
to protect civilians. The question is, on what terms did this consensus
become possible?
First, the policy is anchored in the need to institutionalize a virtuous
cycle of “prevention, mitigation, and learning” in regards to civilian
casualties, restricting legitimate targets, establishing a culture and an
organization of reporting and investigating incidents, and building the
capacity to send out investigative teams (preferably on the ground or
alternatively via air surveillance). This necessity was NATO’s lesson
number one from Afghanistan, and it meant the Alliance had to be
trained and ready to guide civilian casualty work going forward.
NATO had improvised to protect civilians in Afghanistan and is
institutionalizing the capacity to avoid new pains of improvising such
protections in future situations.
From a political perspective, three aspects of NATO’s policy stand
out. First, the document remains narrowly focused on civilian casualty
mitigation. Reducing such losses was the key ISAF focus in Afghanistan,
and the NATO policy continues the ambition to protect civilians from
physical violence. The Alliance could have gone much further, as far as
human security and securing access to clean water, education, and so
on, but perhaps a more intuitive emphasis on slightly broader issues of
detention, restitution for damaged property or casualties, or unexploded
ordnance clearance would have been more appropriate. NATO chose
to stick to protection from physical violence but, in a nod to previous
considerations, did agree to include the protection of civilians from
“others’ actions” and to support “humanitarian action.”22 The expanded
interest gives the Alliance a stake in a broader context, where the
organization is but a node in a larger humanitarian-focused network,
but retains the group’s focus on the core business of applying military
force for political purpose.
Secondly, the policy is inherently pragmatic. The “Protection of
Civilians” opens with a broad commitment to “legal, moral, and political
imperatives,” which could imply some sort of legal or normative doctrinal
drive, but the ensuing text makes clear that the pragmatic political
imperative is the one that really matters. NATO’s highest authority—
the North Atlantic Council—is emphasized as the source of NATO
mandates; the policy does not prejudice force protection or collective
defense obligations; and the Alliance eschews the tricky balance of
international humanitarian and human rights law where human rights
21 Compare Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way
to Run an Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (March/April 2012): 2–7 and Alan J. Kuperman, “A
Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” International Security 38,
no. 1 (Summer 2013): 105–36.
22 “Protection of Civilians,” NATO, paras. 16–17.
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by nature are more restrictive on the use of force.23 In one instance, the
policy makes an apparently bold statement: “NATO recognizes that all
feasible measures must be taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate harm
to civilians.”24 But, the key here is the term feasible, which is an implicit
reference to the authority of the North Atlantic Council to define for
itself how much it can actually do.
Thirdly, the policy is very much an invitation for the Alliance to
partner with individual partner nations and international organizations.
The policy was published, which is a sign of public diplomacy and
partnership. Moreover, the policy is framed in paragraphs one and two
with references to wider humanitarian doctrine (on children and armed
conflict, women and peace, and sexual and gender-based violence as
defined by UN Security Council resolutions), NATO operational
partners, and the need for overarching policy. The presence of these
elements is the Alliance nodding to the greater human security and
human development context. Moreover, NATO partners were actively
involved throughout the drafting of the policy, so much so that NATO
allies and officials debated at one point on how far non-Alliance actors
should be allowed to shape the organization’s policy.25
The sum of these political facets is a policy that systematically offers
the Alliance input from a wider range of international community actors
into efforts to protect civilians, takes note of the legal and normative
principles for doing so, and identifies what the Alliance can do at a
practical level to reduce the threat of physical violence against civilians.
It is, however, also a policy of an alliance that has its own political
raison d’être and is not willing to submerge itself fully into a global,
humanitarian network. It is a policy characterized more by expediency
than by legal or moral doctrine, and as such, a policy that underscores
the responsibility of the North Atlantic Council—and no one else—to
define what is both necessary and feasible.
The pragmatics are also clear in regard to the instructions for
NATO military authorities inherent in the policy. The policy ends
with a 10-point plan for delivering on the “Protection of Civilians”
ambition, and most of the items describe what International Staff, but
especially what military authorities, must now plan to do about strategic
communications, exercises, training personnel as well as local forces,
capacity building with “requesting nations,” and interoperability with
partnership nations.26 The Alliance’s international staff and military
authorities began work on an action plan for the policy following the
Warsaw summit, and defense ministers approved it in early 2017.
NATO’s “Protection of Civilians” policy leaves the Alliance in the
fairly comfortable position of being politically open and organizationally
ready to engage the international community in broader humanitarian
operations, while retaining its right to define the scope of its ambitions
and its actions. Strong proponents of humanitarian action, however, will
find this insufficient and a validation of the criticism leveled against
23 The policy simply states that humanitarian law and human rights law may be included in
NATO’s mandate “as applicable.” “Protection of Civilians,” NATO, paras. 5–7.
24 “Protection of Civilians,” para. 7.
25 Author’s interview with NATO Protection of Civilians official, December 2016.
26 “Protection of Civilians,” NATO, paras. 15–24.
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NATO in the Afghan context of the Alliance being inherently focused
on its own political and military needs and an inadequate partner in the
wider normative drive for human security.
Such criticism will stoke the temptation inside NATO to narrow
protection-of-civilian issues to one of managing the proportional use of
armed force in war, which essentially would be back to the business of
war, not that of managing crises and stabilizing other societies. Thus,
Alliance policy is crafted with considerable political and diplomatic skill
but is nonetheless marked by an underlying clash of philosophies or
visions—is NATO a spoke in the great wheel of UN governance, or is it a
political entity that can, at its own discretion, contribute to humanitarian
work? If NATO decision-makers choose simply to steer clear of the
issue, which could be politically tempting, the unintended consequence
would be the erosion of the Alliance’s support for the “Protection of
Civilians” policy. As we are about see, there are several operational and
political reasons why Alliance authorities should consider the current
policy a precautionary measure that merits their continued engagement.

Benefits of Pragmatism

The parameters of NATO’s protection-of-civilians engagement
are quite clear: the Alliance wants to retain political decision-making
power and to remain focused primarily on the slice of the humanitarian
agenda that is primarily related to civilian casualties. Moreover, NATO’s
approach to the protection of civilians is inherently operational and
pragmatic: the Alliance has a culture and tradition of “doing things”—
missions and operations—and rigid legal or moral doctrine cannot be
allowed to erode this capacity for action. Still, within these parameters,
there is nothing to prevent the Alliance from aligning the protection of
civilians and collective defense principles to strengthen its international
legitimacy, its command of collective self-defense operations, and
its ability to shape partner policy, including partners participating in
Alliance-related coalition operations. As a pragmatic alliance, NATO
should get on with the task of realizing these benefits.
To gain international legitimacy, the Alliance needs to consider how
to move its dialogue with the United Nations forward, which for all its
complexity in terms of agencies and organizations remains the focal
point for humanitarian debates. The United Nations is in some ways
the antithesis to the Alliance—doctrinal where NATO is pragmatic,
legalistic where NATO is political. It only complicates matters when,
from within the UN Security Council, Russia and China view NATO
with suspicion and resist a wider partnership with the Alliance.
For all of these reasons, NATO’s formal relationship with the United
Nations is strictly limited, in fact confined, to interaction between
representatives of the two secretariats along lines defined by the 2008
Joint Declaration signed not by Alliance and UN member nations but by
NATO and UN secretary generals. Today, the Alliance knows something
the UN needs to know—in particular, how to train and certify forces

War among (& for) the people

Rynning

47

for operations and how to run intelligence-led operations.27 In the UN
system, there is recognition of these needs, just as there is recognition
that it needs to clarify how its doctrine on “the responsibility to protect”
is compatible with the use of military force.28 To prepare for a sustained
and enhanced dialogue with the United Nations on these issues, all
of which will reflect positively on NATO’s political and operational
legitimacy, the Alliance should not let the “Protection of Civilians”
policy abate but engage it as a diplomatic leveler.
In terms of collective defense, the traditional argument is that
such action is inherently legitimate according to the UN Charter, and
NATO can therefore make such plans along tried and tested lines—the
proportional and discriminatory use of force as defined by humanitarian
law. This argument is also precisely what the Alliance is applying in
its plans to anticipate and to deter Russian aggression. Still, there is a
case for reform. When planning, military authorities calculate collateral
damage estimates containing some sort of noncombatant casualty cutoff
value that determines the level and intensity of strikes.29 The military
method for doing so may be tried and tested, but as the authors of an
insightful study suggest, Afghanistan and other recent conflicts clearly
indicate the underlying algorithms “can benefit from a wider range
of inputs.”30 This logic applies irrespective of whether the forces are
preparing for war (collective defense) or crisis management (protectionof-civilians missions). The logic should lead decision-makers to reform
and to modernize the command organization and culture in terms of its
inherent readiness to monitor, to track, and to analyze civilian harm on
the battlefield. This challenge of reform applies at the collective NATO
level and at the state level for national command organizations.
Finally, there are clear benefits in terms of the Alliance’s partner
policy. In part, the policy applies to those partners that experience hybrid
threats, such as Ukraine, where Russia is exerting a variety of threats
from direct physical assault (i.e., the annexation of Crimea) to support for
insurgents and political and social destabilization. NATO’s main support
to Ukraine has hitherto consisted of trust funds that channel voluntary
financial contributions for building specific nonlethal capabilities such
as command and control, logistics, and cybersecurity. The Alliance
and Ukraine are putting a brave face on this support, upgrading it to
a so-called comprehensive assistance package, but it remains diverse,
limited, and indirect.31 Should the Alliance garner the political desire to
go one step further—for instance, by offering lethal assistance (i.e., arms
supplies)—the stakes would increase. In this instance, solid policies and
procedures for guaranteeing, to the greatest extent possible, Ukraine
27 The United Nations traditionally does not certify forces for its operations; however, NATO
always does. The United Nations runs missions simply by mandate, but recent experience, especially
in Mali, calls for a more active, intelligence-based approach to certain operations, which NATO has
plenty of experience in doing.
28 Dan Kuwali, “ ‘Humanitarian Rights’: Bridging the Doctrinal Gap between the Protection
of Civilians and the Responsibility to Protect,” International Humanitarian Legal Studies 4, no. 1
(2013): 5–46, doi:10.1163/18781527-00401004; and John Karlsrud, “The UN at War: Examining
the Consequences of Peace-Enforcement Mandates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the
CAR, the DRC, and Mali,” Third World Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2015): 40–54, doi:10.1080/01436597.2015
.976016.
29 Christopher D. Kolenda et al., The Strategic Costs of Civilian Harm: Applying Lessons from
Afghanistan to Current and Future Conflicts (New York: Open Society Foundations, 2016), 62.
30 Ibid.
31 NATO, Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine (Brussels: NATO, 2016).
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would employ its arms in line with a clear and ambitious protectionof-civilians policy would be critical to have in place. Otherwise, the
mission’s “legal, moral, and political imperatives”—to borrow from
NATO’s own policy—would be jeopardy.
Partners can also be operational, of course. Irrespective of whether
the Alliance is commanding an operation such as Operation Unified
Protector in Libya (2011) or supporting efforts such as the Global
Coalition against Da’esh in Syria and Iraq, the core of NATO nations,
including the United States, find themselves cooperating with a
network of diverse partners. Using its partnership toolbox and regional
cooperation initiatives to standardize military procedures, enable joint
training, and maintain political channels, the Alliance has, in fact,
become a hub for developing and maintaining such coalitions, in effect,
serving as a multilateral framework of support for US grand strategy in
the Middle East and North Africa. The Alliance’s tools and procedures
can ensure NATO allies and their operational partners, wherever they
come from, see eye-to-eye on the need to restrain the use of force in
coalition operations.
The Global Coalition is a case in point. Strictly speaking, the
coalition states are fighting a war of self-defense (at the request of the
Iraqi government) against a widely unpopular enemy (the Islamic State,
or Da’esh), but the usual rules of war need not apply because the human
suffering that allows Da’esh to take root is at the heart of the campaign.
In addition, the enemy easily conceals itself among civilians in this
theater, and the Coalition tracks casualties mainly by air surveillance, as
the ground footprint is much lighter than in Afghanistan. The Coalition,
thus, faces a hybrid protection of civilians-focused self-defense mission
that is exceptionally challenging in its own way but still similar to efforts
in Afghanistan. The need for precautionary policy in this regard has
not diminished, and NATO can help partners prepare their politicalmilitary command chain for it.

Conclusion

The Alliance was driven via ISAF to develop a civilian casualty
doctrine and tracking and mitigation organization that promised
to maintain the link between the use of force and political purpose,
just as it sought to build links to development and governance via a
comprehensive approach. After Afghanistan, NATO allies drew lessons
for a protection-of-civilians policy, promising de facto not to forget
but rather to improve; however, this promise is now at risk. Russia has
pushed collective defense back to the top of the agenda. To introduce
human rights law on a battlefield is to expose oneself to both real and
manipulated criticism intended to undermine the legitimacy of and
support for the operation, and the Alliance and the United Nations
are tied into a clash of political visions that tempt NATO and UN
policymakers respectively to pull back and to get on with their business.
NATO’s “Protection of Civilians” policy remains an invitation to
cooperate but also contains this bottom line: the Alliance will support
the wider human and collective security agenda but not in any measure
that infringes on its ability to function as a collective defense alliance.
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Without question NATO’s “Protection of Civilians” policy will not
appease all critics of the role collective defense organizations get to play
within the global community of security management—of NATO’s role
in the UN system. These critics can be found in the wider debate as
well as within UN agencies and in the UN Security Council. To the
extent they gain voice, these detractors will reinforce the impression
in NATO that the Alliance did right in demarcating itself from the
politics of global organization. The heart of the matter is, therefore, not
bureaucratic complications but political and normative differences—
can and should a collective defense alliance such as NATO shape
global humanitarian action? This article has argued that the stakes—in
terms of diplomatic legitimacy, command organization and culture, and
partnership policy—are too high for the Alliance to pull back from
humanitarian action to focus on its regional defense and deterrence role.
NATO can take concrete steps to bridge the gap: to counter the
tendency to make this a defense ministerial item of low priority, it can
ensure that the North Atlantic Council, in foreign minister format,
regularly reviews the “Protection of Civilians” policy, just as it regularly
addresses NATO-UN relations at summits of heads of state and
government. The council may also counter the current plan to make
actions protecting civilians merely one of many activities for the military
chain of command. The Alliance can ensure that its International Staff
retains the capacity to develop overarching policy ideas, a capacity it is
currently losing. The Alliance is right to steer clear of the normative
pitfalls in the underlying human security debate that would rob the
Alliance of its ability to act, to actually do things. But, as outlined in this
article, there is ample reason to get on with the pragmatics of bringing
to life key crisis management lessons of NATO’s campaigns.
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Military Force and Mass Migration in Europe
Matthew N. Metzel and John M. Lorenzen

ABSTRACT: This article provides historical background for
policymakers facing the complex international concern of mass
migration. By examining prior American interventions and
identifying existing policies that support military responses, planners
can begin to develop effective solutions for the current crisis.

I

n 2016, President Donald Trump addressed the topic of Europe’s
mass migration crisis: “If you do not treat the situation competently
and firmly, yes, it is the end of Europe.”1 These words of caution
highlight the growing seriousness of the problem. In 2015, more than 1
million refugees and migrants flooded the southern border of Europe,
with another 2.6 million seeking refuge in Turkey.2 By the end of 2016, the
European Union reported an additional 500,000 illegal border crossings
while Turkey struggled to manage 3.5 million displaced civilians from
neighboring war-torn states.3 For comparison, Italy and Greece received
over 1 million migrants and refugees by sea in 2015, and over 300,000 in
the first nine months of 2016.4 Compounding this challenge, members
of criminal and terrorist organizations have embedded themselves in,
and recruited from, vulnerable migrant and refugee populations.5
Although the United States supports the European community
with diplomatic and economic aid, the cumulative impact of migration
threatens to destabilize several member states within the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. To achieve strategic objectives for a strong and
resilient security posture within the Alliance, US leaders should consider
employing limited military means to address the problem of mass
migration in Europe.
This article argues the US military should support an overarching
grand strategy to assist European allies facing the complex problem of
mass migration. While current US policy has emphasized the use of
diplomatic and economic support for affected nations, there has been
1 Michel Rose, “Trump Raps Merkel over Migrants, Says U.S. Could Have Good Relations with
Putin,” Reuters, February 9, 2016.
2 International law defines migrants and refugees differently, but the terms are used
interchangeably in reference to Europe’s foreign populations. United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), The Refugee Convention, 1951, with commentary by Dr. Paul Weis (Geneva:
UNHCR, 1990), 6; Somini Sengupta, “Migrant or Refugee? There Is a Difference with Legal
Implications,” New York Times, August 27, 2015; and “United States European Command Posture
Statement 2016,” United States European Command (USEUCOM), February 25, 2016, http://www
.eucom.mil/media-library/article/35164/u-s-european-command-posture-statement-2016.
3 “Fewer Migrants at EU Borders in 2016,” Frontex, January 6, 2017, http://frontex.europa
.eu/news/fewer-migrants-at-eu-borders-in-2016-HWnC1J; and Mehmet, “Refugee Influx to Turkey
Sharply Rises,” Al-Monitor, November 30, 2016.
4 “Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response: Mediterranean,” UNHCR, October 2015,
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php.
5 “Fewer Migrants,” Frontex; and Cetingulec, “Refugee Influx.”
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little discussion concerning the use of the military arm of national power
to help address this ongoing crisis. Yet, the examples of World War
II Europe (1944–45), Bosnia (1992–95), and Kosovo (1999), highlight
the historical value of applying US military leadership, planning, and
resourcing as part of a holistic international humanitarian response.
Several key assumptions underpin our argument for increasing US
military involvement to support the civilian response to mass migration.
First, violence and economic hardship in the Middle East and Africa will
continue to drive irregular migration flows into NATO member states,
which will outpace the response capacity of European governments and
conventional humanitarian relief actors.6 Second, Islamic State activity
will spike in Europe as the terrorist organization seeks soft targets to
detract attention from strategic losses in Syria and Iraq.7 Third, terror
and criminal organizations will persist in leveraging the migration crisis
through displaced civilian populations.8 Fourth, European allies will
become increasingly hostile toward migrants and refugees due to real
and perceived economic and security threats.9 Finally, domestic pressure
will cause political leaders within the affected nations to look for options
beyond civilian response activities.

European Security Environment

The recent surge of migrants and refugees from the Middle East
and Africa has placed an enormous strain on the economic, security, and
political stability of several states. The inflows create opportunities for
international terrorists to aim weapons of mass migration toward Europe by
embedding members among the displaced populations traveling from
war-torn regions of the world. Germany confirmed 340 cases of Islamic
extremists recruiting within refugee centers and Europol reported 300
cases of similar efforts.10
The European Union’s efforts since 1999 to strengthen the European
Border and Coast Guard Agency, also known as Frontex, have failed
to address several gaps in immigration security and control, including
legal obstacles that prevent law enforcement collaboration to determine
identities of suspected smugglers.11 Since 2015, migrant-related terror
activity in Europe has spiked, damaging the public’s sense of domestic
safety and injuring an already fragile economy.12 The resulting distrust
6 Liz Alderman, “Aid and Attention Dwindling, Migrant Crisis Intensifies in Greece,” New
York Times, August 13, 2016.
7 Maamoun Youssef, “ISIS Leader Urges Attacks in Europe, U.S.,” CTV News, May 22, 2016.
8 Philip Breedlove, United States European Command: Theater Strategy (Stuttgart, Germany:
EUCOM, 2015), 2; and Ross and Jovanovic, “Paris Bomber.”
9 “Unemployment Statistics,” Eurostat, August 22, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics; and “Migrant Crisis: Tensions Run High
in Lesbos as Refugees Stage Street Protest,” Telegraph, September 8, 2015.
10 Greenhill, “Weapons of Mass Migration,” 11–13; “Germany’s New Security Measures:
Integration Panic,” Economist, August 18, 2016; Shehab Kahn, “European Border Agency
FRONTEX Warns ISIS is Weaponising Refugees,” Independent (London); Meira Svirsky, “13 Percent
of Syrian Refugees Support ISIS: Poll,” Clarion Project, November 1, 2015, https://clarionproject
.org/13-percent-syrian-refugees-support-isis-poll.
11 Nick Mathiason, Victoria Parsons, and Ted Jeory, “Frontex to Get Budget Hike after Refugee
Failures,” EUobserver (Brussels), September 21, 2015; Julian Hattem, “FBI Chief: ‘Gaps’ Remain in
Screening Syrian Refugees,” Hill (Washington, DC), October 8, 2015.
12 Andrew Higgins, “Link to Paris Attack Roils Debate over Migrants in Hungary,” New York
Times, December 17, 2015; and Tim Hume, Tiffany Ap, and Ray Sanchez, “Here’s What We Know
about the Brussels Terror Attacks,” CNN, March 25, 2016.
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is captured in recent opinion polls, where 55 percent of Greeks and 60
percent of Italians believe refugees increase the likelihood of domestic
terrorism.13 Similarly, 72 percent of Greeks and 65 percent of Italians
claim refugees will take domestic jobs and benefits from national
citizens.14 These perceptions have affected European elections, as
the subject of mass migration moves to the forefront of international
discourse. The political—as well as economic, social, and security—
winds in Europe have changed, causing many elected officials to explore
options previously ignored.15
Medical concerns also surround the migration crisis, as displaced
populations historically carry a disproportionate percentage of infectious
diseases, such as human immunodeficiency virus, and hepatitis. In fact,
21 percent of tuberculosis cases in 2007 came from non-EU migrants.16
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control recently
stated migrants and refugees have overwhelmed the capacity of several
health service providers, creating gaps in medical treatment and records
management along Europe’s southern border.17 This challenge has
raised concerns from European citizens who question the government’s
ability to protect the health and safety of the domestic population.18

Impact of Mass Migration

Turkey, Greece, and Italy represent three NATO member states
where migration has affected stability. American military planners
should contemplate options to support Allied efforts for coping with
the security, economic, and political challenges that have emerged. The
following information and analysis provides an overview of some of the
challenges, opportunities, and risks that face each nation.

Turkey

Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan are the points of origin for nearly
half of all refugees who crossed Europe’s borders in 2015.19 In March
2016, the European Union announced an agreement with Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to curb the massive flow of migrants
traveling north through Turkey. This pact contained the following key
provisions: the European Union would pay Turkey 6 billion Euros to
hold approximately 3.5 million refugees and migrants; the European
Union would accelerate consideration for Turkey’s membership; Greece
could redirect migrants to Turkey; and Turkey would be required to

13 Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons, “Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will
Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs,” Pew Research Center, July 11, 2016, http://www.pewglobal
.org/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/.
14 Ibid.
15 Erik Kirschbaum and Andrea Shalal, “German Anti-Immigrant Party Beats Merkel in
Her Home District,” Reuters, September 3, 2016.; and interview with German general officer,
September 4, 2016.
16 Tony Barnett et al., Migrant Health: Background Note to the “CDC Report on Migration and Infectious
Diseases in the EU” (Stockholm: European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, 2009).
17 Flavia Riccardo et al., Handbook on Using the ECDC Preparedness Checklist Tool to Strengthen
Preparedness against Communicable Disease Outbreaks at Migrant Reception/Detention Centres (Stockholm:
European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, 2016).
18 Scott Campbell, “Italian Officials Ban Migrants with Potential Infectious Diseases over
Outbreak Fears,” Express (London), July 8, 2015.
19 Phillip Connor, “Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million
in 2015,” Pew Research Center, August 2, 2016, http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02
/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/.
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prevent further irregular migration to the EU.20 The agreement has
significantly reduced flows, for now, but with uneven implementation,
the future prospects of the provisions are uncertain. How long the
Turkish government can sustain the added weight of humanitarian
responsibility remains unknown, as unemployment reached 12.1 percent
in November 2016, and the estimated cost to support migrants exceeds
$500 million per month as of February 2017.21 Unfortunately, President
Erdogan continues to threaten European leaders with another flow of
migrants and refugees in an effort to bolster domestic popularity and
leverage further concessions from the European Union.22

Greece

Greece is another NATO ally hit hard by the effects of mass migration.
In 2015, more than 850,000 migrants and refugees illegally entered
Greece, most traveling through Turkey and across the Mediterranean
Sea.23 Many migrants either continued northward or returned to
Turkey, but over 62,000 remain in hastily constructed holding areas.24
Geography also plays an important role in mass migration to Greece,
as this nation serves as a gateway into the rest of Europe under the
Schengen Agreement within the Treaty of Amsterdam. Through the
agreement, residents may travel visa-free across 26 European nations.25
This pact benefits economic trade, but it also adds a degree of complexity
for Greece when dealing with security responsibilities for migrants and
refugees. Nonetheless, Greece greatly benefited from the agreement
between the European Union and Turkey, as migrant numbers dropped
by 79 percent from 2015 to 2016, from 67,000 refugees in January 2016
and 3,500 during August of the same year.26

Italy

According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, Italy also
grapples with the complex problem of mass migration. Prior to the Arab
Spring and the collapse of Muammar Gadhafi’s regime, Italy enjoyed
a controversial agreement with Libya that kept migration from North
Africa within politically acceptable limits. This agreement, under the
auspices of colonial reparation, allowed the Italian coast guard to return
migrants to Libya in exchange for annual payments of roughly $5 billion
US dollars. The arrangement proved to be effective, as Italy received
just 7,300 migrants from North Africa in 2010. However, following the

20 “EU-Turkey Statement: Questions and Answers,” European Commission, March 19, 2016,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm; Alison Smale, “Angela Merkel’s
Trust in Turkey and Greece on Migrants Comes with Risks,” New York Times, March 20, 2016; and
Cetingulec, “Refugee Influx.”
21 Cetingulec, “Refugee Influx.”
22 Safak Timur and Rod Norland, “Erdogan Threatens to Let Migrant Flood into Europe
Resume,” New York Times, November 25, 2016.
23 “Greece Data Snapshot,” UNHCR, March 29, 2016, https://data2.unhcr.org/en
/documents/download/47259; and UNHCR, Greece Fact Sheet (Geneva: UNHCR, February 2017).
24 “Fewer Migrants,” Frontex.
25 Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 233–34; and “Schengen Area Countries List,” Schengen Visa Info,
October 20, 2016, https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-countries-list/.
26 “Fewer Migrants,” Frontex; and “Since Alan Kurdi drowned, Mediterranean Deaths
Have Soared,” UNHCR, September 2, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/9
/57c9549e4/since-alan-kurdi-drowned-mediterranean-deaths-soared.html.
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upheaval in Libya in 2011, migration jumped to 30,000 and exceeded
100,000 per year by 2014.27
Unfortunately, the recent agreement with Turkey did not reduce
migration to Italy; in fact, numbers increased from 150,000 in 2015 to
over 180,000 in 2016.28 A key problem also involves the risk of drowning
while crossing the central Mediterranean. The United Nations reported
the mortality rate for migrants traveling from North Africa to Italy is 1:42,
and that over 4,100 migrants drowned while attempting to reach Europe
in the span of just 12 months.29 Even with these tragic statistics, tension
between Italian citizens and migrants over the perceived negative effects
to citizen safety and economic security has contributed to such behavior,
including explosions set off by 300 migrants near Turin, Italy, in 2016.30

History of US Military Support

US military leadership, planning, and resourcing has helped curb the
destabilizing effects of displaced populations in Europe during World War
II, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and US military capability can just as effectively
address today’s problem of mass migration. All three examples have
similarities to the current crisis that are based on geographic location,
forced migration, and ambiguity of the role the US military should
have during mass migration crises. Nonetheless, several differences
are evident, including the reasons for mass migration, the size of the
displaced populations, the migrants’ demographics, and the improvements in
international and nongovernmental organizations’ response capabilities.
Notably, the following case studies involve migrants mostly displaced
from within Europe’s borders, while the current crisis involves migrants
and refugees traveling to Europe from the Middle East and Africa.

Case Study 1: World War II Europe

The care and repatriation of millions of displaced persons was a
monumental challenge during the most devastating war in European
history. After Eisenhower took command in January 1944, refugees
and displaced persons were treated as a command responsibility,
and military units cared for and controlled the refugee camps and
installations.31 Planning cells were tasked with managing and monitoring
support for migration and refugee operations from 1944 through 1945,
and their guidance regarding unaccompanied children was adopted
with minor changes by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration.32 Despite the lack of clear political direction from US
and Allied officials, Eisenhower initiated an effort that would eventually
27 “Refugees/Migrants,” UNHCR.
28 Steve Scherer, “Record 2016 Pushes Migrant Arrivals in Italy Over Half Million,” Reuters,
December 30, 2016; and Frontex, “Fewer Migrants.”
29 “Since Alan Kurdi drowned,” UNHCR.
30 Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “Tensions Run High in Rome’s Suburbs as Italy Struggles with
Migration Crisis,” Guardian, July 26, 2015; and Oli Smith, “Migrant Centre Explosions: Violence
between Locals and Migrants Shuts Down Italian City,” Express, November 25, 2016.
31 Louise W. Holborn, The International Refugee Organization: A Specialized Agency of the United
Nations, Its History and Work 1946–1952 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 3, 15–27; and
Malcolm J. Proudfoot, European Refugees: 1939–52: A Study in Forced Population Movement (Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1956), 96, 97, 162–67, 450–68.
32 Proudfoot, European Refugees, 159; and Joseph B. Schechtman, The Refugee in the World:
Displacement and Integration (New York: A.S. Barnes, 1963), 3–4.
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provide humanitarian aid for more than 6.7 million displaced refugees
and migrants during and after the war.33
These efforts were possible because Eisenhower agreed with Field
Marshal Moltke’s statement that plans may amount to nothing, but the
process of planning is invaluable.34 Proudfoot explained the Allies had no
plan for managing mass migration in 1943, or at least no comprehensive
plan that addressed the complexities of displaced populations on the
battlefields of Italy. Eisenhower directed his staff to form a Displaced
Persons Branch to integrate the lessons learned in Italy as part of
contingency planning for the Normandy invasion, Operation Overlord.
These plans were finalized and published just two days prior to the
invasion and their implementation played a pivotal role in mitigating
the suffering of displaced civilians across Europe. A key component of
the plans included tailored guidance to account for disparate regional
challenges—for example, one appendix focused on migration issues
in France, while another addressed refugee contingencies in Belgium.
Finally, the migration plans helped inform resource decisions, such as
Allied trucks to transport food, supplies, and displaced persons and
allocation of military personnel for construction, plumbing, sanitation,
and security services for each refugee support center.35
From 1944 through 1945, Allied planners were faced with the
challenge of balancing limited means to address a growing number
of wartime requirements.36 In one instance, Proudfoot explains, the
Supreme Headquarters directed US Civil Affairs units in Italy to feed
and to transport migrants on the battlefield, but the units did not have
the authority to task the necessary logistical capabilities for their assigned
mission. The planners corrected this problem through military-operated
support centers across Europe that provided subsistence, lodging,
sanitation, medical, educational, and security services for refugees and
migrants. The headquarters also assigned combat support capabilities—
such as personnel from civil affairs, military police, medical, and
transportation units—to operate the centers.
When Germany surrendered in May 1945, Allied forces had provided
humanitarian aid to over 2 million displaced civilians. By September
of that same year, the number had grown to almost 7 million.37 Law
Number 1, which established the principle of “non-discrimination
on the grounds of race, creed nationality, or political opinion” likely
contributed to the American’s successful refugee mission.38 Thus, the
headquarters later facilitated training missions for the newly established
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to transfer the
humanitarian mission from military to civilian control.39

33 Proudfoot, European Refugees, 159.
34 Helmuth von Moltke in Peter G. Tsouras, ed., The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations
(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000), 364.
35 Proudfoot, European Refugees, 96–97, 162–63, 167, 191, 450–68, 480–81.
36 Jeffrey Record, Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends (Washington, DC:
Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984), 1–3.
37 Proudfoot, European Refugees, 96–97; 125–28; 159; 162–63.
38 Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953), 148.
39 Holborn, International Refugee Organization, 168–69.
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Case Study 2: Bosnia

The problem of forced migration in Europe reemerged in the 1990s,
after the European Commission recognized the independence of Slovenia
and Croatia in January 1992 and Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992,
and the United Nations and the European community failed to facilitate
peace within the Republic of Yugoslavia. As the communist regime
crumbled, ethnic fighting began among Muslim Bosnians, Serbian, and
Croatian populations, who comprised 44 percent, 31 percent, and 17
percent of the population, respectively.40 Because of the violence, the
United Nation’s peacekeeping forces in Bosnia were unable to provide
humanitarian relief to thousands of displaced civilians.41 Between 1992
and 1995, an estimated 97,000 people were killed during the Balkan
conflict and over 2.3 million civilians were driven from their homes.42
This disruption caused significant concern for NATO officials due to
the negative impact on the security posture of member states in the
region, and the US military responded once again.43
US military leaders arrived late to the Bosnian conflict, mainly
because senior military and political leaders viewed the situation as a
European problem.44 Warren Zimmermann, former US Ambassador to
Yugoslavia, blamed America’s reluctance on the “Vietnam syndrome,”
while General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned
against committing forces in the Balkans without a clear political end
state.45 However, heightened media attention on the escalating violence in
Bosnia, coupled with the United Nations’ inability to stabilize the region,
pressured Washington to accept a more prominent leadership role.46
Once NATO agreed to the UN request for military assistance,
US military leadership took center stage and provided much needed
direction and motivation to enforce the terms of peace agreed to under
the Dayton Accords.47 In November 1995, US General George A.
Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander, visited the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees’ headquarters for a personal assessment of
the humanitarian situation in Bosnia.48 He also directed NATO staff to
develop detailed plans, including a time-phased repatriation effort, to
best support peace objectives outlined by the United Nations Security
Council.49 Finally, to show his commitment to the success of this
operation, Joulwan proposed a collocated command group consisting of
NATO and United Nations’ personnel.50
40 Sadako N. Ogata, The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2005), 50–51.
41 Ibid.; and Walter E. Kretchik, “Military Planning before Operation Joint Endeavor: An
Initial Assessment,” in Robert F. Baumann, George W. Gawrych, and Walter E. Kretchik, Armed
Peacekeepers in Bosnia (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 69–94.
42 Steven Woehrel, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Current Issues and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 2013), 2.
43 Kretchik, “Military Planning,” 63 and 67; and Ogata, Turbulant Decade, 104.
44 Joyce P. Kaufman, NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict and the Atlantic Alliance
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 217; Ogata, The Turbulent Decade, 53; and Kretchik,
“Military Planning,” 68.
45 Robert F. Baumann, “From UNPROFOR to IFOR,” in Armed Peacekeepers, 38.
46 Ogata, Turbulent Decade, 102.
47 Woehrel, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
48 Ogata, Turbulent Decade, 106.
49 Ibid., 106–7.
50 Ibid.
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As in World War II, US military planning played a critical role
in supporting the problem of mass migration in Europe. Similar to
Eisenhower’s planning team, Joulwan’s staff sprang into action within
the Supreme Headquarters.51 These planners led the development of what
would become Operation Joint Endeavor, and provided guidance to the
NATO-led peacekeeping force that would enter Bosnia in December 1995
and transfer the mission to the European Union in 2004.52 Furthermore,
US Army Europe and V Corps planners also played a significant role in
developing a detailed campaign plan that included a large sustainment
force capable of supporting the complexities of an international
humanitarian effort under the terms of the Dayton Accords.53
Resourcing US military forces in Bosnia became a point of
contention within American domestic politics in the 1990s. Many leaders
worried about becoming involved in a European affair with no vital US
interests, while others warned of joining an effort that had no clear exit
strategy.54 However, heightened media attention in the summer of 1995
caused US officials to act by employing military means to help stabilize
Bosnia and provide much needed humanitarian relief to millions of
displaced civilians.55
By September 1995, US ground forces in Europe began training
for peacekeeping operations, and by late December, American military
units entered the war-torn region of Bosnia as part of a NATO-led
peace Implementation Force.56 Resourcing this operation extended past
American political projections, as US forces continued to deploy to Bosnia
from December 1995 through 2004, until being replaced by forces from
the European Union.57 For all the challenges surrounding logistical and
security demands in the Balkans, US military resourcing proved to be
a critical component of a holistic international response to the largest
forced migration crisis in Europe since the end of World War II.

Case Study 3: Kosovo

In 1999, Europe witnessed yet another large-scale forced migration
event.58 Like Bosnia, Kosovo’s migration crisis was a product of failed
diplomatic talks between members of the international community and
Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic. Most of the disagreements
centered on the Yugoslavia’s response to Kosovar separatists.59 Fearing
another Bosnia scenario, the international community quickly intervened
to pressure Milosevic to accept a cease-fire agreement between the Serbs
and Kosovars.
However, as reports of genocide reached the international
community, the UN Security Council authorized a NATO air campaign
against Serb military targets to begin in March 1999. Milosevic responded
by forcing more than 800,000 Kosovars to flee their homes for the safety
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Kretchik, “Military Planning,” 60.
Woehrel, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2–3; and Kretchik, “Military Planning,” 61.
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Kretchik, “Military Planning,” 68–69.
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of bordering nations.60 The ensuing migration undermined the security
posture of several bordering nations and placed enormous strain on allied
resolve—for example, 100,000 refugees flowed into Macedonia, creating
a domestic political crisis that required international intervention.61
Meanwhile, another 100,000 Kosovars fled to Albania and 27,000 to
Montenegro.62 The international community would once again turn to
the US military for much needed leadership, planning, and resourcing to
help address the problem of forced migration in Europe.
US General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe,
answered the international community’s call for a leader who would
provide the purpose, direction, and motivation necessary to address the
growing crisis in Kosovo. Early in the conflict, Clark warned politicians
in Washington that NATO bombings would become a race against time
since Milosevic would likely increase violence against the Kosovars
in response to NATO air strikes.63 Unfortunately, Clark did not communicate this warning to leaders within the United Nations, who were
surprised by the tens of thousands of migrants who overwhelmed the small
refugee camps located in Albania and Macedonia.64 This communication
failure contrasted sharply with the partnership experienced during the
Bosnia conflict, and seems odd given the repeated warnings by Milosevic
concerning his political weapon of choice in Kosovo.65
Although US military leaders miscalculated the size and scope of
forced migration in Kosovo, they moved quickly with NATO allies to
plan a detailed crisis response effort for the economic and political strain
on flailing border states.66 Specifically, Supreme Headquarters planners
faced several synchronization challenges that included late-arriving
logistical requests from the United Nations, as well as accusations of
encroachment into the oversight responsibilities of UN humanitarian
officials.67 Simultaneously, military planners juggled several domestic
political concerns within the affected border states—for example, the
Macedonian government viewed Kosovar refugees as a security threat
and officially opposed the NATO air campaign, which they believed
caused a spike in migration activity.
In contrast, Albania was generally supportive of NATO military
operations and openly received Kosovar refugees because of their
shared ethnicity.68 Fortunately for the Alliance and the international
community, Milosevic sued for peace within a matter of months,
allowing military leaders to turn their attention to developing plans for
a NATO-led peacekeeping force shaped by the previous campaign in
neighboring Bosnia.69
The US military played a pivotal role in the Alliance’s ability to
resource a well-organized humanitarian operation, especially along
60
61
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64
65
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the Macedonian and Albanian borders. Sadako Ogata, the UN’s high
commissioner for refugees, admitted that NATO forces provided a more
efficient system of support to migrants than did her own organization.70
During this crisis, the Alliance’s leaders wisely chose to tap the enormous
potential of military logistical capabilities that provided 4,600 tons of
food and water, 2,600 tons of tents, and 1,600 tons of medical supplies
to affected nations between March and June of 1999.71

Analysis of American Efforts

In each case study, US military leadership served as a pillar and
catalyst for effectively addressing the migration crisis. Although
Eisenhower, Joulwan, and Clark each faced disparate challenges, they
recognized the destabilizing effects that refugees and migrants had on the
security posture of the affected nation-states. All three military leaders
served as the commander of allied forces in Europe, which provided the
organizational structure and command authority necessary to oversee a
multifaceted, international operation. Two of the three leaders seized the
initiative by studying the impact of migration on security and stability
operations and by directing planning teams to develop and coordinate
a holistic, integrated response. However, different levels of success
resulted from variations in leadership style and the authorities that each
leader had in committing the necessary resources.
US military planning served as the second pillar for success,
highlighting the importance of communicating the commander’s intent
and synchronizing logistical requirements associated with the complex
demands of mass migration. Each planning group factored a range of
geographic and ethnic considerations into their analysis and dispersed
limited resources across long lines of communication to achieve their
stated objective. Of the three staffs, the planners during World War
II arguably faced the most difficult task of fighting Axis powers in
Europe while simultaneously providing humanitarian support for over
6 million refugees.
Nevertheless, each of the planning teams faced its own set of unique
challenges—for example, the planners in 1995 operated under a severely
compressed timeline for developing the right-sized peacekeeping force
in Bosnia, while those in 1999 focused on hasty expansion of refugee
camps in Macedonia and Albania. In 1945, planners developed training
programs for UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration personnel to
assume civilian control of the migrant crisis, while the military focused
on enforcing security zones of separation between warring ethnic
groups to set the conditions for UN aid to the Balkans. Ultimately,
each planning staff succeeded in developing the flexible guidance
necessary to communicate the commanders’ intent while synchronizing
humanitarian relief for millions of displaced civilians.
US military resourcing, especially logistical resourcing, serves as
the third pillar of success for addressing mass migration in Europe. All
three case studies demonstrated a weakness in nonmilitary response
efforts to cope adequately with the massive logistical requirements.

70 Ibid., 151.
71 “NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo,” NATO, July 15, 1999, https://www
.nato.int/Kosovo/history.htm.
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Military planners’ recognition of resourcing mistakes made during
operations in Italy greatly influenced Allied humanitarian efforts
following Operation Overlord. Close coordination between the military
leadership and members of the UN helped establish clear lines of
responsibilities for distributing humanitarian aid within designated safe
zones. And, the willingness of military planners to offset the logistical
shortcomings of several humanitarian organizations in Kosovo helped
stabilize the populace and allow for an orderly transition from military
to civilian oversight.

Recommendations

Based upon a complex set of challenges surrounding Europe’s
problem of mass migration, senior leaders should consider employing US
military leadership, planning, and resourcing to strengthen the security
posture of NATO. To this end, the US European Command publicly
announced its intention to work with US interagency partners, while
monitoring the refugee crisis.72 However, there has been little concrete
progress on addressing the existing gaps in European response efforts,
or in designing integrated civil-military contingency plans for a future
spike in mass migration.
Military leaders must seize the initiative to strengthen the security
posture of NATO. Recently, a senior US military leader explained that
limited assets must be focused on the mission of deterring Russia, while
the European Union addresses the migrant crisis.73 Although this is
a reasonable position, considering the high-risk threat of a revanchist
Russia, historical case studies highlight the value of employing US
military capabilities to counter the destabilizing effects of forced
migration. It is also worth considering that humanitarian and deterrence
missions in Europe are not mutually exclusive, but rather interdependent
and essential for achieving a strong and resilient NATO alliance.
Metaphorically speaking, it is important to keep a sharp eye on the
opponent’s queen during a chess match, but it may be the lowly pawn
that creates a checkmate. The decision to apply US military means to
the problem of mass migration is certainly a political one. However,
developing options and contingency plans to address likely security
threats is the role and responsibility of military leaders.
The US European Command should consider establishing a
planning team focused on studying the problem of mass migration in
Europe. Once established, this planning cell should develop a range of
options in coordination with host nation officials, the United Nations,
and other humanitarian organizations. Under most circumstances, the
US military would not lead humanitarian relief operations, but bilateral
or multilateral planning efforts could bridge the civil-military divide
and enable government and nongovernment agencies to understand
unique military capabilities. More importantly, these planning efforts
increase the probability of saving lives while simultaneously stabilizing
the security posture of several European allies. Multilateral planning
is a low-cost, high-payoff activity which would increase understanding
72 “U.S. European Command Posture Statement 2016,” US European Command, February
25, 2016, https://www.eucom.mil/media-library/article/35164/u-s-european-command-posture
-statement-2016.
73 Interview with military leader, September 29, 2016.
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and readiness without detracting from a necessary focus on more
conventional deterrence activities.
Putting plans into action requires resourcing, and there are several
limited ways that the US European Command could approach this
challenge now, which would establish a baseline for larger-scale contingency
operations should the need arise. Congress already funds combatant
commanders to perform humanitarian operations through the Overseas
Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid appropriation. The annual requests
for such funding could include estimates for supporting mass migration
contingencies. Planners could also leverage the capabilities of reserve
forces through the use of Active Duty for Operational Support funding.74
This option would allow military leaders to keep active component units
focused on deterring Russia, while simultaneously building individual and
unit readiness in the reserve components through operational employment overseas. Finally, planners should consider including requests for
specified capabilities as part of their annual integrated priority list to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of the program objective memorandum.75
The following recommendations for providing US military support
to Turkey, Greece, and Italy are based on a net assessment of several
gaps in existing capabilities. These recommendations should not be
considered comprehensive, but rather serve as a starting point for
further research, analysis, and bilateral and multilateral planning. It is
worth noting that in February 2016, NATO sent a maritime group to
patrol and report suspected migrant smuggling activity in the Aegean
Sea as part of a security request for assistance from Turkey, Greece,
and Germany.76 NATO forces also contributed maritime forces for
Operation Sea Guardian in November 2016 to support the European
Union’s antimigrant smuggling efforts in the central Mediterranean
Sea.77 The following information highlights the value of providing
additional support capability.
Turkey would likely benefit from targeted US military support
to address issues of protection, health services, and infrastructure
development in support of the 3.5 million refugees and migrants located
within its borders.78 The US Army Corps of Engineers could, for example,
help train Turkish military and civilian agencies in constructing temporary aid stations, schools, and sanitation facilities, using construction
materials paid with funds from the existing agreement between the
European Union and Turkey. In addition, US military physicians could
provide technical training and support to help prevent the spread of
communicable disease and treat the growing number of women and
children with health-related issues.79 Once a resolution is established in
Syria and Iraq, civil affairs experts could assist the Turkish government
in developing repatriation plans for future implementation.80 Regardless
74 Gary Morris, (deputy director, Army Reserve, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of
the Chief, Army Reserve), email message to author, February 17, 2017.
75 Ibid.
76 US Army Europe, civil affairs operations officer, email message to author, December 8, 2016.
77 Ibid.
78 “Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan in Response to the Syria Crisis: Turkey,” UNHCR,
November 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224; and Cetingulec,
“Refugee Influx.”
79 Cetingulec, “Refugee Influx.”
80 Trump, “Remarks by President.”
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of the support package developed, US military planners should consider
a range of options to help prevent Turkey from becoming an increasingly
autocratic and unstable member of NATO.
Greece could benefit from US military training and assistance
for improved security screening activities. In 2015, several terrorists
entered Greece claiming to be migrants, but they later conducted deadly
bombings in Paris and Brussels.81 Increased intelligence support and
coordination could reduce the risk of future attacks against NATO
member states. US military engineers could also assist with infrastructure
development to improve hastily constructed holding areas that currently
contain over 62,000 refugees.82 Targeted US military medical support
could also help curb the spread of communicable disease in the region,
while reducing the government’s reliance on the success or failure of the
fragile agreement with Turkey.
Finally, although Italy has relatively stable economic and security
positions in Europe, the Italian government could benefit from US
military means. Training opportunities and support packages could
include maritime rescue capabilities to reduce the staggering number
of migrants lost at sea. Unmanned aerial reconnaissance support could
assist Frontex efforts to develop appropriate security responses by
identifying high-risk watercraft crossing the central Mediterranean and
identifying suspected smuggling activities. The US military’s medical
expertise in gynecology, obstetrics, and pediatrics could prove helpful
to the more than 59,000 refugee women and children already located
in Italy.83 Finally, civil affairs personnel could play a role in managing
administrative functions and communication efforts within large
refugee holding areas.

Conclusion

US political leaders should consider employing military leadership,
planning, and resourcing to achieve the strategic objective of a strong
and resilient security posture in NATO. Although the United States
continues to assist allies and partners by providing billions of dollars in
aid, there is no substitute for applying all of the elements of national power
when dealing with the complex challenges of mass migration. Options
for action or inaction include intersecting lines of risk within the larger
question of European security. The case can be made that too much, or too
little, involvement could interfere with long-term US interests; however, it
seems prudent to develop options for senior leaders to consider as part of a
comprehensive strategic assessment of the migrant challenge in Europe.
In the end, the United States must do what it has always done in response
to a crisis that involves its European allies—America must lead.84

81 Andrew Higgins, “Link to Paris”; and Chris Graham et al., “Sources Say Ibrahim El Bakraoui
Was on US Counterterrorism Watch List before Paris Attacks,” Telegraph, March 26, 2016.
82 “Migrant Crisis,” Telegraph; and “Tension Grows, Refugees on Chios Burn Down Refugee
Pre-fab Shelters,” National Herald, October 10, 2016.
83 “Asylum Seekers Monthly Data,” UNHCR, October 18, 2016, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en
/asylum_seekers_monthly; and Sarah Crowe and Chris Tidey, “Record Numbers of Unaccompanied
Children Arrive in Italy,” United Nations Children’s Fund, October 18, 2016, http://www.unicef
.org/media/media_92928.html.
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Transforms,” Department of Defense, February 14, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News
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ABSTRACT: This article explores the individual, situational, and
system roles influencing the 2011 incident in which a small unit of
US Marine scout snipers urinated on three Taliban corpses. Without
absolving individual responsibility, the authors emphasize a strong
command climate is the most important influence behind ethical
and professional behavior.

I

n the waning days of 2011, the leaders of 3d Battalion, 2d
Marine Regiment, could justifiably reflect with pride on the unit’s
accomplishments during the past year. Tasked with a key role in the
largest, most austere area of operations in northern Helmand province,
the commanding officer instituted a comprehensive ethical warrior
program into every aspect of operations and through each phase of
training, combat operations, and post-deployment recovery.
During the seven-month deployment, 3/2 garnered high praise for
its innovative tactics and for the exploits of its successful scout sniper
platoon. The Commandant and the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps
subsequently hosted a congratulatory breakfast for the scout sniper
platoon. The battalion even garnered national attention and praise when
actress Mila Kunis attended its post-deployment Marine Corps Birthday
Ball in November 2011.
With the loss of six marines and one US Navy corpsman, the
deployment had been challenging and difficult. But, the battalion had
returned triumphantly with its honor clean. Little did it suspect, twelve
days into the new year, a 39-second video clip posted on YouTube would
forever transform the legacy of that deployment. The video showed four
marines from the unit urinating on the bodies of a few Taliban fighters.
This article explores the professional and ethical dimensions of the
four marines’ actions and focuses on why the event happened. The main
objective is to understand whether this unit of marines fully grasped the
ethical implications of its behavior.
We analyze the urination incident by adopting the ethical
decision-making typology of outcomes developed by Ann Tenbrunsel
and Kristin Smith-Crowe. Their typology “distinguishing between
the process that produced the decision (moral or amoral decisionmaking) and the decision that resulted (ethical or unethical), produces
four different outcomes—intended ethicality, unintended ethicality,

1 The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and Colonel Timothy S. Mundy
for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this article.
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intended unethicality, and unintended unethicality.”2 Tenbrunsel and
Smith-Crowe explained “the moral decision-making that follows from
moral awareness can result in unethical decisions as well as ethical
ones; likewise, the amoral decision-making that follows from moral
unawareness can lead to ethical decisions as well as unethical ones.”3
Thus, the incident potentially falls into the categories of intended
unethicality, and more likely, unintended unethicality.
Our research indicates the marines associated with the incident
accepted the behavior as normal: urinating on dead enemies was not a
desecration, or a war crime, but a strong victory statement made against
an extremely cruel enemy. In the moment, it is questionable whether the
marines clearly perceived the unethical dimension of what they were
doing. To the extent their behavior had become normal—a victory
statement—such behavior also became unintentional. Thus, it is very
likely the action occurred in a condition of ethical blindness. At least one
marine came to regret his action, which is consistent with a temporary
inability to see the ethical dimension of such behavior. Several marines,
however, showed no regrets for their roles, which leads to the belief
that they intentionally engaged in unethical behavior. It can be argued
their perceptions of the conditions in which they operated, no longer
filtered by a healthy command climate, removed ethical thinking from
their decision-making. Thus, their conduct would be consistent with
unintended unethicality.
To understand what led these experienced and high-performing
marines to engage in such unethical and unprofessional actions, we
explore three main elements significant to explaining human behavior.
First, we focus on the individual to understand whether these marines
exhibited or had different characteristics from other marines and,
therefore, might have been more inclined to engage in unethical behavior.
Second, on the situation to evaluate whether these marines operated
in an exceptional environment, which contributed to their unethical
behavior. Third, on the system, the organization they belonged to, to
evaluate whether it failed to promote ethical behavior and actually might
have encouraged unethical behavior. We posit the consequential element
of this system to be the command climate.
Unethical behavior is the result of several elements failing. Indeed,
a functioning and resilient system should be able to prevent unethical
behavior. Yet the following analysis provides strong evidence that the
command climate in which these marines operated over a number of
months had degraded to a dangerous level. This finding does not excuse
the behavior of the individual marines nor absolve them of responsibility
for their actions.
Our objective is to provide an opportunity to reflect on the role of
the command climate, or the system, to determine the behavior of unit
members and to ensure it is prepared for difficult challenges, particularly
in highly stressful situations such as combat. More important, this article
emphasizes the pivotal role commanders play in shaping command
2 Ann E. Tenbrunsel and Kristin Smith-Crowe, “Ethical Decision Making: Where
We’ve Been and Where We’re Going,” Academy of Management Annals 2, no. 1 (2008): 553,
doi:10.1080/19416520802211677.
3 Ibid., 554.
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climate. Particular attention is given to the problematic phenomenon
that well-meaning leaders might unintentionally create conditions
leading to unethical behavior.

Outstanding Platoon

The marines of the sniper platoon were extremely experienced;
several of them were tactically savvy and adaptable thinkers. Many
had seen combat in its ugliest face. For those who had separated, their
sense of brotherhood and service caused them to return to the Marine
Corps and to volunteer for deployment. Marines have unique and special
motivations and bonding that are often even stronger for a tight-knit
unit such as the scout snipers.
The scout sniper platoon of 3/2 was shaped mostly by its platoon
leader, Staff Sergeant Joseph W. Chamblin. Chamblin joined the platoon
in late summer 2010 believing he would be the platoon sergeant. He had
been a marine for 15 years, 10 of which as a sniper. He had deployed
on missions abroad several times and already had seen combat in both
Afghanistan and Iraq.4 As a result of the battalion struggling to fill all
of the officer billets while preparing for the deployment to Afghanistan,
and likely because the commanding officer wanted an experienced sniper
in charge of the platoon rather than a young junior officer, Chamblin
was selected to take command of the platoon.
The immediate challenge was to prepare the platoon for the
deployment to Afghanistan. Chamblin remembered: “Unfortunately,
the starting point wasn’t good. The Platoon’s reputation wasn’t stellar
in the Battalion or the sniper community. When I arrived, the platoon
had fourteen men and only one school trained scout/sniper or HOG
[Hunter of Gunmen].”5
A few years earlier, while a scout sniper instructor in Quantico,
Virginia, Chamblin had plenty of opportunities to meet, train, and
develop many experienced, outstanding, and committed marines. In
his new role as platoon commander, Chamblin asked some of them
to join the platoon. Sergeant Robert W. Richards—a marine since
2007 who had completed a tour of duty in Garmsir, Afghanistan, with
1/6—accepted. Other marines respected Richards, and he understood
the most effective way to employ snipers. During the battle of Marjah
(Operation Moshtarak) in February 2010, Richards was seriously
wounded by an improvised explosive device (IED).6 His psychological
wounds matched his physical wounds; he qualified for 100 percent
disability. Yet Richards recovered from the physical wounds and coped
with the psychological ones. Once removed from limited duty status,
he returned to the Marines. Initially Richards was supposed to mentor
the less experienced snipers. Yet, the more time he spent with the scout
sniper platoon, the clearer it became in his mind that he needed, but also
wanted, to deploy with them. He became the leader of Team 4.

4 Joe Chamblin, Into Infamy: A Marine Sniper’s War, with Milo Afong (Middletown, DE:
CreateSpace Publishing, 2015), 109.
5 Ibid., 113.
6 Hope Hodge Seck, “Marine Sniper Rob Richards Died from Drug Toxicity: Autopsy,” Marine
Corps Times, November 30, 2014.
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By the fall of 2010, the platoon had gone through intensive training.
Out of the 39 marines and 2 sailors, “twenty-three of the Marines were
school trained HOGs, and the others were hand selected, exceptional
infantrymen.” 7 In addition to completing tactical training, all 3/2
units were directed to incorporate ethics instruction in every aspect
of training, and to conduct two hours of focused ethical instruction
every week. Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Christopher G.
Dixon, a veteran of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, understood
the demanding uncertainties of a dispersed, counterinsurgency
environment. In his view, the mission required the marines of 3/2 to be
ethical warriors, “to show restraint in the use of force and sometimes
accept tactical risk, in order to protect the people and to support our
strategic goals.”8
The battalion’s ethical warrior program sought “to develop highperforming individuals and small units who are morally, psychologically,
and emotionally resilient in order to operate, live and thrive on an
austere battlefield defined by fog, friction and severe stress.”9 Small unit
discussions and ethical decision games were conducted. An ethical warrior
reading list was posted to the battalion’s shared drive. The program
continued during combat operations in Afghanistan. Significantly,
prior to and following each mission, small-team leaders were to address
and debrief potential or encountered ethical dilemmas, making the
“harder-right” a matter of “muscle-memory.”10 Finally, the program
helped post-deployment marines develop resilience and minimize posttraumatic stress. The marines of 3/2 probably completed more ethics
training than other units who had deployed to either Afghanistan or
Iraq. Moreover, the ethics training concept, which focused on small
group discussions led by leaders in the platoon and in smaller units,
was sound.
Early in 2011, the battalion relieved 1/8, in Helmand Province,
Afghanistan, a widely-recognized Taliban stronghold. Historically, bloody
fighting between the International Security Assistance Force troops and
the Taliban occurred in Helmand. Despite the great commitment of
resources and lives, the province remained very unstable and volatile.
The Musa Qala and Now Zad districts, where the battalion was deployed,
were particularly dangerous, hotly contested areas. Chamblin deployed
one sniper team to Now Zad, nicknamed Apocalypse Now Zad, and the
rest of the platoon to Musa Qala.11
The marine snipers proved to be extremely effective from the start,
killing a significant number of Taliban. The enemy called them “ghosts”
as they were able to hit hard and remain unseen.12 The most innovative
tactic adopted by the snipers put them in a leading role with the support
of a tank unit. In a few months the snipers’ accomplishments were
known and acknowledged beyond the battalion. Three months into the
7 Chamblin, 116.
8 E. G. Clayton, Letter of Instruction, “3d Battalion, 2d Marines Ethical Warrior Program,”
October 1, 2010, Camp Lejeune, NC.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Dan Lamothe, “3/2 Marines Replace 1/8 in Musa Qala, Now Zad,” BattleRattle (blog),
Marine Corps Times, March 30, 2011, http://battlerattle.marinecorpstimes.com/2011/03/30/32
-marines-replace-18-in-musa-qala-now-zad/.
12 Chamblin, 130.
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deployment, the platoon had more than 70 confirmed kills.13 Chamblin
wrote, “the command couldn’t have been more pleased with our work
and results.”14
Major General John A. Toolan, the commanding officer of II
Marine Expeditionary Force and the commander of Regional Command
Southwest in Afghanistan, did not miss the excellent performance of the
tanks and snipers that resulted in 50 kills in 10 days, noting the likelihood
of individuals with “upwards of 100 kills.”15 Toolan even visited with the
platoon to congratulate them on their successes.
Towards the end of the deployment, while the marines of the
scout sniper platoon were waiting to return to the United States, thenCommandant of the Marine Corps General James F. Amos—who was
on a visit to Afghanistan with Sergeant Major Micheal P. Barrett, the
sergeant major of the Marine Corps—decided to have breakfast with
the platoon. The platoon’s achievement had been acknowledged by
many at different levels, but to have the Commandant do so in person
was extremely flattering. The snipers received challenge coins from the
Commandant and words of praise. Chamblin wrote, the Commandant
and the Sergeant Major “specifically requested to sit down with my
platoon. . . . walked around, talked to [platoon members], congratulated
them. . . . shook everyone’s hand, gave them a coin and told them they
had done a great job. It meant a lot.”16

“Piss on these assholes.”

The urination incident took place less than five months after the scout
sniper platoon had deployed to Afghanistan. They had become extremely
experienced in the region and had acquired a solid understanding of the
enemy and its activities. Over several weeks of monitoring an area near
the small village of Sandalah, where the Taliban presence was heavy and
their activity particularly intense, the platoon identified several valuable
targets; they focused on a Taliban command cell.
Seventeen marines, mainly from Team 4, left Patrol Base (PB) 7171
in the early hours of July 27, 2011, to take position close to the village.
Pushing into a territory the battalion rarely had ventured in before, the
patrol covered a few miles while avoiding IEDs and several Taliban
observation points. They arrived in place at five o’clock in the morning.
A little after seven, the scout snipers engaged the enemy, killing twelve
and suffering no casualties.17 Then they received the order from their
command to retrieve a few of the closest Taliban bodies. Chamblin
strongly opposed the request, which he considered to be “completely
unfitting for a sniper mission.”18 Yet as the fight subsided, the snipers

13 Ibid., 143.
14 Ibid.
15 Dan Lamothe, “General: More Than 100 Kills for Some Marine Snipers”, BattleRattle (blog),
Marine Corps Times, September 1, 2011.
16 Gina Harkins, “Exclusive: Controversial Marine Sniper Fires Back at Critics, Military Times,
October 31, 2013.
17 Chamblin, 182–84; and Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC),
Command Investigation into the Alleged Desecration of Corpses by U.S. Marines in Afghanistan (Quantico, VA:
MCCDC, 2012), 26–28.
18 Chamblin, 188.
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sent two Afghans with a wheelbarrow to transport the bodies to a
temporary compound.
Standing there in a brief silence, knowing the men laying dead [at] our feet
were responsible for inflicting pain and misery on our fellow Marines, I felt
a surge of anger deep in my bones. They had taken the life of a man whom
I considered a brother. They’d also gathered his mutilated body parts and
hung them in a tree for us to find. I stood burning inside. Someone jokingly
said, “Piss on these assholes!” The joke died almost instantly, and we couldn’t
help ourselves. Hell, urinating on them still showed more respect for their
dead than they showed of ours.19

Intention of the Individual

When watching the infamous short video of the incident, the marines
appear as if they did what they intended to do. Whether they truly
understood the nature of their actions, however, is unclear. Considering
their experience and training, they should have known their behavior
was unethical and unprofessional. Their conduct, therefore, might be
considered intended unethicality. Yet, analysis reveals the possibility that,
when they decided to urinate on the dead enemies, the marines’ ability to
see the ethical dimension of the action was significantly compromised
or, more likely, completely absent. They were ethically blind.
During his court martial, Staff Sergeant Edward W. Deptola, the
platoon sergeant, expressed regret for not stopping the other marines
from urinating on the enemy bodies. Deptola said, “I was in a position
to stop it and I did not. . . . I should have spoken up on the spot.”20 When
Lieutenant Colonel Nicole Hudspeth, the judge advocate, questioned
Deptola’s motive, he said: “I have no excuse, no reason, ma’am . . . it was
not the correct way to handle a human casualty.”21 It is unclear whether
Deptola regretted not intervening during the incident or condoning the
marines’ behavior. Yet, Chamblin wrote, “Later, when asked why we did
it, Dep [Deptola] said it best. ‘Killing these assholes was not enough.’ ”22
Neither Chamblin nor Richards showed remorse for the incident.
But, what they said helps us understand their behavior. In their minds,
urinating on dead enemies did not constitute desecration, or a war crime,
rather it was a strong victory statement. They had vanquished a brutal
enemy. Chamblin explained,
I didn’t see anything wrong with it. I would do it again. It wasn’t like we had
some random Afghans laying there. They were insurgents, they had weapons
and they were trying to kill us. The same guys were making IEDs and trying
to kill Marines. If they could get over here, they would cut off the heads of
everybody in this room right now. That’s how they are. And you know what?
I won that day. They didn’t.23

At least two factors that influenced the behavior of this small
team are revealed by the events surrounding the incident. For the first
time into the deployment, they had been asked to bring corpses to the
battalion command post. Such a task is unusual for a sniper unit; indeed,
19 Chamblin, 191.
20 “US Marine Pleads Guilty to Urinating on Corpse of Taliban Fighter in Afghanistan,”
Guardian, January 16, 2013.
21 Ibid.
22 Chamblin, 191.
23 Harkins, “Exclusive.”
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Chamblin unsuccessfully pushed back on his chain of command. Yet,
the command’s request put them in close contact with the enemy bodies.
After the incident and before leaving the area, the unit had two locals
load the dead enemies on top of a tank. Despite the fact that body bags,
required by regulations, should have been available, they were not used.
According to Chamblin, once all the equipment was loaded and the dead
bodies were placed on the tank, they decided to ride back to the base on
the tank. It became a victory parade that Chamblin remembered proudly.
Displaying the dead insurgents atop the tanks sent a strong message to the
enemy and the locals. We were the lions, the victors. Riding on top of the
tanks, despite the stench of stinking bodies, felt great, how the Mongols
must have felt riding their horses after a hard fought battle. . . . We were
welcomed back to the Battalion Command post like conquering heroes.24

A growing body of research into ethical behavior and decisionmaking, clearly indicates that individuals confronted with ethical
choices have a tendency to behave in a significantly less rational way
than expected, or not rationally at all.25 Often their decisions are in
direct conflict with their values and their training.26 Looking at decisions
and behaviors from outside a situation, others easily and clearly see the
ethical dimension and implications; yet such clarity for those immersed
in the situation might be compromised.
Guido Palazzo noted “(un)ethical decision making is less rational
and deliberate but more intuitive and automatic. As a consequence, the
ethical dimension of a decision is not necessarily visible to the decision
maker. People may behave unethically without being aware of it—they
may even be convinced that they are doing the right thing.”27 Thus,
when an individual becomes unable to see the ethical dimension of the
decision-making process, a state of ethical blindness develops.
Shaped by combat, servicemembers might tend to act upon unitdefined, socially-approved behaviors.28 Taking place over several months,
a process of ethical fading likely was encouraged, unintentionally although
irresponsibly, by the more senior leaders of the organization, who were
distracted by the excellent outcomes of the scout sniper platoon. In the
deployment workups, battalion leaders already noted an independent
spirit as the sniper platoon failed to observe the standards of the other
marines. A few months into the deployment, battalion leaders could
see the snipers’ behavior was departing from the Marine Corps’s sound
ethical and professional standards. Captain Rudyard S. Olmstead, Kilo
Company’s commander, noted the scout sniper platoon displayed a poor
level of discipline in the way they wore the uniform, and when superiors
addressed the issue, the scout snipers simply disregarded it. Olmstead
24 Chamblin, 192–93.
25 Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (New York: Harper
Collins, 2008).
26 David DeSteno and Piercarlo Valdesolo, Out of Character: The Surprising Truths about the Liar,
Cheat, Sinner (and Saint) Lurking in All of Us (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011); and Max H.
Bazerman and Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Blind Spots: Why We Fail To Do What’s Right and What To Do about
It (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
27 Guido Palazzo, Franciska Krings, and Ulrich Hoffrage, “Ethical Blindness,” Journal of Business
Ethics 109, no. 3 (September 2012): 324, doi:10.1007/s10551-011-1130-4.
28 Ann E. Tenbrunsel and David M. Messick, “Ethical Fading: The Role of SelfDeception in Unethical Behavior,” Social Justice Research 17, no. 2 (June 2004): 226,
doi:10.1023/B:SORE.0000027411.35832.53.
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explained, “we ultimately kind of gave up and said, ‘Well, they’re doing
great stuff outside the wire.’ ”29

Impact of the Situation

To understand an individual’s unethical behavior, it is important
to explore where the behavior took place, the situation in which the
conduct occurred, and how the individual perceived and constructed
the situation as an individual and within a group. The situation can be
very powerful and have great influence on individual behavior. Palazzo
explained “some situations are so powerful that they elicit a specific
behavior in many people, independently of intentions, level of moral
developments, values or reasoning.”30 Indeed, leaders should always
consider how the environment in which they operate could trigger
unethical behavior without their intention.31
Philip Zimbardo, a social psychologist who has undertaken
ground-breaking studies on the impact the situation has on individuals,
stressed the key to understanding unethical behavior is not to consider
immediately the individuals responsible as bad apples, which is a clearly
biased approach. Often they might well be “good apples” operating in a
powerful, very dangerous, highly stressful, “bad barrel.”32 In a situation
permeated by strong, powerful forces, it is possible for individuals to
lose their ability to see the difference between right and wrong and the
application of such judgments.
The scout sniper platoon deployed and operated in a situation of
great physical and psychological stress. The loss of several marines who
were part of, or close to someone within, the very tight-knit sniper
organization made an already demanding situation significantly worse.
On June 3, Sergeant Mark Bradley, the assistant team leader for Team
2, was fatally injured by an IED. Corporal Steven Bradley, a sniper
with Team 4, escorted his brother to Bethesda, where Mark died on
June 16. On June 11, Lance Corporal Aaron Hill, a sniper with Team 3,
accompanied the body of his brother—Lance Corporal Jason Hill, 3/4,
who was killed by small arms fire just a few miles from where the scout
sniper platoon was operating—back to the United States.

Role of Command Climate

The behavior of the marines on July 27 can only partially be
explained as dispositional, situational, or a combination of both. The
individual marines responsible for urinating on the dead enemies were
distinguished servicemembers who had performed extremely well in
previous deployments and had demonstrated their proficiency. Several
US Marine units had deployed in similar or even worse environments,
suffered a higher number of casualties and inflicted major blows on the
Taliban over a number of years. Yet, marines in these situations did not
engage in unethical or unprofessional behavior. Therefore, to understand

29 “Marine 4-Star General Offers Powerful Testimony in Defense of Accused Officer,” Military
Times, October 17, 2013.
30 Palazzo, 329.
31 Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 20.
32 Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York:
Random House, 2008); and Tenbrunsel, 20.
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why this small unit behaved in such an unethical and unprofessional
manner, the role of the system—the command climate—in failing to
discourage the behavior must be considered.33
According to Zimbardo, “systems matter the most” because
they “provide the institutional support, authority, and resources that
allow situations to operate as they do.”34 Zimbardo emphasized the
negative side of systems, yet when inspired and regulated by ethical
and professionally sound principles, systems play an important role in
preventing members of an organization operating in a stressful powerful
situation to engage in unethical behavior. Moreover, leaders—whose
responsibility, and commitment, is to make sure that systems are inspired
by “norms, morals, and ethics”—might unintentionally become victims
of a powerful situation. As a result they might compromise their ability
to “regulate/control and shape” the system to be as effective as possible
at interacting with the situation while providing strong motivations and
clear guidance for individuals to behave ethically and professionally.
While conducting the Stanford Prison Experiment, Zimbardo even
fell victim to this dangerous dynamic. The fictitious prison system
he devised included his leadership role as the warden; however, the
organization degraded from the first night shift. Hazing, initiated by a
group of student-guards on a group of student-inmates, escalated in a
matter of days.
Zimbardo acknowledged the student-inmates were quickly subjected
to forms of punishment that made them suffer, which was unacceptable
and unethical for a scientific experiment. Yet, he failed to see how quickly
the ethical dimension of the experiment was degrading. Zimbardo was so
absorbed by the experiment and the progression of behavior that he lost
the ability to recognize the unethical and unprofessional conditions for
both the student-guards and student-inmates. His ability to provide the
system with positive inputs was compromised as he became distracted
by the “encouraging” results of the experiment.
If Zimbardo and his team continued to focus on the amazing
and unexpected evolution of human behavior, it is very unlikely that
they would have stopped the experiment. Even when prison inmate
8612 had a nervous breakdown, when “things begin to turn sexual”
during the fourth day, and when a student-inmate broke down every
night thereafter, Zimbardo failed to comprehend the experiment was
out of control.35 Dr. Craig W. Haney, a researcher who participated in
the experiment, remembers the break downs “were scary to see, were
upsetting to us, they were unexpected, they were very clearly the real
thing . . . we had not built in time to step back and to look at what was
happening. . . . We were caught up in the events that were taking place.”36
Despite indications that the experiment was corrupted by major
unethical behavior that impacted the student-inmates, and despite
33 On page 234 of “Ethical Fading,” Tenbrunsel and Messick stress “one set of variables that
leads to unethical behavior are the environmental or contextual cues that exist in an organization.
Organizations should thus identify the structural, institutional, and systematic factors that promote
unethical behavior.”
34 Zimbardo, 226.
35 “The Stanford Prison Experiment,” Heroic Imagination, August 20, 2011, https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=sZwfNs1pqG0.
36 Ibid.

74

Parameters 47(3) Autumn 2017

the fact that Zimbardo and his team should have known that such
behavior was unacceptable for a scientific experiment, they carried on.
Arguably this was a case of unintended unethicality. The experiment
likely would have continued for the planned two-week period, possibly
with terrible, yet unintended consequences if Christina Maslach, an
assistant professor of psychology at University of California Berkeley
and romantic acquaintance of Zimbardo, had not visited the “Stanford
Prison” five days into the study.37 She was shocked by the “madhouse,”
but even more surprised that “Phil seemed to be so different from the
man [she] thought [she] knew, someone who loves students and cares for
them in ways that were already legendary at the university. He was not
the same man that [she] had come to love.”38
Zimbardo the experimenter successfully created a situation in which
role-playing students behaved in ways that stimulated his scientific interest
and validated several of his assumptions. Zimbardo the warden failed to
regulate the system to prevent degradation. His main focus was on the
experiment—his mission—which distracted him from his responsibility
to protect the mental and physical wellbeing of the students. Zimbardo
had fallen into the leader’s trap, and Maslach came to his rescue. After
a tense argument, Zimbardo—alerted to the fact that he had become a
victim of his own experiment—decided to call it off.
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Doty and Major Joe Gelineau stressed the
role played by command climate in preventing or encouraging unethical
behavior: “Historically, there are examples of questionable command
climates resulting in behaviors that are not in tune with our professional
military ethic or a result of character-based leadership.”39
According to a previous field manual, Army Leadership, “an
organization’s climate is the way its members feel about their
organization. Climate comes from people’s shared perceptions and
attitudes, what they believe about the day-to-day functioning of their
outfit. These things have a great impact on their motivation and the
trust they feel for their team and their leaders.”40 The role leaders play
in shaping and maintaining a healthy command climate is pivotal:
“The members’ collective sense of the organization—its organizational
climate—is directly attributable to the leader’s values, skills, and actions.
As an Army leader, you establish the climate of your organization, no
matter how small it is or how large.”41 Doty and Gelineau rightly noted
Command climate is set at the battalion level. Although brigade-and-above
commanders will establish a command climate, it is at the battalion level
where the most profound and effective influence occurs. Battalion-level
commanders . . . most closely “touch” and influence soldiers’ attitudes and
behaviors. Counterinsurgency operations, which are often decentralized
at company- and platoon-level operations, highlight the importance of
battalion commanders establishing and enforcing—by their presence
(“leadership by walking around”)—a moral/ethical command climate.
37 Philip G. Zimbardo, Christina Maslach, and Craig Haney, “Reflections on the Stanford Prison
Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Consequences,” in Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives
on the Milgram Paradigm, ed. Thomas Blass (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000), 215.
38 Ibid., 216–17.
39 LTC Joseph Doty and MAJ Joe Gelineau, “Command Climate,” Army 58, no. 7 (July 2008): 22.
40 Headquarters, US Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Field Manual 22-100
(Washington, DC: HQDA, 1999), 3-12.
41 Ibid.
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Company commanders and platoon leaders are at the execution level of
the battalion commander’s command climate. . . . Most importantly, if a
battalion level commander does not set and enforce a command climate,
subclimates will be established by leaders in the unit [emphasis by the
author]. Subordinate leaders within the unit with referent and expert power
(charisma) will establish subcultures that may or may not be what the unit
commander desires. Setting a moral/ethical command climate must be an
intentional process by commanders and is a requirement to maintain the
moral high ground in this era of persistent conflict.42

The initiatives taken by 3/2’s commanding officer before the
deployment, and in particular the design and implementation of the
ethics training program focused on the professional and moral actions of
small unit leaders, indicated a strong commitment to a healthy command
climate. Yet after the battalion deployed to Afghanistan, the overall
strength of the command climate eroded, probably unintentionally
and over a number of months. The Command Investigation into the Alleged
Desecration of Corpses by U.S. Marines in Afghanistan noted a “high turnover
rate in the chain of command. Turnover of key leadership billets
within Kilo Company, immediately before and during deployment in
Afghanistan, contributed to an environment where necessary discipline
standards were lacking. Team 4, Scout Sniper Platoon 3/2 operated from
PB 7171, considered to be the base with the worst discipline standard in
[Regimental Combat Team]-8’s area of operations.”43 The investigation
also noted
Kilo Company discipline issues ranged from the state of police to
accountability. Specifically, PB 7171 was found to have: (1) marines not
wearing [personal protective equipment], in dirty uniforms, without haircuts,
and not shaving; (2) unsanitary conditions and ammunition on the deck;
(3) insufficient patrol orders being issued, fighting positions without range
cards or identified primary directions of fire, and marines not conducting
appropriate drills and inspections.44

These concerns were brought to the attention of the 3/2 leadership
while division and marine expeditionary force leaders praised body
counts, open roads, and increased market activity to validate the
success of the surge. The tactical success gave the command a sense
that everything was under control. Yet, General John F. Kelly stressed
that 3/2 was “loose in the way it did business” and “a lot of people
doing great things but general confusion in how people were organized
for combat.”45

Consequences of a Slippery Slope

Often, ethical and professional blunders such as the urination
incident are viewed and treated as isolated events. Indeed, at this time
there is no known evidence of similar behavior from other Marine units
who deployed in Afghanistan. All of those units fought a tough enemy
while displaying honorable behavior. Yet, the urination incident, although
specific to the unit, is not isolated: it belongs to a broader context.

42
43
44
45

Ibid., 24.
MCCDC, Command Investigation, 53–54.
Ibid., 24
“Marine 4-Star.”
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For the scout sniper platoon, it is quite clear that many indicators of
a healthy system—the unit culture, discipline, obedience, and cohesion
of the command climate—were compromised. It also appears that
the frame—the filter through which the scout snipers perceived their
situation—had become particularly rigid. They had moved into an
“us-them” frame, in which “us” were only the members of the platoon
and “them” were not only the enemy but also fellow marines who
did not approve of the snipers’ conduct. In his book, Chamblin often
was less than pleased, and at times very frustrated, with anyone who
tried to address the scout sniper discipline issues and who disapproved
of their behavior.46
Thus, under a rigid frame and a deteriorated unit subclimate, urinating
on the dead enemy bodies likely revealed more about the overall state
of the platoon rather than a momentary lapse of judgment (for which
many of the involved marines have yet to show any sign of remorse). The
incident indicated the unit’s command climate had reached a dangerous
level and worse behavior might have been very likely. The unit’s constant
transgressions and breach in discipline were not properly addressed
and were ultimately tolerated by the chain of command. Though likely
unintentional, this dynamic created a dangerous slippery slope.
For a number of reasons, leaders might not enforce a unit’s
standards. Leaders might want to give their subordinates a break,
they might not want to be perceived as too tough, and perhaps, they
might even sympathize with perceptions of micromanagement. Such
approaches hide dangerous dynamics and make it difficult to see more
serious unit infractions.
Lieutenant General William R. Peers, the senior Army officer
who investigated the My Lai incident, provided much wisdom and
enlightening reflections on the role leaders play in preventing war crimes,
which retain great validity today. Some of Peer’s leadership requirements
for a counterinsurgency environment, include:
A commander must be constantly alert to changes in the attitude and
temperament of his men and the units to which they belong. Ground
combat in a counterinsurgency environment may develop frustration and
bitterness which manifest themselves in acts quite apart from that which
would normally be expected. Accordingly, commanders must be quick to
spot such changes and to take appropriate corrective action.47

Bazerman and Tenbrunsel emphasized “if we find minor infractions
acceptable, research suggests, we are likely to accept increasingly major
infractions as long as each violation is only incrementally more serious
than the preceding one.”48 Kelly clearly identified such an issue: “It’s a
slippery slope to urinating on corpses, to raping women, to murdering
kids.”49 This analysis is a strong professional reminder of how dangerous
46 In the final pages of his book, Chamblin wrote that after the incident had been revealed “the
only group of people that stood by my men and me, was our fellow scout/snipers, a Brotherhood of
shared pain. These men went out of their way to help and defend us, with one exception, Sergeant
Major Michael [sic] Barrett, then Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps. Sergeant Major Barrett was
a former Scout/Sniper Instructor and as it turns out, Uncle Tom extraordinaire! What a piece of
shit” (212).
47 William R. Peers, The My Lai Inquiry (New York: Norton, 1979), 248.
48 Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, “Ethical Breakdowns,” 63.
49 “Marine 4-Star.”
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and costly tolerating behavior that gradually departs from accepted
standards can be. If the unit deployment had been longer than seven
months, it is possible the marines would not have engaged in the type of
war crimes Kelly mentioned. Yet it is also true that the unit would have
been more inclined to engage in such behaviors than other units with a
strong command climate.

Conclusions

The urination incident is an extremely insightful case that provides
valuable understanding on why members of an organization might
engage in unethical and unprofessional behavior and the pivotal role
that the command climate plays in determining such a behavior.
Before the deployment to Afghanistan, the marines of the 3/2 scout
sniper platoon certainly would have been considered above average, but
more likely outstanding. They had the experience, the time-in-service,
the commitment, and the desire to serve that are typical of solid marines.
The situation into which the unit deployed was extremely powerful, yet it
was no different from the situation in which thousands of other marines
operated ethically and professionally.
Notably, the battalion commander was genuinely committed
to preparing his marines for the difficult ethical challenges of a
counterinsurgency environment. He wanted his marines to be able to
make sound ethical choices while operating among civilians. In many
respects, Dixon was an innovative thinker who invested a significant
amount of time in ethics instruction when other commanders would
have valued other areas of tactical training.
Yet, despite the best of intentions, 3/2’s leaders became distracted by
the achievements of the scout sniper platoon as they became associated
with the overall success of the battalion. This mindset probably detracted
from the necessity of enforcing and maintaining sound marine standards
with the scout sniper platoon.
Commanders might find reprimanding a supporting unit or
organization uncomfortable, and to a certain extent challenging,
especially when such a unit is instrumental to the success of the larger
organization. Leaders might become inclined to condone and accept
minor infractions of the standard, which are mistakenly perceived as
harmless, for fear of compromising the enthusiasm of a successful
unit. The danger is for leaders to compliment immediate, visible,
positive results that enable the success of the entire organization
while underestimating the long-term, latent, negative consequences of
unethical and unprofessional behavior within supporting units. Allowing
the command climate to depart gradually from institutional standards
can incite a dangerous process whose outcome is the slippery slope. As
then-Commandant of the Marine Corps General James F. Amos wrote:
“There is a disturbingly frequent correlation between Marines who act
poorly and units with poor climate.”50
Our analysis of the 3/2 scout sniper platoon indicates the command
climate plays an important, if not the most important, role in preventing
unethical and unprofessional behavior. The command climate is like
50 General James Amos, white letter, “Command Climate,” May 9, 2013, Washington, DC.
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a double-edged sword: it has the potential to discourage and prevent
unethical and unprofessional behavior, or indeed, it might encourage
unethical and unprofessional behavior. Clearly, there might be cases in
which units with a strong command climate might experience members
engaging in unethical and unprofessional behavior; conversely, units
with a weak or degraded command climate might experience a difficult
deployment without instances of inappropriate behavior.
What should be acknowledged, however, is that units with a
resilient command climate will be better prepared to deal with stressful
deployments and situations while also being significantly less likely
to have members of the organization engaging in unethical behavior.
The command climate serves as a filter between the situation and the
individual and is regulated by organizational leaders; the more effective
the filter is, the better the behavior of the individuals.
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ABSTRACT: This article discusses the role of movie images in
influencing the public’s perceptions of servicemembers. The
implications of these findings are relevant to policymakers responsible
for balancing servicemembers’ needs with public perceptions.

D

ue to its role during America’s long wars and its effect on
perceptions of US military prestige, the entertainment media
can be considered one of the third forces—“organizations that
can influence the outcome of armed combat.”1 This article explains the
ability of combat films to influence civilian and military perceptions of
servicemembers and veterans. By understanding Hollywood’s depictions
of servicemembers in combat and veterans at home, military leaders can
respond better to media-influenced perceptions of military institutions
and the people who provide our nation’s defense.
The film American Sniper, based on the autobiography of Chris
Kyle, a veteran US Navy Seal sniper with 160 officially confirmed kills
during four tours in the Iraq War, serves as a fulcrum for this article.2
Although the book and film were criticized for inaccuracies, the film
was nominated for several Academy Awards, and Kyle’s murder by
Eddie Ray Routh accelerated the notoriety of both productions. The
mutually generated interest in the film and the trial presented a unique
opportunity to study not only civilian perceptions of servicemembers
portrayed in Hollywood movies but also the potential impact on jurors’
perceptions of “Routh,” a former Marine with post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) who was depicted in the film prior to the trial.3

Hollywood’s War Films

The Oxford Dictionary of Film Studies defines a combat film as one
that features “scenes of combat that are dramatically central and that
determine the fate of the film’s principal characters.”4 Such films may
include home-front dramas, veterans’ stories, service comedies, basic
training films, spy films, prisoner-of-war movies, and partisan films.
While the American Civil War and international conflicts may be included,
1 US Army War College, Key Strategic Issues List, 2016–2017 (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College
Press, 2016), 5.
2 Jason Hall, Chris Kyle, Scott McEwen, and Jim DeFelice, American Sniper, directed by Clint
Eastwood (Warner Brothers, 2014).
3 A defense of not guilty by reason of insanity was mounted based on the defendant’s PTSD.
The Texas jury found Routh guilty, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole. See Mike
Spies, “Inside the Tortured Mind of Eddie Ray Routh, the Man Who Killed American Sniper Chris
Kyle,” Newsweek, November 23, 2015.
4 Annete Kuhn and Guy Westwell, A Dictionary of Film Studies (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012), 449.
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the genre is usually associated with representations of twentieth-century
wars. Edison Company films of the Spanish-American War are said to be
the first war films. Wings (1927), a World War I film named Best Picture
at the first Academy Awards ceremony in 1928, is an early example of an
antiwar movie.5 America’s Office of War Information exercised a great
deal of control over scripts during World War II, resulting in prowar
propaganda films that came to characterize the combat genre.
Despite some cynical Vietnam-era films in the 1960s and 1970s,
such as The Deer Hunter and Apocalypse Now, the pro-American, prowar
conventions established during World War II largely remain.6 Films
such as First Blood and subsequent titles in the Rambo series provided
audiences with a revisionist version of Vietnam.7 Contemporary films—
such as The Hurt Locker, American Sniper, and Brothers—shift the focus
from the squad or platoon perspective of World War II combat films to
the impact of the Iraq War on the individual soldier, both during the war
and upon returning home.8
Saving Private Ryan and The Thin Red Line ushered in the current era
of the genre, in which advancements in digital cinematography and
computer graphics technology offer audiences increasingly dramatic
and violent images of combat.9 The films use visual realism to disguise
heightened moral assertions: should soldiers be proud or devastated
about killing the enemy? Some critics assert films like Saving Private Ryan
and Black Hawk Down are based on contrived plots, relying on combat
sequences more like those from action movies, rather than realistic
depictions of twenty-first century combat.10 Unlike combat films of the
1980s—such as Platoon and Hamburger Hill, which were lauded for their
realism—contemporary films set in Afghanistan and Iraq are more
entertainment than history.11 The visual style of the new Hollywood
combat film presents a realistic and graphic image of combat, but does
not present a true story. Such films appear to be founded in realism,
while actually reinforcing common myths of heroism and war.12
A 2011 book about contemporary war films argues these realistic
looking fictions offer audiences a cast of ordinary folks they can relate
to in extraordinary circumstances. Frequently, soldiers are depicted as
5 John Monk Saunders et al., Wings, directed by William A. Wellman and Harry d’Abbadie
d’Arrast (Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation, 1927).
6 Michael Cimino, Deric Washburn, Louis Garfinkle, and Quinn K. Redeker, The Deer Hunter
(EMI Films, 1978); and John Milius, Francis Ford Coppola, Michael Herr, and Joseph Conrad,
Apocalypse Now directed by Francis Ford Coppola (Zoetrope Studios, 1979).
7 David Morrell, Michael Kozoll, William Sackheim, and Sylvester Stallone, First Blood directed
by Ted Kotcheff (Anabasis N.V. and Elcajo Productions, 1979); and Kuhn and Westwell, Dictionary
of Film Studies.
8 Mark Boal, The Hurt Locker, directed by Kathryn Bigelow (Voltage Pictures et al., 2008);
and David Benioff, Susanne Bier, and Anders Thomas Jensen, Brothers, directed by Jim Sheridan
(Lionsgate et al., 2009).
9 Robert Rodat, Saving Private Ryan, directed by Steven Spielberg (DreamWorks et al., 1998);
James Jones and Terrence Malack, The Thin Red Line, directed by Terrence Malick (Fox 2000 Pictures,
Geisler-Roberdeau, and Phoenix Pictures, 1998); and Philippa Gates, “Fighting the Good Fight: The
Real and the Moral in the Contemporary Hollywood Combat Film,” Quarterly Review of Film and Video
22, no. 4 (2005), 297–310, doi:10.1080/10509200590475788.
10 Mark Bowden and Ken Nolan, Black Hawk Down, directed by Ridley Scott (Revolution
Studios, Jerry Bruckheimer Films, and Scott Free Productions, 2001); and Gates, “Fighting the
Good Fight.”
11 Oliver Stone, Platoon (Hemdale and Cinema 86, 1986); and James Carabatsos, Hamburger Hill,
directed by John Irvin (RKO Pictures, 1987).
12 Gates, “Fighting the Good Fight.”
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uneducated grunts, not always clear on why they are fighting, but fighting
for survival and from a sense of patriotism.13 This article explores the
relationship between servicemembers’ perceptions of the realism of
combat films, civilians’ perceptions of the same, and the impact of those
perceptions on real servicemembers. This is known as the phenomenon
of third-person perception.

Third-Person Perception

In lay terms, third-person perception (TPP) is the belief that media
messages influence others more than oneself. The concept was introduced
more than 30 years ago regarding a service unit consisting of mostly
African American troops and white officers on Iwo Jima island.14 The
Japanese dropped propaganda leaflets over the island encouraging the
“colored soldiers” to stop risking their lives for the white men. Despite
no evidence that the leaflets had an impact on their intended audience,
the troops were withdrawn. The example was interpreted to illustrate
how people act on their perceptions of media influence rather than on
reality.15 Dozens of studies have documented the phenomenon across a
variety of contexts. Some contexts, such as press coverage, advertising,
and pornography have received a great deal of attention.16 Given the
origins of the theory, it is surprising to note there have been no published
studies on TPP regarding contemporary warfare until this exploration.
While no previous studies of TPP regard depictions of
servicemembers, a few studies have focused on film. In 2006, a small
study of college students found reverse TPP, or first-person perception,
regarding the documentary An Inconvenient Truth.17 Participants believed
they were more likely than their peers to be influenced by the film.
First-person perception was related to the willingness to promote the
film and to make personal changes toward a more sustainable lifestyle.
These behavioral effects and attitudinal changes are referred to in the
literature as third-person effects, which are important when documenting
TPP because people act on their perceptions. First-person perception
tends to emerge when participants believe it is good to be influenced;
TPP emerges when media influence is perceived to be bad. A study
of adults in Singapore, for instance, found participants believed they
were less influenced than others by films with homosexual content.18
An earlier study of college students documented TPP regarding alcohol
13 Martin Barker, A Toxic Genre (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 4–68.
14 W. Phillips Davison, “The Third-Person Effect in Communication,” Public Opinion Quarterly
47, no. 1 (1983): 1–15, doi:10.1086/268763.
15 Baker, Toxic Genre.
16 Nikos Antonopoulos et al., “Web Third-Person Effect in Structural Aspects of the Information
on Media Websites,” Computers in Human Behavior 44 (2015): 48–58, doi:10.1016/j.chb.2014.11.022;
Guang-Xin Xie and Jessie M. Quintero Johnson, “Examining the Third-Person Effect of Baseline
Omission in Numerical Comparison: The Role of Consumer Persuasion Knowledge,” Psychology and
Marketing 32, no. 4 (April 2015): 438–49, doi:10.1002/mar.20790; and Lijiang Shen et al., “A Social
Comparison Explanation for the Third-Person Perception,” Communication Research 42, no. 2 (2015):
260–80, doi:10.1177/0093650212467644.
17 Davis Guggenheim, director, An Inconvenient Truth (Lawrence Bender Productions and
Participant Media, 2006); and Sue-Jen Lin, “Perceived Impact of a Documentary Film: An
Investigation of the First-Person Effect and Its Implications for Environmental Issues,” Science
Communication 35, no. 6 (2013): 708–33, doi:10.1177/1075547013478204.
18 Shirley S. Ho, Benjamin H. Detenber, Shelly Malik, and Rachel L Neo, “The Roles of Value
Predispositions, Communication, and Third-Person Perception on Public Support for Censorship
in Films with Homosexual Content,” Asian Journal of Communication 22, no. 1 (2012), 78–97, doi:10
.1080/01292986.2011.622775.
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content in films.19 While the TPP literature on film remains small, a
larger body of literature on television consistently documents similar
findings. Participants believe others are more influenced by television
content unless that content is perceived to be positive.20

Analysis and Findings

After the release of American Sniper and during jury selection for
Routh’s trial, this study examined servicemembers’ perceptions of how
Hollywood films depict servicemembers and veterans and how those
depictions shape civilian perceptions and attitudes. Participants were
recruited through email listservs and social media. Two large midAtlantic universities shared a link to an online survey with veterans and
students currently serving in the military. Veterans of Foreign War posts
in the same regions were also asked to share the link. Participants were
asked to complete the survey and share the link with colleagues who
have any type of military service. A smaller control group of civilians
was collected in a similar way from the same universities.

Demographics

Servicemembers participating in the study were 23 to 76 years
old with a mean age of 36.2 years; civilians, 23 to 56 years old with a
mean age of 27.4 years. Seventy-seven percent of servicemembers and
sixty-five percent of civilians participating in the study were male. The
majority racial groups of both types of participants was similar: whites
comprised 84 percent of servicemembers and 87 percent of civilians;
blacks 5 percent for both groups. Hispanics (5 percent) and Asians
(2 percent), however, only participated in the servicemember group.
Four percent of servicemember participants and 8 percent of civilian
participants identified as mixed or other racial backgrounds.

Military Experience

Servicemembers gained their experience over 1 to 30 years, with 10.2
years being the group’s mean length of service. Veterans’ end of service
dates ranged from 1978 to 2015, with a mean of 2009. Forty-eight percent
of servicemembers experienced as many as nine combat deploy-ments
lasting up to 50 months—an average of 1.6 deployments lasting 14.7
months. Servicemembers participating in the study attained the following
ranks: officer (25.6 percent), warrant officer (3.6 percent), and enlisted
(69.6 percent). Sixty-two percent of servicemembers served on active duty
and fourteen percent in reserve components. Individuals affiliated with
the US Air Force comprised 35.7 percent of the servicemember group;
Army, 30.4 percent; Navy, 3.6 percent; Marine Corps 21.4 percent; Coast
Guard 0 percent; and National Guard 7.9 percent.

Method

Researchers asked qualitative, open-ended questions to gain insight
into participant perceptions of Hollywood combat films. Queries asked
for names of three combat films participants believed to be inaccurate

19 Dong-Hee Shin and Jun Kyo Kim, “Alcohol Product Placement and the Third-Person
Effect,” Television and New Media 12, no. 5 (2011): 412–40, doi:10.1177/1527476410385477.
20 Shen et al., “Social Comparison.”
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portrayals of war, soldiers, and veterans and three films believed to be
accurate. Additional questions revealed inaccuracies or accuracies about
the films. Then, participants were asked about common misperceptions
regarding servicemembers and veterans that may have been influenced
by combat films.
Quantitative measures established participant levels of third-person
perception in relation to the influence of American Sniper on civilian jurors
for the Routh trial.21 If participants had seen American Sniper, they were
asked to rate the accuracy of the film as well as the accuracy of other
Hollywood combat films. Participants were provided with a statement
about Routh’s military experience and PTSD. Then researchers asked
participants how likely they would be to accept a defense of not guilty
by reason of insanity if they were a juror. Scores of 0, not very likely, and
6, very likely were assigned.
After these questions were administered, the demographic
information noted above was collected. Civilians were also asked if
they had a close family member or friend with military experience that
significantly influenced their perceptions. Answers from participants
who responded “yes” to this item were excluded from analysis.
Researchers used IBM SPSS software for the statistical analysis.
T-tests and correlations were used for hypothesis testing. To analyze the
qualitative research questions, responses were grouped into categories
and direct quotes were documented. Two military servicemembers
provided insight and analysis based on independent reviews of the
qualitative data.

Findings

Do servicemembers believe depictions of war, soldiers, and veterans in Hollywood
movies are accurate? Servicemembers rated the accuracy of Hollywood’s
depictions from 1, not at all accurate, to 6, very accurate, with a mean
of 4.0 and standard deviation of 1.1. The accuracy of American Sniper
was rated higher, with a mean of 4.7 and standard deviation of 1.3.
For perspective, this equates to a D rating for the accuracy of most
Hollywood combat films and a C+ for American Sniper.
When asked to name up to three titles for inaccuracy, participants
listed 37 combat films. Out of those productions named by more than
2 percent of participants, servicemembers identified Hurt Locker (25
percent), Top Gun (6 percent), A Few Good Men (5 percent), American Sniper
(5 percent), Brothers (4 percent), and Jarhead (4 percent). Civilians chose
American Sniper (35 percent) and Jarhead (14 percent). Notably, nearly a
third of servicemembers did not name films, specifically saying they did
not or could not watch combat films after serving. A few explained they
only named older films such as Top Gun and A Few Good Men because
they enjoyed the film as an adolescents, but could not watch them now.22

21 Davison, “Third-Person Effect.”
22 Jim Cash, Jack Epps Jr., Ehud Yonay, and Warren Skaaren, Top Gun, directed by Tony Scott
(Paramount Pictures and Don Simpson/Jerry Bruckheimer Films, 1986); and Aaron Sorkin, A Few
Good Men, directed by Rob Reiner (Columbia Pictures Corporation and Castle Rock Entertainment,
1992). One participant specifically said these films influenced his decision to enlist, but he soon
learned their stories were nothing like the reality of military life.
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The inclusion of The Hurt Locker on the list of inaccurate films is
startling because it also earned more than $15 million in the US box
office and the 2009 Academy Award for Best Picture. Moreover, 25
percent of servicemembers’ responses recognized its inaccuracies while
military consultants likewise dismissed the production as fiction.
When asked to name accurate films, 30 percent of participants wrote
in “none” or “almost none” instead of suggesting titles. Of participants
who listed films, 22 titles were perceived to be accurate, but few were
listed by more than one person. Lone Survivor, Black Hawk Down, and
Jarhead were frequently listed with comments about accurate depictions
of military life, solitude, and why people fight.23 Many qualified their
comments with “but” statements such as “Black Hawk Down captures
the brotherhood of military service, but the battles are exaggerated
and unrealistic.”
Which aspects of combat films do servicemembers find to be the most accurate
and least accurate? In terms of inaccuracies, the smallest details are often
the most irritating. Uniforms were the clear leader (20 percent). Film
characters wearing hats indoors, not wearing hats outdoors, and uniforms
not matching characters’ ranks were commonly cited. Similarly, small
details were often mentioned about weapons capabilities and handling,
as well as limitless supplies of ammunition. Servicemembers mentioned
that everyone in the movies seems to be not only expert marksmen but
also experts in multiple areas such as explosives and tactics. Battles
orchestrated by Hollywood were often described as more dramatic
than those in real life: soldiers were too macho, and situations and
circumstances were exaggerated to keep audiences on the edge of their
seats. Specifically, depictions of soldiers were described as exaggerations:
macho mavericks disregarded rank and authority in ways that would
never be seen in real life, and enlisted men were depicted as ignorant,
uneducated racists.
When asked about the details combat films get right, 20 percent of
servicemembers who responded said “nothing” or “almost nothing.”
The only aspect many agreed on was the comradery or brotherhood
of the people who serve together, especially in combat. Some say
military life is captured well, especially the boredom of waiting and the
depiction of gallows humor. Servicemembers also say their service takes
a toll on their family lives; 9 percent say Hollywood accurately captures
the struggle.
How much influence do servicemembers believe inaccurate combat films have
on civilians’ perceptions of soldiers and veterans? Servicemembers commonly
respond civilians perceive everyone is broken: “Everybody has PTSD, is
crazy, or has a screw loose; we’re all ticking time bombs.” Likewise, there
are misperceptions that soldiers are bloodthirsty alcoholics, addicted to
killing, and devoid of human emotions. These associations are likely
related to misperceptions that all servicemembers have participated in
combat missions and killed people. Enlisted servicemembers believe
Hollywood portrays them as uneducated racists who joined the military
23 Peter Berg, Marcus Luttrell, and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor, directed by Peter Berg (Film
44 et al., 2013); and William Broyles Jr. and Anthony Swofford, Jarhead, directed by Sam Mendes
(Universal Pictures, Red Wagon Entertainment, Neal Street Productions, and Motion Picture
KAPPA Produktionsgesellschaft, 2005).
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because they were not smart enough to get into college, and who returned
home broken and potentially dangerous.
How do perceptions differ among servicemembers and civilians? In some
cases, the differences between the perceptions of servicemembers and
civilians are marked. Servicemembers struggled to identify accurate films
whereas civilians named only nine films inaccurate; only three titles were
named more than once. Both feature films civilians considered accurate
were deemed inaccurate by servicemembers. Restrepo, mentioned by 12
percent of civilians, was actually a documentary that aired on HBO.24
Two misperceptions influenced by films were recognized by both
servicemembers and civilians: all servicemembers have been in combat
and killed people, and soldiers are bloodthirsty adrenaline junkies
addicted to killing.
The most interesting point of disagreement is PTSD. Servicemembers cited the misperception that everyone is broken, everyone has
PTSD mostly. Among civilians, 16 percent also believe PTSD is
overrepresented, but 11 percent believe the misconception is that
soldiers come home fine, with no PTSD, and seamlessly reunite with
their families. Eleven percent of civilians also believe the depiction of
heroes fighting for a just cause is the biggest misconception.
Civilians believe Hollywood combat films, at their best, illustrate
the pointlessness of war through the internal struggles of enlisted men
and women. They balance patriotism and love of control with simple
acts of kindness in war, showing not all Muslims are terrorists and not
all American soldiers are racists. Civilians believe Hollywood’s version
of combat, at worst, presents realistic battles in historically inaccurate
contexts that simplify global politics and glorify American heroes.
Conversely, servicemembers assert battle scenes are inaccurate: the
average engagement is brief; 20 minutes of engagement are followed by
an hour or more wondering if it is over, if it is safe to move. Military
participants say Lone Survivor captures this well, arguing there is no time
for politics or context during combat. All that matters is that the person
to your left, the person to your right, and you go home safely.

Servicemembers’ Third-Person Perception and the Trial of
Eddie Ray Routh

While everyone exhibits TPP, it was more pronounced in this study
among servicemembers than civilians. This finding matters because
people act on their perceptions not reality. The trial of Eddie Ray Routh
provides a perfect example.
Servicemembers were mostly unwilling to accept the proposed
defense of not guilty by reason of insanity; in fact, 40 percent indicated
they would definitely not accept it. Only 6 percent said they would be
very likely to accept the defense. Civilians were less extreme, with 11
percent definitely not accepting the defense and 11 percent very likely
to accept it. Consistent with the literature, participants who exhibited
higher levels of TPP were more likely to presume the defendant guilty.
Thus, the trial represents a microcosm of public opinion and an excellent

24 Tim Hetherington and Sebastian Junger, directors, Restrepo (Outpost Films, Virgil Films &
Entertainment, and Passion Pictures, 2010).
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example of media influence—American Sniper proclaimed Routh guilty
prior to jury selection.

Conclusion

Media depictions can be a powerful third force that not only
motivates young men and women to serve their country but also sways
public support for lengthy military engagements. Public relations battles
at home affect more than just public opinion; it impacts recruiting,
retention, and morale, as well as policy. Similar to the previous example
of the perceived impact of leaflets on minority servicemembers on Iwo
Jima, this study—the first of its kind—measures TPP regarding the
perceived impact of Hollywood combat films on civilians’ perceptions
of servicemembers and veterans. The study documented TPP and thirdperson effect—the presumption of guilt or innocence of a defendant in
a high-profile, real-life murder case depicted in a popular film.
From the many differences in perceptions of servicemembers and
civilians, the most likely explanation for the verdict differing among
the research groups is related to PTSD. Films like Brothers and American
Sniper portray veterans struggling to reunite with loved ones. Brothers
paints a hopeless picture of a doomed marriage that escalates to violence.
American Sniper shows a rocky start, followed by process of healing cut
short by another veteran suffering from PTSD killing his would-be
mentor. Servicemembers find both films unrealistic and say the myth of
the broken soldier with PTSD is Hollywood’s latest legacy. Civilians are
torn: some agree PTSD is overemphasized in combat films and others
argue happy reunions with well-adjusted veterans are the myth. Civilians’
willingness to accept and servicemembers definitive rejection of Routh’s
PTSD defense underscores the different perceptions. Alternatively,
military consultants suggest servicemembers are quick to support one
another and would not accept the defense because they would not want
the killer of one of their contemporary heroes to go free.
Many veterans and servicemembers of the Iraq and Afghanistan
Wars say 1980s films like Top Gun and A Few Good Men influenced their
decision to serve, but quickly assessed the productions to be inaccurate
at best. While military participants recognized contemporary combat
films capture the brotherhood of soldiers, most of them are discontent
with being depicted as uneducated, ignorant, bloodthirsty racists in need
of counseling for PTSD. Civilians, on the other hand, see the films as
accurately portraying the sights and sounds of war while simplifying
why America sends men and women to fight in the first place.

Implications for Strategic Communications

To understand how third forces such as the media can influence
servicemembers’ morale as well as garner public support for extended
wars, commanders must be aware of portrayals of servicemembers and
combat in Hollywood films. Common myths and misperceptions must
be addressed not only within the Department of Defense but also in the
Department of Veterans Affairs. Public affairs offices can be create and
distribute national messaging strategies to dispel myths. Encouraging
film screenings and discussions within the military and initiating
external media campaigns focusing on the accuracy of film depictions,
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misconceptions about PTSD, and perceptions of “broken” veterans can
shape public opinion.
One technique called “Message of the Day” could be used to initiate
social change. The Defense Department and the Department of Veterans
Affairs could adopt a communications strategy that presents a unified
message about the inaccuracies of Hollywood films. The messages
might starting with “it’s not like the movies” and provide a detail such
as “we care about our community.” The message needs to be repeated,
particularly when addressing policy and budget issues. The message can
be reinforced through public speaking events and targeted social media
campaigns such as #NotLikeTheMovies.
As the message gains traction, it is important to address the common
myths about PTSD specifically. Critical incidents, especially those
occurring stateside, get a lot of traction. Credible spokespeople must
be prepared to respond to media requests with accurate information
about PTSD, explain what it looks like, and provide realistic estimates
of its prevalence. Such events also need to be followed by positive stories
about successful veterans from all walks of life. The public as well as the
military community deserve to know men and women who served their
country are not broken.
The best tool to shape opinion through Hollywood films is film.
Pentagon support for combat films dates back to the 1920s. The most
successful of these were The Green Berets, Top Gun, and Black Hawk
Down.25 The Green Berets was a prowar film starring John Wayne made to
counterbalance Vietnam War protests. The film did not hold up over
time because of the simplistic viewpoint, but it drew an audience and
generated discussion during its run in theaters. Top Gun was produced
with the full support of the Navy, including fighter jets and aircraft
carriers. The popularity of the film increased recruitment by 400
percent. Servicemembers in the study mentioned Top Gun as a film
that encouraged them to enlist or that contributed to their positive
perceptions about the military. Black Hawk Down, also frequently named
in the current study, provided a quick, symbolic response to September
11, 2001, and continues to inspire.

25 James Lee Barrett and Robin Moore, The Green Berets, directed by Ray Kellogg, John Wayne,
and Mervyn LeRoy (Batjac Productions, 1968).

88

Parameters 47(3) Autumn 2017

John Chapin
Dr. John Chapin, a professor of communications at Penn State University,
conducts interdisciplinary research in media studies and applied communitybased research in violence prevention. He is the recipient of the Stephen
Schafer National Research Award for significant contributions to the field of
crime victim rights from the National Organization for Victim Assistance and
legislative citations from both Houses of Congress.

Marissa Mendoza-Burcham
Dr. Marissa Mendoza-Burcham, an assistant professor of psychology at Penn
State University, specializes in child and family clinical psychology, child and
adolescent development, and neurodevelopmental disabilities. She also trained
and worked in school districts, community clinics, children’s hospitals, and
psychiatric hospitals.

Mari Pierce
Dr. Mari Pierce, an assistant professor in the Administration of Justice
Department at Penn State Beaver, researches disparities in punishment
decisions, criminological theory, sex offender registration policies, and judicial
responses to crimes against children.

army expanSibility

Expanding Brigade Combat Teams:
Is the Training Base Adequate?
Esli T. Pitts
ABSTRACT: Given our poor track record of predicting the nature
of the wars that have transpired since Vietnam, this article describes
a model for transitioning the current Army into a force that might
be needed in the event of a great power war.

I

n a world where America, its allies, and its partners do not maintain
large standing armies, our potential enemies still believe in maximizing military strength. In March 2016, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the
“distinct challenge to our national security” posed by Russia, China,
North Korea, and Iran, who continue “invest[ing] in military capabilities
that reduce our competitive advantage.”1 Much of this investment is in the
form of modernized conventional warfighting capabilities. In February
2011, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed “when it comes
to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements,
since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten
it right.”2 He then warned of the challenge of justifying the expense of a
larger force given the decreasing likelihood of a “head-on clash of large
mechanized armies.”3 Contrast this statement with Secretary Rumsfeld,
who famously observed that countries go to war with the armies they
have, not the armies they need.4
This article considers how, in the event of a great-power war such
as the one Gates discounted, the United States might transition from
the Army it has, to the one it might need, by doubling the building
blocks of Army units, brigade combat teams (BCTs), with particular
focus on armored BCTs. The article discusses key training requirements
and offers recommendations for simplifying Army expansion, should it
become necessary.5
Despite several historical examples of Army expansion since
World War II, doubling the number of BCTs is complex and without
modern parallel. Within current infrastructure, the Army could double
the number of trained BCTs, but to do so rapidly would be extremely
challenging. Unless the Army significantly changes end-strength and
training capacity in the generating force, imposes stop-loss, assumes
1 Hearing on the Department of Defense Budget Posture, Before the Senate Armed Service Committee, 114th
Cong. (March 17, 2016) (posture statement of General Joseph Dunford Jr., US Marine Corps,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
2 Robert M. Gates (speech, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, February 25, 2011).
3 Ibid.
4 Eric Schmitt, “Iraq-Bound Troops Confront Rumsfeld over Lack of Armor,” New York Times,
December 8, 2004.
5 The goal of doubling the Army’s BCTs was chosen arbitrarily; some scenarios would require
more, some less.
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significant risk with inexperienced leadership, and increases stocks of
ready equipment, the ability to generate trained brigades will be limited
to a largely sequential and time-consuming process.

Training an Expanding Army

In January 2016, the Congressionally mandated National
Commission on the Future of the Army warned “significant reductions
in the size of the generating force put the ability to expand the Army
at risk.”6 The Commission noted that there was no link between the
size of the generating force, any anticipated Total Army Analysis need
for an expansible Army, nor a requirement for the generating force to
support expansibility.7 In other words, the lynchpin of expansibility is
insufficient, and there is no plan to address it.
The Army must, therefore, consider its goals carefully and align the
Total Army Analysis process to right-sizing the generating force—even
if the goal is not to double brigades but to reach a specified planned
capability. The Army grew by 16,000 soldiers in Fiscal Year 2017 through
a combination of increased recruiting and higher retention of senior
soldiers.8 Some portion of that growth may go into the generating force,
but the damage caused by the recent loss of trained leadership who could
support future expansibility is already done.
The Fiscal Year 2017 Modified Table of Organization and
Equipment adopted a triangular brigade structure for the armored BCT
(4,184 soldiers) with three maneuver battalions and a cavalry squadron.
Each of the maneuver battalions has a headquarters company and
three line companies. Two of the battalions are tank-heavy and one is
infantry-heavy. The cavalry squadron is comprised of a headquarters,
three reconnaissance troops, and a tank troop.9 About 35 percent of
the brigade combat team (1,479 soldiers) are so-called trigger-pullers,
including 355 tankers, 340 scouts, and 667 infantry, and 117 armor or
infantry officers.10 The remaining soldiers in the brigade require a similar
training process, but analyzing it is outside the parameters of this article.
Doubling the Army’s armored BCTs would require the Army to
train a high volume of soldiers. With attrition at 12–14 percent during
initial entry and 12 percent during unit training, 15 new armored brigade
combat teams would require about 27,700 tankers, scouts, and infantry.
The remaining infantry and Stryker brigades could require roughly
100,000 more soldiers.11 Despite the seeming simplicity, the following
approaches entail a high degree of friction.
A modern BCT is much more complicated than a brigade of the early
2000s. Likewise, training and education requirements are much more
6 Carter F. Ham et al., National Commission on the Future of the Army: Report to the President and
Congress of the United States (Arlington, VA: National Commission on the Future of the Army,
2016), 57.
7 Ibid.
8 Tom Vanden Brook, “Army To Spend $300 Million on Bonuses and Ads To Get 6,000 More
Recruits,” USA Today, February 12, 2017.
9 FMS-Web (1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, and subordinate units).
10 Ibid.
11 Given ongoing force structure changes, including adding additional infantry battalions to
overseas infantry brigade combat teams, the number of 100,000 is more of an informed estimate
than based on Force Management System’s specific data.
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demanding. Missions and operating environments can also be more
complex, and unit cohesion and proficiency can take years to develop
fully.12 Despite these factors and the specialized training required for
large subsets of the Army, the following model, derived from historical
examples, can serve as a starting point for producing new brigades.13 In
this model, the Army identifies the manning requirements, establishes
dates, or aimpoints, for forming the new brigade and schedules
institutional training to prepare new recruits and cadre to join soldiers
who already meet those requirements at the unit’s formation. This
theoretical capacity is subject to filling initial training courses, procuring
required equipment, and assembling cadres of mid- and senior- grade
leaders to reach the aimpoint.
Institutional training involves basic and specialized instruction for
large cohorts of recruits and leaders. Assuming brigades are formed on a
sequential and consistent timeline, trained soldiers can also be provided
on a predictable schedule with limited difficulty. The more rapidly
brigades must be built, however, the more the current infrastructure
will be challenged. Moreover, a significant amount of centralized
management will be required to balance education with tactical or
technical skills during expansion efforts.
A key consideration, the total quantity of soldiers required, varies
based upon the assumption that a stop-loss will accompany any event
that leads to doubling the force. Therefore, unless the Army is in active
combat, the primary problem is filling the ranks of new units, not
replacing combat losses or soldiers whose term of service has expired.
A 25 percent overage for training would offset historical rates of
attrition during both initial training and after forming brigades. But,
this allocation does not consider replacing significant combat losses.
Were it necessary, the training requirement would rapidly consume
not only the overage but also a potentially high percentage of training
capacity. Accounting only for attrition during training, an armored BCT
would require the following enlisted soldiers (E1–E4): 186 tankers, 229
scouts, and 413 infantry. Sergeant (E5) requirements would include 87
tankers, 52 scouts, and 135 infantry. With overage, the brigade would
require 1,035 junior enlisted soldiers and 343 sergeants.

Training Brigades

The armor training brigade at the Maneuver Center of Excellence,
Fort Benning, Georgia, conducts One Station Unit Training (OSUT) for
both tankers and scouts.14 The training lasts roughly 16 weeks for either
skill and currently produces 1,440 tankers per year after 12.7 percent
attrition and 2,340 scouts after 14.1 percent attrition.15 Additional
capacity, added in the summer of 2017, should increase the total
graduates per year to 1,920 tankers and 2,748 scouts.16 Given modest
12 Hornick, Burkhart, and Shunk, “Rightsizing the Army,” 43.
13 The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) concluded the Army
“could not provide [the Commission with] a formal plan for expanding the Army.” See NCFA,
Force Generation (FG) Subcommittee Monthly Meeting (Arlington, VA: NCFA, October 21, 2015), briefing
slides, 7.
14 The armor training brigade includes one armor battalion and one cavalry squadron.
15 Armored brigade commander, email messages to author, February 13–14, 2017.
16 Ibid.
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additional resources, the existing brigade infrastructure could support
three additional companies to train such soldiers.17 The infantry training
brigade graduates 12,900 infantry per year after a typical attrition of
14 percent.18 With classes filled to normal capacity, the brigade could
graduate 19,300 infantry per year; however, it could produce 21,100
graduates under surge conditions.19
Given overage and current rates of attrition, the Maneuver Center
of Excellence would be required to start training for 342 tankers, 352
scouts, and 685 infantry to fill one armored BCT. At current rates of
throughput, Fort Benning could train sufficient tankers for 1.23 armored
BCTs, enough scouts for 1.4 armored BCTs, and enough infantry for 4.15
armored BCTs per quarter. Should the Army return the two mechanized
infantry companies it removed from the armored BCT structure in 2017,
it could only generate 3.1 armored BCTs per quarter. This rate builds 1.7
infantry BCTs per quarter. Should additional replacement requirements
be necessary due to combat losses, the Army could either activate the
existing surge capacity at Fort Benning or use the National Guard’s
system of Regional Training Institutes to train additional soldiers.
Newly-formed brigades will not have the time or skills to train soldiers
on many essential tasks, such as drivers’ licensing, job-specific skills,
and combat lifesaver training, which are usually left to a new soldier’s
first unit. To form BCTs rapidly, OSUT could be lengthened; thereby,
economies of scale and experienced instructors could be leveraged to
conduct such training prior to soldiers arriving at newly-formed BCTs.

Noncommissioned Officers

A sufficient quantity of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) would
not likely be available to fill more than 1 or 2 armored BCTs per quarter.
Accordingly, manning the NCO ranks in brigades requires multiple
solutions such as training potential leaders identified during initial
training, cross-leveling experience from existing brigades, recalling
experienced leaders to active duty, and employing contractors or other
nondeployable leaders in the generating force.
Sergeants. Sergeants serve as fire-team leaders and vehicle gunners
while providing first-level leadership in their platoons. An armored BCT
requires 87 tanker, 52 scout, and 135 infantry sergeants with an overage
totaling 343 sergeants.
One primary source of sergeants would be reminiscent of the
Vietnam War’s Noncommissioned Officer Candidate’s Course, which
produced sergeants from soldiers who demonstrated promise during
basic training. One model involves sending the top 25 percent of each
graduating OSUT class immediately to a modified Basic Leader Course.
This course would focus, first, on small unit leadership, followed
by several weeks of training specific to the soldier’s field and rank,
including tactics, maintenance, and gunnery.20 These new NCOs would
17 Ibid.
18 G-3 Training staff member, Maneuver Center of Excellence, email messages to the author,
February 22 and February 27, 2017.
19 Ibid.
20 Required percentages differ significantly depending on the needs of armor, scout, and infantry organizations, combined with the unknown variable of how many other sources are providing
soldiers to train as sergeants.
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be effectively prepared for leadership and receive a different brigade
assignment than their peers from initial training. While most of these
NCOs would join the newly-forming brigades, some would also report
to existing units to allow experienced NCOs to cross-level to the
new brigades.
Midgrade and Senior NCOs. The biggest personnel challenge of
generating brigade combat teams is filling midgrade and senior NCO
ranks with experienced leaders while maintaining existing brigades and
meeting the requirements of the generating force. An armored BCT
requires 42 tanker, 47 scout, and 80 infantry staff sergeants with an
overage total of 211. The distribution of sergeants first class equates to
23 tankers, 12 scouts, and 26 infantry, an overage total of 76. Master
sergeants and command sergeants major fill 17 tanker or scout billets
and 13 infantry slots with an overage total of 38. Given the performance
of midgrade NCOs during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite
deferring NCO education, the Army might accept the risk of rapid
promotion in a cross-leveling strategy, which might also favor technical
or tactical training over leadership courses.21 Nevertheless, the Master
Gunner’s School is an essential course to ensure the master gunners within
the armored BCT are indeed combat vehicle weapons systems experts.22

Officers

The unique roles, responsibilities, and training requirements for,
as well as the smaller numbers of, officers means every effort should
be made for them to complete all professional military education and
training requirements to support the brigade’s aimpoint.
Lieutenants. Except for the two-year option for Cadet Initial Entry
Training through the Reserve Officer Training Corps, there is no way
to accelerate commissioning through a university. Therefore, Officer
Candidate School will be the primary source for lieutenants—1,080
graduates per year—for the first two to four years of an Army expansion
effort.23 With five months’ notice, the school could expand its courses
and increase the number of graduates to 3,200 officers.24 The Army
National Guard also has substantial officer-training capacity.25
After initial training, all lieutenants would attend the armor or
infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course, which is the minimum training
required to lead a platoon. In 19 weeks, these courses respectively graduate
480 and 1,440 officers per year with additional capacities of 840 and
21 Some examples of alternate training include Ranger School, the Tank Commander
Certification Course, Army Reconnaissance Course, Mortar Leaders Course, Mechanized Leaders
Course, Stryker Leaders Course, and Battle Staff Noncommissioned Officer Course.
22 The authorization is for a master gunner at each tank and infantry company, plus tank and
Bradley master gunners at both the battalion and brigade levels. The squadron is authorized one
master gunner at the squadron level and one for the tank company, but a Bradley master gunner is
not authorized at the troop level. For more details, see FMS-Web (1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division,
and subordinate units; accessed February 18, 2017).
23 “Army ROTC: Army ROTC Leader Development: Cadet Initial Entry Training,” US Army,
March 17, 2016, http://www.goarmy.com/rotc/courses-and-colleges/curriculum/cadet-initial-entry
-training.html; and regimental commander, email message to author, December 9 and 16, 2016.
24 Battalion commander, email.
25 Essentially every state and some territories conduct Officer Candidate School at their Regional
Training Institute. Most states currently conduct 2–3 small classes of 10–20 students per year. For
one example, see “Officer Candidate School: Apply: OCS Program Dates,” Alabama National
Guard, December 19, 2016, http://al.ng.mil/ALABAMA/Careers/OCS/Pages/OCS_Apply.aspx.
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2,200 students.26 A new armored BCT would require, with overage, 76
junior lieutenants—33 armor officers filling armor or cavalry billets, 19
infantry officers, and 9 more from either branch. A secondary manning
requirement for 51 junior lieutenants would be created per brigade to
replace senior lieutenants or newly-promoted captains assigned to the
Maneuver Captain’s Career Course during the expansion. The combined
output of the armor and infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course are
sufficient to fill three armored BCTs per quarter.
Most new officers attend unit-specific training such as the Army
Reconnaissance Course, Bradley Leaders Course, Stryker Leaders
Course, Airborne School, Ranger School, or the Mortar Leader Course
after completing the Basic Officer Leadership Course. Thus, training
for a new infantry or armor officer lasts 9–12 months.27 Despite the
need to build brigades and the risks associated with selecting scout or
mortar platoon leaders prior to their arrival at the unit, new lieutenants
must continue to receive this training before they are assigned to their
brigades as such opportunities after arriving will be limited. Other
positions, such as executive officer, require more experience and should
be filled from existing brigades.
Captains. The 51 senior lieutenants or newly promoted captains
required to man a new armored BCT would include 15 armor, 12
infantry, and 14 officers from either branch. The secondary manning
requirement would replace 15 senior captains departing their brigades to
attend the Command and General Staff College. During the last decade,
unit commanders have typically hesitated to send their senior lieutenants
to the Captain’s Career Course; however, immediate completion of
this program would be essential to building new brigades. With the
majority of captains stabilized, the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course,
which currently achieves 800 graduates per year, can build 2.75 new
armored BCT’s per quarter while allowing for attrition.28 The primary
concern arises from the resultant loss of experience among captains
who will serve as company commanders or fill battalion and brigade
staffs. Sequentially building new armored BCTs mitigates such loss by
spreading it over time and across units.
Majors. Unlike the other officer grades, there is a large population
of senior captains and majors serving in nonessential positions such as
graduate school students, instructors, or other broadening assignments.
Each brigade would require 10 armor or infantry majors to be trained
and assigned as the operations and executive officers in the brigade and
its four maneuver battalions. Typically, such officers are graduates of
the one-year resident Command and General Staff College program or
the fourteen-week Intermediate Level Education. Subject to training
requirements, these officers could rapidly fill the required billets in a
new brigade.
Closed during World War I to ensure officers were available for
the war, the Command and General Staff College continued training
during World War II, graduating more than 19,000 staff officers in 27
26 Battalion commander, Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course, email message to author,
December 16, 2016.
27 Cavalry squadron commander, email message to author, December 7, 2016.
28 G-3 Training staff member, email.
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shortened staff courses that closely resembled the current Intermediate
Level Education timeline.29 By shortening the resident program and
conducting multiple iterations per year, enough field grade officers could
be trained to form leadership cohorts for the new armored BCTs.
Commanders. The typically low selection rate for command at the
battalion and brigade levels leaves a significant population of available
high-quality lieutenant colonels and colonels. In the first year of
expansion, alternates from the most recent command select lists could
be selected for the authorizations of one colonel to command each
brigade and four lieutenant colonels to lead the maneuver battalions.
In subsequent years, the command select list would align with manning
requirements. The increased number of commands could impact the
ability to fill senior staff positions at and above the corps level, but this
deficiency could be offset by deferring retirements.
The Army already conducts a general Pre-Command Course at Fort
Leavenworth and a Maneuver Pre-Command Course at Fort Benning.
By combining both courses at Fort Leavenworth and scheduling them
in conjunction with Intermediate Level Education cohorts scheduled for
the same new brigades, the Army could incorporate some basic planning
exercises into the course while simultaneously building the command
teams for each brigade.
The Army retains significant training capacity in the states’ Regional
Training Institutes, many of which currently possess armor, cavalry,
and infantry military occupational specialty qualification and NCO
education programs.30 If this capacity was unnecessary, the institutes
could disband and either support building the cadre for new armored
BCTs or replace leaders in the generating force who could then fill
armored BCT positions.

Brigade Combat Team

On the identified activation date, trained soldiers and leaders would
converge on a designated location, whether the infrastructure of a
deployed armored BCT, a recently deactivated one, or a mobilization
force generation installation capable of housing and supporting the
entire brigade’s training regimen.31 The first five brigades might be
partially equipped from the five Army prepositioned stock fleets or from
existing units’ idle stay-behind equipment. Subsequent brigades would
have to wait for new equipment to be procured.
Two potential sources of cadre exist around which to build brigades.
First, the Army has six combined arms training brigades with the mission
of training and mobilizing the Army National Guard. Combined arms
training brigades, consist of commanders and rudimentary staffs at
29 John W. Partin, ed., A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth 1827–1983 (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Combat Studies Institute, 1983), 37, 41.
30 A typical example of a state’s capability is the Pennsylvania Army National Guard’s 166th
Regiment, which currently offers military occupational specialty qualification for armor, scouts, and
infantry as well as the Basic Leadership Course for NCOs. See “166th Regiment,” Pennsylvania
Army National Guard, November 6, 2017, http://www.png.pa.gov/army_national_guard/166th
_regiment/Pages/default.aspx.
31 Mobilization Force Generation Installations have varying capacity in training areas and
housing. As of 2015, there are only three such installations capable of housing more than 4,000
soldiers at the same time: Fort Stewart, Georgia; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; and Camp Shelby,
Mississippi. For more details, see “White Paper: CATB to ABCT Conversion.”
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the battalion and brigade levels, and company training teams with a
team chief and a cadre of NCOs. In the event that the National Guard’s
brigades are already mobilized, those training brigades could form the
nucleus of the first five armored BCTs. Using the training brigades would
allow time to identify, train, and assemble soldiers, junior NCOs, and
officers, as well as the entire cavalry squadron, to form the next brigades.
The 1st Army conducted a feasibility study of this concept in 2015,
concluding it would be possible.32 Secondly, in similar fashion, the Army
is currently planning to form six security force assistance brigades. Like
the combined arms training brigades, these brigades consist of a cadre
of leaders and staff, without a full complement of enlisted soldiers and
junior NCOs, around which a brigade combat team might be formed.

Training Model

A 37-week battalion training model that concentrates on combined
arms maneuver in a contemporary operating environment and culminates in a combat training center exercise, would enable newly-formed
armored BCTs to achieve initial proficiency in brigade maneuver.33
Because the training progression would require four maneuver battalions
to rotate through key training resources, particularly live-fire ranges, a
minimum of 40 weeks would be required to sequence all four units
through the training. The following schedule for each battalion rotation
also includes “white space” for retraining and equipment maintenance.
The model does not provide for training in stability operations or other
nonessential skills.
During Week 1, soldiers initiate administrative inprocessing, draw
their equipment, and start to build teams. The next five weeks include
individual and basic collective task training, and also a two-week
leader training program and command post exercise. Week 7 involves
a situational training exercise on chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear scenarios, which is followed by crew drills and maneuver at
the fire team and squad levels in Week 8. Week 9 is allocated for unit
needs, while Weeks 10 and 11 focus on tactical training and platoon
battle drills. Week 12 is another week of white space for recovery or
additional training.
Weeks 13–16 include fire team and squad live fire exercises and crew
qualification on all stabilized and unstabilized systems, culminating
in platoon gunnery table XII. Another week of unit recovery or
retraining time occurs before the company-level situational training
exercises during Weeks 18 and 19; a company-level live-fire exercise
and battalion-level fire coordination exercise happen during Week 20.
Another unplanned training period is available in Week 21. Weeks 22
and 23 include a battalion command post exercise followed by battalion
situational training exercises. Finally, while soldiers recover and prepare
unit equipment for deployment to a combat training center, unit leaders
participate in an armored BCT command post exercise that occurs
during Week 24.

32 “CATB to ABCT Conversion.”
33 This training model is informed primarily by my professional opinion as a combined arms
battalion commander for two years, as well as a task force senior maneuver trainer at the Joint
Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Germany, for two years.
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At this point, the unit has another week to prepare for the combat
training center deployment, which occurs during Week 26. Training at
the center—which might be the National Training Center, the Joint
Readiness Training Center, or a similar local training area, if necessary—
lasts through Week 30. The unit returns to its home station during Week
31 and conducts recovery, retraining, and semiannual or annual services
on vehicles and equipment through Week 34. The unit conducts block
leave during Weeks 35 and 36 and becomes operationally capable in
Week 37.
While the required training time is fixed, the total time required
to grow new brigades will vary based on such factors as mobilizing
the Army National Guard, vacating the mobilization force generation
installations, forward-deploying units to the Army prepositioned stock
fleet, building complete equipment sets, and initiating a steady flow
of new soldiers, as well as locating, transferring, and training initial
unit cadre.
Even building the first brigades around the experienced and
intact combined arms training brigades from 1st Army would require
augmentation with the entire cavalry squadron and with staff sergeants
from either the generating force or the existing brigades. Officer billets
could be filled by courses already underway. For the first brigades to
form, the force would be dependent upon whether a Basic Leadership
Course for sergeants was underway and how far along the various OSUT
courses might be in training. A fully-trained enlisted force might not
be available for four to six months. Moreover, the assembled force
would require about nine more months of training to be minimally
ready. Subsequently formed brigades would be more limited by the
ability to generate a cadre of experienced midgrade leaders once the
flow of enlisted and junior NCOs was established. Once prepositioned
equipment was issued, the rate of forming armored brigades would be
wholly dependent upon procuring additional matériel.

Risks

Although individual armored BCT’s can be built rapidly, there is risk
in doing so. Primarily, the entire force would lack experience. Existing
brigades would not only release many of their most experienced leaders,
but would also acquire inexperienced replacements. New brigades would
receive some experienced cadre, but many of those soldiers would likely
be inexperienced in their new billets or ranks.
A recent study described the practice of keeping a small Army that is
rapidly expansible in a time of war as “a flawed approach.”34 The primary
reason 30 months are required to build a brigade combat team is for
experience. Currently, soldiers at the unit level average five years in service,
while historically, draftees and volunteers alike spent two years in service.35
Considering the increasingly complex battlefield and equipment, there
is no replacement for experience. Nevertheless, this proposal would
generate brigades with experience measured in months, not years.
34 John R. Evans Jr., Getting it Right: Determining the Optimal Active Component End Strength of
the All-Volunteer Army to Meet the Demands of the 21st Century (Washington DC: Brookings Institute,
2015), 21.
35 Ibid.
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The junior leaders from the Vietnam War were a mass-produced
expedient to face the pressing needs of that war. They were not trained
to be professional and long-serving leaders, but a short-term source of
combat leadership. While they did lead well on the battlefield, they lacked
the ability to provide mature leadership in garrison. The young sergeants,
in particular, were trained to be “good enough to win the war” but were
given almost no instruction in discipline or garrison leadership.36 Recall
the lesson in the Army’s previous attempt to build more effective and
cohesive units that continued to train together as Cohesion, Operational
Readiness, and Training units; when average leaders were placed under
time constraints and high pressure to form a unit rapidly based on
inexperienced soldiers, “vertical” cohesion actually suffered.37
Historically, when the Army expands, it is also forced to lower
standards for recruitment and retention. Struggling with recruitment
during the early years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army
reduced standards to allow up to four percent of recruits in Category IV
of the Armed Forces, the lowest aptitude category, to enter the service.38
Currently, only 71 percent of American youth meet standards for service,
and the trend is getting worse.39 Lowering these standards creates both
discipline and performance problems. Disciplinary problems will be
worsened by the fact that most soldiers’ first line supervisors will be
inexperienced junior sergeants barely months ahead of those they are
leading. One of many examples of the risks posed to performance by
lower quality soldiers is stark. Given the same training as tank gunners,
soldiers categorized as IIIA (scoring in the 50th to 64th percentile on the
Armed Force Qualification Test) scored 34 percent better on the test than
did soldiers categorized as IV (scoring in the 10th to 30th percentile).40
The last risk is to mission success. While it is mathematically
possible to push the right numbers of soldiers through training, promote
them, assign them a billet, and propel them through a modicum of
training, they still lack the proficiency and lethality gained only through
multiple iterations in diverse conditions associated with day and night
operations in inclement weather and during chemical conditions. Failing
to train soldiers for proficiency, particularly when combined with the
performance of lower-quality recruits, is disastrous.

Recommendations

Although the Army may not decide to double the number of brigade
combat teams right now, multiple brigade combat teams may need to be
added as part of a future Army expansion. For that reason, the Army
should consider the following recommendations:

36 Lee M. North, The United States Army and the Sergeant Problem: The Army’s Systemic Inability To
Produce Enough Sergeants and a Proposal To Fix It (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and
General Staff College, 2014), 26.
37 Kenneth C. Scull, Cohesion: What We Learned from COHORT, Study Project (Carlisle Barracks,
PA: US Army War College, 1990), 22–23.
38 Anna Badkhen, “Army Relaxes Its Standards To Fill Ranks / Critics Say Push To Meet
Quotas May Let Unstable Recruits Join Up,” SFGate (San Francisco), July 11, 2006.
39 Blake Stilwell, “Here’s Why Most Americans Can’t Join the Military,” Business Insider,
September 28, 2015.
40 Jennifer Kavanagh, Determinants of Productivity for Military Personnel: A Review of Findings on
the Contribution of Experience, Training, and Aptitude to Military Performance (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2005), 27.
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Link the generating force to the Total Army Analysis process.
Codify a minimum number of brigade combat teams to be supported
immediately from the generating force. Grow the generating force
to support expansibility.
Assign battle roster identification numbers to the expansible force.
Add a designation for expansible battalion and brigade commanders
on the Command Select List as a category separate from principals
or alternates. Build the expansible force’s battle roster to the extent
possible, including coding soldiers in the generating force to specific
duty positions in the expansible brigades. Compare the generating
force’s capacity against battle-rostered cadre and identify manning
solutions for any shortfalls.
Formally task the combined arms training brigades and security
force assistance brigades with a wartime mission as the cadre of
expansible brigades.
Assess current and surge capacity at active and reserve
component schools against expansibility goals with, and without,
stop-loss in effect. Assess all centers of excellence and state regional
training institutes. Capture costs and infrastructure requirements to
generate excess training capacity at incremental increases of 10, 25,
and 50 percent.
Adjust personnel policies to support expansibility. Enable
recalling experienced soldiers who have not met their individual
ready reserve commitment or who have retired. Assign battle-roster
numbers for those soldiers. Code these soldiers to specific duty
positions in the expansible brigades. Encourage national, state, or
local programs focused on the health and fitness of America’s youth.
Maintain prepositioned BCT equipment sets consistent with
Total Army Analysis goals. Reset sufficient combat vehicles in depots
or long-term storage. Procure and store all equipment necessary
to equip sufficient brigade combat teams. Build additional Army
prepositioned stock capability in both armored and Stryker Brigades.
The Army’s 2013 Strategic Guidance reads: “The Army must
preserve options for the future by retaining the capacity to expand
and provide the capabilities needed for future challenges.”41 Clearly,
the Army identified the risks assumed by cutting the force structure,
particularly in the generating force. Given fiscal realities, however, the
Army is currently operating at the edge of efficiency—sufficient capacity
to maintain the Army we have, but not the one we might need.
Secretary Gates may be right when he says we have seen the last
major combat involving large mechanized formations; then again,
he also said our record of predicting future war is perfect—we have
always been wrong! Regardless, should America identify the need for a
large Army, we will not have the luxury of time. It is, therefore, in the
Army’s—and the nation’s—best interests to minimize the time required
to build brigade combat teams.
41 Raymond T. Odierno and John M. McHugh, Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013 (Washington
DC: HQDA, 2013), 15.
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Rapid Expansion and the Army’s
Matériel: Is There Enough?
Robb C. Mitchell
ABSTRACT: This article examines the matériel challenges the US
Army might encounter if it were required to expand to twice its size
on short notice.

F

or the US Army to expand rapidly, its leaders will have to make
critical decisions on organizational and matériel requirements.
However, a recent research effort at the US Army War College
reveals that some equipment, such as air defense artillery and aviation
assets, will be difficult to procure quickly.1 This challenge is due to the
manufacturing requirements of American and allied industries, and
it is significant enough to require the Army to reexamine some of its
expectations about rapid expansion. For instance, 10 years would be
needed to produce theater ballistic defense equipment and ammunition,
eight years for aviation assets such as attack helicopters, and three years
for armored units such as the M2 Bradley fighting vehicles and armored
breaching vehicles.
Admittedly, the Army could use prepositioned stocks to overcome
some of its matériel challenges. Likewise, older equipment from the
depots could be issued, newer equipment from commercial markets
could be purchased, or the Army could adjust the quantities it requires.
But, these solutions will not provide the Army with everything it needs;
nor would they provide it with the most capable equipment for fighting
another great power.

Analytical Framework and Findings

The benchmark for this study was doubling the Army within a
36-month time frame. While any number of scenarios would not require
that level of effort, many would. Regardless, the benchmark helped
identify a number of stress points within the matériel production system
that the Army should address. In addition, the following assumptions
were made. First, financial aspects of production are relaxed. Second,
acquisitions and contracting allow for open competition and sole-source
contracting. Third, maintenance and sustainment are initially conducted
by contractors and later transitioned to Army personnel. Fourth, space
for facilities or training is sufficient. Fifth, American acquisitions are
prioritized by the State Department, which would include stopping
production for foreign military sales and delaying new agreements
during expansion. Sixth, equipment from Army prepositioned stock is
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as a field artilleryman
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Army Staff before
1 This study was carried out by an integrated team of faculty and students who examined the attending the US Army
War College.
US Army’s ability to expand quickly to fight a great-power war.
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harvested as soon as possible and refilled later. Lastly, outdated equipment
solutions are accepted by the Army until new matériel becomes available.
The study’s principal finding was that American industry would
struggle to build and to field enough theater ballistic defense, aviation,
mechanized infantry, and other matériel to meet the benchmark
described above. Therefore, to acquire the raw materials needed to
produce Army equipment during an expansion effort, the Department
of Defense should develop and publish a plan similar to the Industrial
Mobilization Plan of 1939.2 The pre-World War II mobilization plan that
synchronized production schedules of different equipment, for example,
was published by the Army in early 1938, nearly four years before Pearl
Harbor, updated the next year, and modified throughout the war.3
Under the guidance of President Franklin D. Roosevelt the
government redirected some factory output prior to World War II. In
addition, lend-lease agreements enabled the United States to support
Allied efforts to thwart Axis powers while preparing for the nation’s
possible involvement.4 In 1942, the War Production Board was
established to take control of and manage the requirements process. By
1944, the Victory Program had produced 185,000 planes and 120,000
tanks.5 Despite a slow start, the proactive measures that national leaders
began in 1939 laid the groundwork for industry structure and for raw
materials to be postured correctly before war was declared in December
1941. In sum, the nation took three years to produce the equipment
the Army needed for combat operations in a two-front war. Without
Roosevelt’s foresight, an additional two years, or more, might have been
needed to produce the same amount of equipment.
Notably, today’s Army already has lethal units with mostly
modernized equipment and a robust funding and acquisition system.
Unfortunately, the manufacturing base for large equipment is small, and
the competition with foreign companies is great. Today’s systems and
the tools to produce them are more complex, which requires more time
and skill than has been needed previously.
The Army is also challenged by an industry preference for funding
new technology but then producing only enough for deployable units to
use. In practice, this approach creates a small number of well-equipped
units and a large number of ill-equipped units. From the industry
point of view, producing a small amount of equipment for ten years is
preferable to producing a large amount of equipment for three years.6
Thus, to fight a major war, the Army’s leadership must communicate a
sense of urgency to industry leaders about how much and how soon the
equipment is needed.

2 Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States
Army, 1775–1945 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1955), 479–80.
3 1938 Protective Mobilization Plan; 1939 Protective Mobilization Plan; and Kreidberg and
Henry, Military Mobilization, 479–82.
4 US Office of the Historian, “Lend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early
Years of World War II,” US Department of State, October 12, 2017, https://history.state.gov
/milestones/1937-1945/lend-lease.
5 Mobilization, 16–18.
6 Interview with resourcing division chief, January 25, 2017. For operational security purposes,
names and other interview details have been removed.

army expanSibility

Mitchell

103

The new plan that the Defense Department develops, therefore,
should articulate the intent to mine or to purchase raw materials such as
aluminum, copper, steel, tungsten, and other rare-earth materials.7 Since
the United States is the world’s fourth largest producer of copper and
steel as well as the sixth largest producer of aluminum, acquiring these
resources should be manageable. Although the United States does not
mine or produce tungsten, it could likely purchase that material from
Canada, the world’s third largest producer.8
China produces most rare-earth materials. Thus, purchasing those
materials could be problematic during future conflicts. Other nations
are attempting to produce more of these materials, but progress is
slow. The Defense Logistics Agency manages stockpiles and contracts
for strategic minerals distributed to industry. Public law also allows
defense requirements a higher precedence than commercial needs.9 The
Department of Defense only monitors rare-earth materials, however,
and has no plan to direct the acquisition of raw materials, internally
or from foreign nations, nor to coordinate material distribution to
American industry.10
Albeit with some equipment shortages, the full support of the
government, and unlimited funding, the Army would be able to build
quickly Stryker and light BCTs, field artillery, engineer, transportation,
and other support units. However, as further analysis demonstrates,
numerous challenges exist that prevent theater ballistic air defense units,
combat aviation brigades, and armored BCTs from being doubled as
quickly as other units.

Air Defense Units

Industry could not double the quantity of missile units within three
years. To expand from 15 to 30 Patriot battalions, the Army would need
360 more MIM-104 launchers.11 Current production for this weapon is
designated for foreign military sales, and the M903 launching station
upgrades, scheduled through 2024, do not include producing new units.
Due to the manufacturing time for subcomponents, one battalion could
be fielded within five years.12 A 30-month start-up would be required to
add facility space and vendors.13 Even after prioritizing US needs over
foreign military sales, the program manager would need a minimum of
ten years to equip 15 more Patriot battalions.14
7 Interview with deputy maneuver division chief, December 6, 2016; interview with mission
command system synchronization officer, January 26, 2017; and email message to author,
March 29, 2017.
8 Amber Pariona, “Top Copper Producing Countries in the World,” World Atlas, April 25, 2017,
http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/top-copper-producing-countries-in-the-world.html; Benjamin
Elisha Sawe, “Top 10 Steel Producing Countries in the World,” World Atlas, April 25, 2017, http://
www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-top-10-steel-producing-countries-in-the-world.html; E. Lee Bray,
“Aluminum,” in US Department of the Interior, Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2015, (Reston,
VA: US Geological Survey, 2015); and “Tungsten: World Concentrate Production, By Country,”
IndexMundi, March 30, 2017, http://www.indexmundi.com/en/commodities/minerals/tungsten
/tungsten_t15.html.
9 Email message to the author, March 29, 2017.
10 Ronald W. Murawski, Strategic Materials Protection Board Meeting Pre-Brief (Washington DC:
Army, Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology [ASA (ALT)], February 10, 2014), briefing slides.
11 Interview with Patriot system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
12 Interview with Patriot deputy system synchronization officer, March 7, 2017.
13 Interview with Patriot deputy system synchronization officer, March 29, 2017.
14 Interview with Patriot system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
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Patriot missiles would be even more difficult to double. To obtain
the 3,000 additional missiles, the Army would immediately have to start
stockpiling the missiles required to prosecute any anticipated major war
immediately. The vendor would need 18 months to produce the first
10 missiles before being able to sustain production of 10 missiles per
month, with a surge capability of 30 missiles per month for one year.15
At this rate, the vendor would need about ten years to meet the required
expansion quantity of Patriots. The Army could hire another vendor,
but development and testing of the new missile would require about
five years.16 If the testing was successful, the secondary vendor could
decrease the missile time line to eight years.
An Army plan to double terminal high altitude area defense
(THAAD) missile batteries from 8 to 16 would also fall critically
short within three years. Equipment production for these batteries is
scheduled to end near the end of 2018. If a pending foreign military sale
reopens the production line, the Army’s purchase of this equipment will
be more affordable. Once reopened, the first battery would take three
years to produce. Sustained manufacturing would then produce one to
two batteries per year.17 At this rate, the Army would have 16 batteries
in about seven years.
Ammunition production is more difficult. The combat load of
a THAAD battery is 48 missiles. At current rates of production, the
Army plans to acquire 60 percent of the missiles required for seven
batteries by 2017.18 Fourteen batteries could therefore be fielded, trained,
and deployed by the end of 2021. Obviously, this goal could be met
more quickly with additional vendors developing and producing other
munitions with the same capabilities.
Given the increased demand for short-range air defense capability
during 2017, the Army is reassessing how much additional capacity is
required.19 As a planning factor, the Force Management Directorate
supports one such battalion per division, a growth from 9 to 36
battalions.20 These units could be built with new technology, under
the best of circumstances, within four years. The Army also plans to
place the FIM 92 Stinger short-range, man-portable, air-defense weapon
system in BCTs by the end of 2017 for the first time since 2004 and add
Avengers to Army prepositioned stock.

Combat Aviation Brigades

American industry would be challenged to build the aircraft
necessary to double the existing 21 combat aviation brigades. These
combat units require 137 aircraft each, a total of more than 2,800
aircraft. Additional aircraft would be needed for the generating force
training at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The organizational plan increases
the attack capability by adding Apaches, while decreasing the assault

15 Interview with Patriot system synchronization officer, December 7, 2016.
16 Interview with Patriot system synchronization officer, March 20, 2017.
17 Interview with THAAD system synchronization officer, January 27, 2017.
18 Interview with THAAD system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
19 Interview with Joint theater air and missile defense system synchronization officer,
March 8, 2017.
20 Interview with deputy division chief, December 6, 2016.
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and medical evacuation capability by subtracting UH-60 Black Hawk
helicopters, consistent with the vision from Army leadership.21
My number one need is for combat aviation. . . .the biggest gap in our
capabilities. . . . Everybody knows that the Army is designed to fight with
our aviation. So, the Army is trying to figure out a way to do it whether it is
rotational aviation, [or] rotational troops. . . . Combat aviation is critical.22

Building Army aviation is extremely time consuming. For each
airframe, the vendor needs 12 to 18 months to reach maximum
production capacity, to corner the market, and to procure steel and
titanium. Even more challenging is the need to hire and train skilled
laborers to manufacture the complex gearboxes, engines, and drivetrain
components. Opening additional production lines would not help in
the short term, and building a new facility or retooling an existing
facility would take at least 24 to 36 months. New locations would
gradually reach maximum production capacity in four years under the
best circumstances.23
The Army currently has 734 Apache attack helicopter airframes
for an expansion requirement of 42 combat action brigades and for the
training base at Fort Rucker. The airframes would take a minimum of
nine years to produce at a rate of 110 aircraft per year with a start-up
requirement of three years.24 Maximum capacity would occur during the
fifth year, and the rate cannot be increased due to the physical constraints
of the production line. The limitations associated with subcomponent
suppliers, such as the alloys for the compound blade and the time
required to test tolerances and specifications, could be accelerated with
unlimited funding, but not significantly.25 At this rate, 672 aircraft could
be produced in eight years. With two additional facilities, production
could reach maximum capacity in five years, 330 aircraft could be
produced during the seventh year, and the required aircraft would be
available in nine years.26
The quantity of Black Hawk assault helicopters would be extremely
difficult to double within three years, but could be achieved in six. The
Army currently has enough Black Hawks for every expeditionary combat
aviation brigade capable of assault and for those capable of attack and
assault. To increase to 42 combat action brigades and meet the increased
training requirements, the Army will require an additional 700 aircraft.27
The current production pace of UH-60Ms to replace the existing
Black Hawk models should be sustainable through 2028.28 The 30-year
life cycle of the older UH-60As cannot be extended since the deteriorating
airframes are unsafe. The facility could build enough Black Hawks in
36 months to equip four combat aviation brigades. With unlimited
21 Steven Powell, Leader Book, Army 2023 (Washington, DC: HQDA G-3/5/7, December 6,
2016), briefing slides, 50–51.
22 Jen Judson, “Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges: US Army Europe and Its Role in Deterrence,” Defense
News, March 7, 2016.
23 Interview with ASA (ALT) staff, February 16, 2017.
24 Interview with attack aviation system synchronization officer, December 7, 2016.
25 Interview with aviation systems coordinator, March 29, 2017.
26 Interview with ASA (ALT) staff, March 10, 2017.
27 Powell, 50–51.
28 Interview with assault aviation system synchronization officer, December 7, 2016.

106

Parameters 47(3) Autumn 2017

funding, two more facilities could be built to reach the required aircraft
goal during the sixth year.29
The quantity of CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift cargo helicopters for 42
combat action brigades plus the aircraft needed for training requirements
could be met within five years. The Army currently has two production
lines capable of producing 200 aircraft in just over four years.30
Unmanned aerial systems, such as Gray Eagle and Shadow, provide
commanders with battlefield reconnaissance. But, building enough for
42 combat aviation brigades cannot be done within three years. The
program manager for Gray Eagles is still fielding the system to the
Army. If required today, the vendor would need eight years to reach
the additional 300 systems required for expansion. If prioritized, the
Army could receive expansion quantity for Gray Eagle within six
years.31 Similarly, the Army would not have enough Shadow systems
within three years. The Shadow project fielded 416 systems to the
Army before production stopped in 2010. An Army expansion already
underway would increase the required number of Shadows to nearly
1,000 systems. Assuming a 24 month start-up, the vendor could produce
enough Shadows within five years.32

Armored Brigade Combat Teams

Due to the variety of armored vehicles, armored BCTs are the
third most difficult matériel requirement to address for an expansion.
Fortunately, the Army has 15 manned and 5 unmanned sets of equipment
available. Nine manned armored BCTs are in the active component; five
are in the Army National Guard and one rotational set is in Korea. The
Army possesses enough equipment for three armored BCTs in Army
prepositioned stocks. Other sets of equipment are under production.
Thus, to expand from 15 to 30 armored BCTs, 10 additional sets of
equipment will be needed.33 Alternatively, the Army could issue less upto-date equipment from depots.
Army Matériel Command owns older equipment that could be
refurbished and fielded faster than new equipment could be produced.
Most of the excess equipment stored at the depots would support
maneuver and fires brigades as well as combat service support units.
Such equipment could support two armored BCTs of Bradley infantry
fighting vehicles and M113 armored personnel carriers; three battalions
each of M270 multiple launch rocket systems, M142 high mobility
artillery rocket systems, and M119 105mm howitzers; six battalions of
Avenger missile systems; and most of the medium- and heavy-cargo
and fuel trucks to support those organizations.34 Depending on the
personnel and training time lines, the older equipment could expand the
training base or undergo modernization. Moreover, if such equipment
is fielded to the first expansion units, it could be replaced at a later date.
29 Interview with ASA (ALT) staff, February 16, 2017, and March 10, 2017.
30 Interview with heavy lift system synchronization officer, January 11, 2017; and interview with
ASA (ALT) staff, February 16, 2017.
31 Interview with unmanned aerial systems coordinator, March 7, 2017.
32 Ibid.
33 Interview with force development staff, December 7, 2016, and January 10, 2017.
34 Interview with Army Matériel Command liaison, March 29, 2017.
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The most critical pieces of equipment for armored BCTs are
Bradleys and M1 Abrams tanks. Other necessary armored vehicles
include the M109 Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) 155 mm
self-propelled howitzer, the M88 Hercules recovery vehicle, and the
M1 assault breacher vehicle. The BCTs will also have the new armored
multi-purpose vehicles, which replace the aged M113 armored personnel
carrier and share the same chassis as the Bradley. Therefore, expanding
the Army by 10 armored BCTs will require building 870 tanks and 2,670
Bradley chassis.35
The shared chassis poses a challenge. Raw materials for aluminum
plate armor and other key components as well as available facility space
constrain production to no more than 2 armored BCTs per year with
an 18-month lead time. If additional facilities are used, enough chassis
could be produced within six years.36 Alternately, the Bradleys could
be built and fielded before transitioning production to the armored
multi-purpose vehicles. In both scenarios, the Army must coordinate
aluminum procurement with the Defense Logistics Agency. Under
these conditions, the Army could achieve expansion requirements
within 48 months.
The Army can successfully double its tank battalions by modernizing
current inventory. Nearly 2,000 M1A1 Abrams tank hulls can be
refurbished before engines, transmissions, and turrets are added. After
12–18 months, this pipeline can produce enough tanks per month, to
enable the Army to meet tank requirements within 30–36 months.
The upgraded Paladins would require four years to expand from 15
to 30 battalions in the active component and from 10 to 20 battalions
in Guard echelons above the brigade level. Current production of the
modernized howitzer systems can be expanded to meet requirements37
The desired quantity of Hercules systems can be obtained within
24 months by refurbishing current inventory.38 Notably, by ceasing
conversions of A1s to A2s, space can be freed to accommodate the
increased demand for the other armored vehicles.39 Expanding armored
breaching vehicles would take seven years, even though the current rate
of production will field enough vehicles for each armored BCT by 2022.40

Stryker Brigade Combat Teams

Stryker platform production could, with new facilities, be expanded
to equip the force with sufficient vehicles in four years. This rate of
production is enough to fill five of the nine expansion Stryker BCTs
within the 36-month goal. Although expanding Stryker facilities could
increase the rate of production, which would require a 24-month startup time just to complement Stryker vehicle production, the expansion
goal would still take 48 months to achieve.41

35 Interview with deputy maneuver division chief, December 6, 2016.
36 Interview with Program Executive Office Special Project staff, January 26, 2016.
37 Interview with cannon system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016, and March 7, 2017.
38 Interview with integration action officer, February 28, 2017; and interviews with cannon
system synchronization officer, December 7, 2016, and February 28, 2017.
39 Interview with Special Project Office staff, February 28, 2017.
40 Interview with Mobility Branch chief, March 7, 2017.
41 Interview with action officer, February 28, 2017.
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Field Artillery Units

As part of the field artillery expansion, the M270 multiple launch
rocket system (MLRS), the most lethal field artillery system, would
increase sufficiently in three years with no new production.42 Army
Matériel Command has three available battalions of equipment, so the
expansion requirement would be five battalions. The production line for
this equipment was closed in 2005, but older versions of the module can
be modernized.43 The Army can procure the lighter high mobility rocket
system (HIMARS) within four years. HIMARS battalions would expand
from 17 to 34 and require 272 more systems. Using one battalion’s worth
of unmanned systems in prepositioned stock and several owned by Army
Matériel Command, the vendor can produce and field enough of these
rocket systems in the next four years to fill the expansion requirements.
The cannon expansion of M777 155mm howitzers and M119s
will take three years.44 The quantity of M777s would grow from 7 to
14 battalions in echelons above the division level and increase by 32
batteries within the Stryker and infantry BCTs. Production of these
weapons, at a rate of 16 per month, ended in 2011; new production of
M777s requires a two-year start-up.45 M119s would expand from 64 to
128 batteries within infantry BCTs, but some of the 105mm howitzers
are in prepositioned stock and Army Matériel Command owns more of
these weapons as part of a conversion project. Assuming an 18-month
start-up, M119s could reach the expansion target.46
The Army’s new field artillery radar, the AN/TPQ-53 Quick
Reaction Capable Radar, will take four years to field. The vendor is
currently distributing 2 Q53 radars per BCT to replace the older Q36
and Q37 radar systems. Increasing by 172 more radar systems would
take a total of seven years. The Army could mitigate the shortage of
counterfire systems by retaining some of the older systems. With no
funding constraints, the manufacturer could also more than double
the production rate within 18 months of a decision to expand.47 The
AN/TPQ-50 lightweight counter mortar radar could increase by the
required 314 systems in five years.48 The Army could decrease this time
line if it reduced the number of systems for each BCT from 4 to 2.
With unlimited funding, the vendor could also increase production to
16 systems per month.49

Engineer Units

Requirements for bridging equipment, which the Army is currently
short of, and earth moving equipment could be met respectively within
five and two years. Unlimited funding could increase Joint Assault Bridge
output to meet the fielding schedule to armored units by 2022 and restart
production of the Rapidly Emplaced Bridging System production to
field two bridging assets for the expanded maneuver brigades within five
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Interview with rocket system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016, and March 6, 2017.
Interview with rocket systems synchronization officer, January 26, 2017.
Interview with rocket systems synchronization officer, December 6, 2016, and January 25, 2017.
Interview with rocket systems synchronization officer, January 25, 2017.
Interview with rocket systems synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
Interview with product manager, January 26, 2017.
Interview with radar system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
Interview with product manager, January 26, 2017
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years.50 The Army can purchase earth moving equipment quickly from
commercial vendors, who can produce enough bulldozers, excavators,
and other horizontal construction equipment requirements within two
years.51 Additionally, increasing route clearance platoons to protect
maneuver forces could be completed within four years. After depleting
equipment in Army prepositioned stocks, new vendors, with an 18–24
month start-up, could deliver the required quantities of Buffaloes,
Huskys, and Medium Mine Protected Vehicles.52

Supporting Equipment

Communications Equipment. The challenge of communications
equipment—such as radios, mission command systems, and the Joint
Battle Command Platform—occurs not from production, which should
be complete within 36 months, but integrated fielding of this equipment
with the platforms described above. In fact, given enough funding,
industry would be able to produce radios faster than the Army could train
Soldiers.53 Expanding units while maintaining similar communications
equipment and modernization levels, however, would be a struggle.
This aspect would force prioritized fielding to deploying units, causing
combatant commanders to lower communications standards, as well as
focus expansion on maintaining minimal compatibility without latency
throughout the force. As mission command systems are computer
based, the required technologies, such as laptops and software, are easily
procurable in expansion quantities.54
Although the vehicle mounting hardware for the Joint Battle
Command-Platform requires extensive time to install on combat
vehicles and aircraft, expansion could follow the Blue Force Tracking
model—the Army would synchronize procurement with unit
deployment. Requirements might be adjusted by limiting systems to key
unit leaders such as platoon leaders. In this scenario, no two deploying
units would look alike or have the same density. Moreover, 2017 plan
revisions decrease quantity of platforms by 25,000 to improve fielding
velocity and decrease training time by 24 hours to allow reserve units
to train soldiers during one weekend drill.55 The Army would try to
maintain modernization levels within deployment windows to avoid
interoperability challenges. Modernization is anticipated to take eight
years for the existing BCTs, but the Army could decrease this schedule
to three years by synchronizing unit availability with resources.56
Transportation Equipment. The final large, high-density equipment for
the Army are trucks and trailers. Light (80,000), medium (50,000), and
heavy (10,000) trucks, with cargo and fuel capability would take about
five years to complete with a production rate of 20,000 trucks per year
after an 18-month start-up period.57 This time line could be shortened
by allowing more commercial trucks, similar to Mine Resistant Ambush
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Interview with Mobility Branch chief, March 7, 2017.
Interview with mobility support system synchronization officer, March 7, 2017.
Interview with protection system synchronization officer, January 25, 2017.
Interview with radio system synchronization officer, March 8, 2017.
Interview with mission command system synchronization officer, January 26, 2017.
Interview with mission command system synchronization officer, March 8, 2017.
Interview with mission command system synchronization officer, January 26, 2017.
Interview with Transportation Branch chief, March 20, 2017.
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Protected vehicles, or changing American industry to a wartime posture
such as World War II. Either of these options would decrease the
production schedule to three years.

Conclusion

For the Army to respond quickly to a great-power threat, leaders must
complete the critical tasks of approving the organizational and matériel
plans far in advance. World War II experience clearly demonstrates the
benefits of early plans to expand the Army and its required equipment.
American industry produced vast amounts of equipment in the 30
months between Pearl Harbor and the amphibious assault at Normandy.
A detailed organizational plan for expanding deployable units would
influence a detailed matériel plan that could be used to coordinate with
American industry.
Such a collaborative effort will provide vendors with time to
develop their own plans for equipment production as well as allow the
Army to identify the raw materials, space, manpower, and energy needed
for mass production. Synchronization with other organizational plans
such as personnel, training, facilities, sustainment, and ammunition not
discussed here could also occur. Estimates and plans for organization
and matériel should then be updated based upon the evolving adversarial
threats, industry capabilities, and other influences, even during expansion.
Assuming unlimited funding and some optimistic circumstances,
equipment projections for tanks, howitzers, and other major equipment
are favorable; however, shortages in theater ballistic defense, aviation,
and armored units are anticipated. Steps to mitigate these deficiencies
include adding vendors who can develop and produce other versions of
theater ballistic defense weapons and attack aviation aircraft, leveraging
Army prepositioned stock, incorporating older equipment on-hand,
and purchasing new commercial equipment. In order to mitigate major
transportation equipment shortages, Army leadership could change the
organizational plan by decreasing units or equipment quantities as well
as deploy units into battle with shortages.
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By Tom Basile
Reviewed by James P. Farwell, National Security Expert; Associate Fellow,
Department of War Studies, Kings College, London, and author of Persuasion
and Power (Georgetown University Press, 2012)

T

om Basile’s Tough Sell: Fighting the Media War in Iraq is really two
books. The first two-thirds of the book offers invaluable insights on
the first two years of the Second Persian Gulf War, relating Basile’s firsthand experiences on the ground in Baghdad as a key player in the strategy
communication shop of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The final
third is a polemic defending the decision made by the administration
of US President George W. Bush to fight the war—a war even Bush
has questioned.
Basile’s conceptual discussion about everything from strategic
communication to ground realities make the book worth reading. Many
challenges confront a military-civilian force attempting to establish and
maintain message discipline and consistency. The cultures are competitive
and finding the right balance is tough. Civilians tend to be more flexible,
while the military decision-making process is bureaucratic. Soldiers are
permitted to speak to the press. In Basile’s view, military personnel can
get the facts wrong, make assertions that lack context, and inadvertently
undercut the mission. His analysis of these challenges is incisive.
Basile, is extremely critical of the media coverage of US efforts in
the Iraq War. He believes most of the press assigned to cover the war
knew nothing, made inadequate attempts to get the facts, and had a
strong anti-US bias. Perhaps. But “Rule 101” in media training presumes
the press knows little or nothing about a topic. This lack of knowledge
by the media is a continuing challenge for strategic communicators
everywhere. The lesson is communication strategies in a conflict zone
should anticipate and plan for the possibility—and in the author’s view,
the probability—that the media will spotlight small problems and ignore
major successes.
Some of the problems the author and others in the Coalition
Provisional Authority experienced when dealing with the media
emanated from the blowback occurring when the Authority revealed
Bush’s rationale for going to war—eliminating Saddam Hussein’s
weapons of mass destruction—came up short. That challenge eviscerated
Bush’s credibility on the war, and affected war reporting on the ground,
as journalists began questioning what the United States government
was doing and how well. Basile’s detailed account of forging and
executing a communication strategy offers powerful lessons for strategic
communicators operating in foreign cultures, especially in nations ruled
by dictators. Hussein had hollowed out Iraq. The coalition had to help
Iraqis rebuild everything—from hospitals and sewage treatment plants
to a new police force—from scratch.
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Basile argues that in surmounting such a stiff challenge, Paul Bremer,
the chief executive authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority,
and his team got a lot done with scant credit from the media for their
work. Basile also challenges top journalists like Rajiv Chandrasekaran,
whose Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone (2006) was
highly critical of the Authority. Smart people often interpret events very
differently. Basile shows the need to hear all sides of the argument.
Basile goes too far, though, in identifying a need to define words like
“win” and “success” a game aimed at managing expectations. Successful
strategy—whether communication, military, or political—requires
defining a desired outcome or end state from which follow strategy,
operations, plans, tactics, and metrics. In early 2003, General David
Petraeus famously told journalist Rick Atkinson: “Tell me how this
ends.” Linda Robinson wrote a fine book using this quote, Tell Me How
This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq (2008).
Petraeus was correct.
Basile’s view that Bremer correctly disbanded the Iraq Army will
surely spark discussion. George Packer, in The Assassins’ Gate: America in
Iraq (2005), and others, citing military sources, argue the decision was a
debacle that led directly to the current problems. Any book like this will
ignite debates at all levels.
Basile merits high credit for his patriotic service and his thoughtprovoking book that provides keen insights into what it takes to make
strategic communication in war zones a success and into the obstacles to
good strategic communication. Tough Sell is highly recommended.

Counter Jihad: America’s Military Experience in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria
By Brian Glyn Williams
Reviewed by Robert L. Bateman, Fellow, International Security Program,
New America

Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2017
400 pages
$39.95

I

t has long been a truism that journalists write the “first draft of
history.” In many ways this is true. Yet as is the case with all early
reports, whether they come from a light infantry scout platoon, a Special
Forces unit conducting strategic reconnaissance, or initial assessments of
satellite or voice intercepts, the initial reports of journalists are often just
that, “first drafts.” History, solid history, requires time.
There are several reasons for this, easily understood upon
brief reflection. First, it takes time to assemble the vast quantities of
information needed to write a solid work of history. Second, time allows
the passions of the moment to fade and hopefully provides the scholar
the chance to examine any issue or era with something approaching
neutrality. Participants themselves become less engaged, and hopefully
with mellowing (and the judicious assistance of personal notes that
might have been written at the time) can themselves see the events they
witnessed with a more critical eye. And finally, of course, when dealing
with military history there is the issue of declassification of documents,
a critical element when trying to reconstruct a cohesive and hopefully
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comprehensive account of events. For all of these reasons academic
military historians generally consider “real” history impossible for at
least 20–25 years after the events took place.
In Counter Jihad Brian Glyn Williams is deliberately attempting to
split the difference between the “first draft” of history and pure history
itself. In effect his book is a serious attempt to write a “second draft of
history.” In this it appears he has done solid work, as far as it can be done
at this point. As an individual, Williams is in a somewhat curious position,
but one that places him well in undertaking such a work. An academic
(a professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts) he
understands the rigorous requirements that must apply to any serious
work of academic scholarship. As a former contract employee of the
CIA, tasked with tracking suicide bombers in Afghanistan in 2007, he
understands both the military culture and the environment of war at
several levels. As a professor who believes in being a teacher not just
being an academic confined to mere research he also had a personal
motivation: many of his students today were grade school children on
September 11, 2001 and have no real idea of what happened through
much of the first decade of this century.
It is worth quoting his stated objective in part: “My aim is to shine
a retrospective light on the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria in order
to ‘historicize’ the disparate events once collectively known as the War
on Terror. The objective is to weave all these disjointed stories together
into one accessible narrative that tells us how we got to the point where
ISIS conquered an area in the Middle East larger than Britain or Israel
with eight million people living under its rule.”
In this Williams has made quite a good start. There are, of course,
gaps that may leave some dissatisfied. These, like all works, are as much
a product of the person writing the book as they are of the perceptions
of the readers.
Williams’ personal experiences in Afghanistan came in no small
part from his experience as an expert on Islamic culture and history
but also as a product of one of his earlier books, a biography on Afghan
leader Abdul Rashid Dostum. It is perhaps as a result of this that his
coverage of Iraq is less in-depth than some might like. The run-up to
the war in Iraq is explained in detail, most especially the politically
motivated manipulation and deliberate misreading of Iraqi capabilities
in NBC issues and blatant lies regarding ties between al-Qaeda and Iraq.
But post-Invasion Iraq, essentially the core of the war there between
2004–10, is glossed over in just 52 pages. Though I would also suggest
that this may be at least a little understandable since a real study would
require a book some 1,000 pages longer at least. (For this we shall have
to wait for the Center of Military History to produce the Tan Books.)
All in all, the book holds up well. Not as detailed as works such
as Tom Ricks’ Fiasco, nor as lightweight as some other brief accounts
of either war. For the specifics of military campaigns or battles during
our longest wars one should look elsewhere. But if you are trying to
find a decent single-source narrative of how we got here, Counter Jihad
accomplishes much of its stated intent, to present a concise single source
“second draft” of history.
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Los Zetas Inc.
By Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College
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he author of Los Zetas Inc.: Criminal Corporations, Energy, and Civil War
in Mexico, Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, is an associate professor at the
University of Texas, Rio Grande Valley in Brownsville. In late 2006, her
family was threatened with extortion by the Zetas and was forced to flee
their farmlands, resulting in her moving from Matamoros, Tamaulipas
to resettle over the border in the United States in August 2009. Derived
from her family’s harrowing experience with the Zetas firsthand—which
undoubtedly influenced her ensuing academic research interests—a
number of arguments are put forth in this work. Her propositions
include “the recent violent conflict in Mexico has its origins in a new
criminal model introduced by the Zetas” and the main hypothesis “that
this new criminal model and government reactions to it mostly benefit
transnational corporate capital” both licit and illicit alike (3, 5).
To address these arguments, a new theoretical framework—
drawing upon business administration perceptions—was developed
that discusses the Zetas transitioning “from a freewheeling criminal
organization to a ‘business,’ albeit one that produces revenue for its
stakeholders though illicit activities and the violence that it uses to
intimidate both its competitors and adversaries” (5). This sets the stage
for exploring the Zetas militarization, responding governmental security
strategy militarization, ensuing societal militarization, and the resulting
impacts on the hydrocarbon industry and energy sector reform.
The book itself contains an introduction, nine chapters, and a
conclusion, as well as numerous maps, tables and figures, an abbreviation
listing, acknowledgements, five appendices, notes, references, and an
index. The work’s chapters are divided into thematic sections titled—
The Zetas: Criminal Paramilitaries in a Transnational Business, Mexico’s Drug
War: A Modern Civil War?, and Los Zetas Incorporated. The work—spanning
six years of research and writing—is primarily academic in orientation
rather than defense community professional focused. As a result, while
exceptionally well crafted—with on the ground research and interviews
of over one hundred individuals on both sides of the border and the
extensive use of both Spanish and English sources—the theoretical
discussions, author arguments, and citations woven into it make for
a very dense compression of information throughout. Of particular
interest is how the work balances its analysis with concerns over pseudoconspiracy allegations—multinational corporation premeditation vs.
political economy structural change—and criminal gang and cartel
socio-environmental modification of areas under their suzerain (e.g.
regions of narcotics impunity within the state) (215). What is striking in
the work is how it reinforces recent scholarship in the defense theorist
community related to criminal and plutocratic insurgency constructs—
the twin insurgencies mode—as a component of dark (and deviant)
globalization studies. Such mutual reinforcement is significant given
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the lack of cross-pollination between the new civil wars (academic) and
criminal insurgencies (defense) literatures.
Detractions to the work are twofold. An initial one—while
relatively minor—pertains to the characterization of the late Dr.
George Grayson’s use of “hyperbolic language” in characterizing the
Zetas (10). Grayson, a respected academic, was an early researcher on
the Zetas who published a number of significant monographs and books
including The Executioner’s Men in 2012 (with Samuel Logan). While he
indeed gets colorful in his language related to the Zetas sociopathic
behaviors in his later work, the sense this reviewer gets is that CorreaCabrera’s academic sensitivities are more offended by Grayson’s mention
of victim castrations and the skinning of their bodies while still alive
(which has been an active component of their psychological operations
program) than Grayson’s perceived lack of knowledge about the Zetas
brutality motivators (10).
The second, larger detraction focuses on her assertion that the
Calderon administration’s militarization policy against the cartels
“in which the military and federal police were sent to perform the
duties of state and local police” was a “radical response” (107, 108). This
is an unfair characterization of the Calderon administration’s policies
because it had no other choice than to directly bring federal assets into
the widening criminal insurgency taking place. The Zetas and the other
cartels had by the time of his election penetrated and co-opted entire
local and state law enforcement agencies—as well as judicial and political
bodies—which resulted in sovereign Mexican territories de facto being
lost to what essentially were militarized criminal entities. That CorreaCabrera does not provide viable alternative suggestions to the Calderon
administration’s security policies she criticizes underlies the fact that the
“hubris of the academy” permeates some sections of her work.
Still, these detractions do not obscure the fact that the other 99
percent of the work—that is, the overall arguments it presents and
information provided in support of them—are first rate. Los Zetas Inc.
very much represents an important addition to research on the Zetas
cartel as well as that on the narcotic wars viewed from the perspective of
the new civil wars literature. It underlines the metastasis of the conflict
from purely narcotics trafficking routes and plazas into territorial
control of regions with great hydrocarbon wealth as well as that of other
natural resources such as timber and iron ore. In summation, this “dark
globalization” type work should be treated as an excellent resource on
the Zetas, including presenting future trajectories for the group and
its factions (e.g. the discussion of four successful business models in
the conclusion), highlighting the broader modern civil war-like trends
taking place in their areas of influence which include Coahuila and
Tamaulipas and related to other cartel resource controlled areas (such
as in Michoacán), and identifying who the winners and losers will be
from this process. However, the work should not be viewed as providing
anything substantive relating to new security policy recommendations
meant to combat the Zetas or to counter the effects of the civil wars
(e.g. criminal insurgencies—ones that are economically rather than
politically driven) presently raging across many regions of Mexico.
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Al-Qaeda’s Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings
By Fernando Reinares
Reviewed by Audrey Kurth Cronin, Professor of International Security, School of
International Service, American University

A
Washington, DC and New
York: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press and Columbia
University Press, 2016
231 pages
$50.00

l-Qaeda’s Revenge is an excellent, well-sourced monograph analyzing
the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks on four commuter trains in
Madrid, Spain. The worst terrorist attack on European soil since the 1988
Pan Am 103 Lockerbie bombing, the so-called 3/11 attacks killed 191
people and injured at least 1,800 others. Victims were ordinary laborers,
university students, and office professionals, crammed into four packed
rush-hour trains headed into the city. This book sheds new light on who
perpetrated the attacks, how, why, and what it all means for anti-al-Qaeda
efforts. Based mainly on police records, criminal proceedings, and
information from the trials of the perpetrators, supplemented by
intelligence reports and personal interviews, it is a welcome contribution.
Beyond the tragedy of the victims’ fates, the attacks set off bitter
arguments about the West’s counterterrorism strategy against al-Qaeda.
Sadly, instead of uniting Spaniards in shared grief, the tragedy polarized
domestic politics. As the bombings happened three days before Spanish
national elections, sparring electoral parties blamed the actor that
benefited them politically. The ruling People’s Party, having bucked
domestic public opinion to side with the US and UK in the 2003
Iraq War, publicly tied the bombings (sans evidence) to the Basque
separatist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna. That was blatantly incorrect.
The Socialists, opponents of the 2003 war, blamed al-Qaeda for the
attacks. They were closer to the mark, and this book explains why.
Through a careful analysis of individuals, cells, and networks, Reinares
traces the origins to Pakistan (al-Qaeda) and Morocco (the Moroccan
Islamic Combatant Group). Al-Qaeda was clearly involved. The book’s
enthusiastic foreword from highly respected former Central Intelligence
Agency officer Bruce Reidel stresses this fact.
A second debate at the global level was about al-Qaeda’s strategy and
its effectiveness. In the aftermath of the bombings, the Spanish Socialists
won the election and pulled troops out of the coalition, an apparent
cause and effect serving bin Laden’s interests beautifully. Pundits waxed
sagaciously about the terrorist leader’s ability to coerce states to withdraw
from territorial commitments. Political scientists saw confirmation of
their bargaining theory models. Another contribution of this study is
its convincing case that these interpretations were wrong. According
to Reinares, with the operation underway years before elections were
called, the perpetrators couldn’t have known the date in advance (128).
Providing careful, detailed evidence, Reinares shows that the real
story predated the 2004 Spanish elections, the 2003 Iraq War, and even
the September 11, 2001 attacks. He demonstrates that violent jihadist
cells were established in Spain in 1994 (160). The specific decision to
carry out the Madrid bombings dated to a December 2001 meeting in
Karachi. It was then ratified at a February 2002 meeting of Maghreb
jihadist groups in Istanbul. The operational network that carried out

Book Reviews: Irregular Warfare

117

the bombings coalesced before the Iraq War, between March 2002 and
summer 2003. So Western observers gave bin Laden too much credit
strategically and too little tactically: Reinares shows that this was not a titfor-tat operation orchestrated by al-Qaeda to sway the Spanish elections.
Third, the attack contributed to public bickering about the true
nature of the global al-Qaeda movement and the implications for the
US response. Some experts argued that the bombings were mainly
“inspired” rather than directed from al-Qaeda central. Others saw
central operational leadership calling the shots.
Hewing closely to his sources, Reinares shows that the Madrid
bombings had both top-down and bottom-up elements. He argues
that a critical clue for understanding al-Qaeda’s role was the weapons
employed. Detonating just before 8:00 a.m., 10 Goma-2 Eco dynamite
bombs were packed into backpacks and remotely triggered by Mitsubishi
Trium cell phones. These particular phones, also used in the 2002 Bali
attacks in Indonesia, were al-Qaeda’s “smoking guns” (so to speak),
because they were exactly the same phones used for explosions training
in an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan (145–46).
But local residents living and radicalized in Spain were also crucial
to the operation. The dynamite had been acquired on Spanish territory,
provided by a Spanish criminal gang (and its juvenile delinquent
stooges). This made the attack unlike the al-Qaeda-sponsored 2003
Casablanca attacks and the 2005 London bombings, which both
used TATP (triacetone triperoxide). “Previous kinship, friendship,
and neighborhood ties not only facilitated the processes of jihadist
radicalization, but also allowed the complete terrorist mobilization of
the 3/11 network,” Reinares writes (82).
Al-Qaeda’s Revenge conscientiously analyzes the detailed evidence
of a tragic incident that killed hundreds of Spaniards and altered the
trajectory of global counterterrorism. Those who counter al-Qaeda
should read it.
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political hiStory
Nixon’s Back Channel to Moscow:
Confidential Diplomacy and Détente
By Richard A. Moss
Reviewed by William Thomas Allison, Professor of History, Georgia Southern
University
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Kentucky Press, 2017
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P

rimarily driven by increased access to various documents from
the presidency of Richard M. Nixon, scholarship on the most
controversial presidency in American history has reached new intensity,
insight, and understanding. An interesting array of scholars—from
renowned historians such as Stanley Kutler, Douglas Brinkley, Jeffrey
Kimball, and Ken Hughes, to more recent scholars such as Luke Nichter
and Richard Moss—have brought both seasoned analysis and fresh eyes
to this voluminous mountain of material. From this work, we know so
much more about the politics behind Nixon’s Vietnam policy, his covert
meddling in the Anna Chennault Affair, and the deeper revelation of the
complicated figure of Nixon himself. It is, as they say, the gift that keeps
on giving.
Welcome to this rich historiography the exciting work of the
aforementioned Richard Moss. An associate research professor in
the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the United States Naval War
College, Moss is one of the foremost students of the Nixon tapes. In
Nixon’s Back Channel to Moscow, Moss convincingly shows the importance
of Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger’s use of
back channels, principally with Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Anatoly Fyodorovich Dobrynin, to Nixon’s Vietnam policy and relations
with the Soviet Union and China.
Like much secret diplomacy, Nixon’s use of back channels was
far from perfect but suited the needs of the moment. For a president
bordering on clinical paranoia, back channels naturally fit Nixon’s
complex personality and Kissinger’s sense of self-importance. Diaries,
memoirs, National Security Council minutes, and other materials
complement the tape transcripts Moss uses to illustrate several cases of
use of back channels by Kissinger and Nixon.
Moss examines back channel roles in defusing the Cienfuegos crisis,
shaping the American response to the India-Pakistan War of 1965—
early talks that became the Strategic Arms Limitation treaties—and,
of course, working the US-Soviet-China triangle, especially in relation
to Vietnam. All of these cases highlight the crucial importance of the
Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship. Dobrynin had used back channels
with the US government for years before establishing the unofficial line
with Kissinger.
For his part, Kissinger wanted a back channel with the Soviets
to manage personally discussions he believed too vital to be left to
officials he viewed as less-gifted—like Secretary of State William
Pierce Rogers. As Moss shows, Kissinger used the channel to slow or
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to accelerate negotiations, to clarify messaging, to suggest “linkage of
unrelated areas,” and as in the case of Vietnam, alert the Soviets to how
the US would respond to a crisis (303). Nixon’s response to the North
Vietnamese Easter Offensive would have assuredly shocked the Soviets
had Kissinger not prepared the ground through the back channel.
The back channel in this case allowed both parties to respond to the
invasion as their constituents would expect, providing cover enough to
save the Moscow Summit between President Nixon and Soviet General
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in May 1972. Among the more interesting
areas Moss discusses is the White House’s special investigation unit—
the infamous “Plumbers”—originally formed out of genuine concern
for unauthorized leaks such as the famous Pentagon Papers. Of course,
what was originally convenient but turned more sinister over time,
leading to illegal acts that would bring down Nixon’s presidency. Moss
also briefly explores the curious Moorer-Radford Affair, in which the
military basically spied on the Nixon administration. Moss contends
that Kissinger’s surreptitious use of back channels bred a Nixon-like
distrust among the Joint Chiefs of Staff toward Kissinger and the
National Security Council (304). Nixon managed to keep the imbroglio
hidden to protect the back channel.
Moss shows the risks and rewards of using back channels in the
highest levels of international relations. The Kissinger-Dobrynin back
channel enabled détente to become a reality. But as productive as the
Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship was, it outlived its usefulness once
détente was achieved. As Nixon’s national security advisor, Kissinger
became a savant-like celebrity, and the ability to use back channels was
eroded. Once he became secretary of state, Kissinger had to revert to
what was in his eyes a bureaucracy-ridden system, the very same one he
had so often circumvented and subverted. By that time, however, the
back channel no longer served its former useful purpose.
With engaging narrative and impeccable research, Moss has
produced an important addition to Nixon historiography. Nixon’s Back
Channel to Moscow sheds further light on what once had been mysterious
and shrouded in shadows. It is an indispensable book for students of
the Nixon years and those interested in the cost-benefit of back channel
contacts. This book could not be more timely.

The Lincoln Assassination Riddle:
Revisiting the Crime of the Nineteenth Century
Edited By Frank J. Williams and Michael Burkhimer
Reviewed by Matthew Pinsker, Associate Professor of History and Pohanka
Chair in American Civil War History, Dickinson College

T

hree American presidents were murdered within the span of 36 years:
Abraham Lincoln (1865), James A. Garfield (1881), and William
McKinley (1901). During the same period, thousands of African
Americans—perhaps tens of thousands—were lynched for trying to
exercise their right to vote for such men. Yet, this explosion of political
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violence has been obscured in American memory because it occurred
after the Civil War, the nation’s bloodiest and most political conflict.
Of course, there is nothing obscure about Lincoln’s murder,
yet Frank Williams and Michael Burkhimer, the editors of this lively
collection of essays, are surely correct in describing it as The Lincoln
Assassination Riddle. The complexities behind actor John Wilkes Booth’s
conspiracy plot, the frantic investigation launched at Ford’s Theatre on
the night of the shooting, the subsequent military prosecution, and even
the lingering cultural memory of the tragic event all involve confounding
political riddles. There is a sense that solving these riddles can help
somehow explain the transition from Civil War to Reconstruction in a
fashion that puts the enduring political violence of nineteenth-century
American history into a more understandable context.
This book is part of the true crime history series from Kent
State University Press. Of all the contributions to this subject—with
representative titles in the series such as Ripperolog y (2006) and Hauptmann’s
Ladder (2014)—this particular volume covers the most significant
national event. For once, a true crime subtitle, Revisiting the Crime of the
Nineteenth Century, is not at all hyperbolic. Lincoln’s assassination was
arguably the central crime of American history.
What Williams and Burkhimer have done so admirably here is to
present the topic in a way that captures many of its key dimensions.
There is plenty of material on the political context of the attack, from
a sobering analysis of Booth’s extensive Confederate connections to a
learned discussion of how nineteenth-century laws of war applied to
the military trial of the conspirators. There is also a precise dissection
of Lincoln’s medical condition after the single bullet struck on Friday
night, April 14, 1865. In addition, various essayists offer insights into the
often-deceptive tactics of the professional actor turned political assassin,
and readers will find several useful and compact biographical profiles of
the other conspirators. Nonetheless, some of the most moving stories
concern the impact of the killing on the Lincoln family and others
whose lives were ripped apart by the assassination.
Nothing in this book will surprise hard-core Lincoln assassination
buffs, but more casual students will appreciate the latest range of insights
from leading minds on the subject presented in a series of short, easy-tofollow chapters. The roster of contributors is truly impressive including
notable experts Hugh Boyle, Burrus M. Carnahan, Joan L. Chaconas,
Richard W. Etulain, Michael S. Green, Blaine V. Houmes, Michael W.
Kauffman, Michael J. Kline, Steven G. Miller, Betty J. Ownsbey, Edward
Steers Jr., Thomas R. Turner, Laurie Verge, and Steven J. Wright.
Still, there have been two important recent books on the Lincoln
assassination by authors who are not represented. Insights from Terry
Alford’s excellent biography, Fortune’s Fool: The Life of John Wilkes Booth
(2015), and Martha Hodes’s wide-ranging study on the cultural aftermath
of the killing, Mourning Lincoln (2015), might have added further depth
to this collection. Yet, what Williams and Burkhimer have achieved
with The Lincoln Assassination Riddle is to provide a compact and effective
gateway for readers who want to catch up on the range of questions
historians have been chasing and trying to answer recently about the
most significant political murder in American history.

Book Reviews: Political History

121

The Netanyahu Years
By Ben Caspit
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, Professor Emeritus , US Army War College

I

sraeli Prime Minister Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu is currently struggling
to address several scandals of various seriousness, including one which
led to the arrest of his former chief of staff on corruption charges. These
problems could potentially emerge as a threat to Netanyahu remaining in
office, but his personality is always to fight to the last and never give up.
Even if the attorney general indicts him, Israeli law does not require him
to resign unless he is convicted of a criminal offense. Moreover, no matter
how serious his problems become, Bibi has consistently proven himself
to be not only a survivor, but also Israel’s most brilliant contemporary
politician. Understanding Netanyahu’s politics and policies is therefore
vital to understanding Israel, and providing such knowledge is the purpose
of Israeli journalist Ben Caspit’s excellent but often unsympathetic new
volume on the prime minister.
Netanyahu grew up in a politically conservative family moving
between Israel and the United States. Bibi’s father, a dedicated scholar of
Jewish history, accepted a position in the United States due his difficulty
finding a position in Israel’s mostly liberal academia. Consequently,
much of Bibi’s early education occurred in the Philadelphia suburbs,
where, he learned to speak perfect English. After graduating from
high school, Netanyahu returned to Israel and joined the elite Sayeret
Matkal commandos and participated in a variety of dangerous combat
operations. Later, he moved back to the United States and graduated
with honors from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
After various forays into business in the United States, Netanyahu
became a public affairs attaché and spokesman for the Israeli embassy
in Washington. Bibi performed superbly in this position due to his
media friendly personality, and he was later promoted to become Israel’s
ambassador to the United Nations. In New York, he again served as an
outstanding Israeli spokesman and perhaps more importantly became
a fundraising genius, able to charm a wide network of friendly Jewish
millionaires and billionaires interested in contributing to projects
in Israel.
After service at the United Nations, Netanyahu returned to Israel
becoming a Likud party leader, where his American-style media and
political talents, “were light years ahead of those of his rivals” (130).
After serving in a variety of important posts including deputy foreign
minister, Bibi was elected prime minister in 1996. Unfortunately for
Netanyahu’s ambitions, he was much better at campaigning than
governing, and his tenure lasted only until 1999 when Labor leader
Ehud Barak defeated him by a large margin. In the aftermath of the
defeat, Ariel Sharon replaced Bibi as head of the Likud. Netanyahu
briefly became Sharon’s foreign minister and then finance minister
after Likud won the January 2003 election. He eventually led Likud in
opposition when Sharon left to form his own very successful political
party, Kadima.
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Netanyahu again became Prime Minister following the 2009
election. According to Caspit, he entered office with three main political
goals beyond strengthening his hold on power. These were to end the
Iranian nuclear program, to undermine and destroy the peace process
with the Palestinians without being blamed for doing so, and “to survive
unharmed the Obama administration, doing his utmost to ensure that
it lasted only one term” (245). Caspit suggests that the last goal was
particularly important to Netanyahu since he viewed Obama’s chief goal
for the Middle East as “to make peace with the Muslim world” (256).
He believed Obama had no real affinity for Israel or any serious record
of working with pro-Israeli interest groups.
When Obama gave a conciliatory speech in Cairo about US relations
with the Islamic world, Caspit describes Netanyahu as watching it with
burning anger. Obama also pressured the Israelis to stop building and
expanding settlements in the West Bank and thereby empower the
peace process. Eventually, Obama and Netanyahu descended into an
overwhelming level of distrust that would become “endless mutual
loathing” (315). To make matters worse for Netanyahu, Obama had come
to power with around 70 percent of the Jewish vote and surrounded
himself with liberal Jewish aides whom some of Netanyahu associates
described with the slur “self-hating” (281). The crisis became acute in
early 2015 when Netanyahu delivered a speech to Congress opposing the
Iranian nuclear agreement that Obama claimed as a major achievement
of his administration. The speech did nothing to derail the agreement,
but instead threatened to harm traditional bipartisan support for Israel.
Some Democrats may have even started to view Netanyahu as a new Dick
Cheney, someone they would never trust on matters of war and peace.
According to Caspit, Netanyahu turned Iran into an obsession
and became thoroughly convinced Iran was an irrational, messianic,
and suicidal state that would allow itself to be destroyed by US and
Israeli retaliatory strikes in order to annihilate Israel. This viewpoint
was not shared by either the Israeli security community or the Obama
administration. Caspit maintains that Netanyahu is so certain on this
issue that he will not consider divergent views and even regards himself
as a modern-day Winston Churchill, opposing Iran when others sought
to appease it. Moreover, Caspit also argues Netanyahu, believes he
alone has “the historical, intellectual, and mental attributes to bring
together all the sane forces in the world to stop the second Holocaust”
(178). Netanyahu’s credibility in making such a grandiose claim may
nevertheless be partially undercut by his September 2002 testimony
before the US Congress in strong support of an invasion of Iraq, to
which he saw almost no down side.
In sum, this work is an important, interesting and comprehensive
biography but it is also a harsh critique of important Israeli and US
policymakers and most especially Netanyahu. Obama, Trump, Sara
Netanyahu, and a variety of other US and Israeli politicians are also
taken to task on some occasions, but never as harshly as Bibi. Whether
or not Netanyahu’s flaws are as profound as Caspit maintains will be for
the reader to consider.
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military hiStory
War in the Shallows
By John Carrell Sherwood
Reviewed by Martin N. Murphy, Visiting Fellow, Corbett Centre for Maritime
Security Studies

W

ar in the Shallows represents, in the author’s own words, “the first
comprehensive scholarly attempt to piece together the operational
history of the US Navy in South Vietnam” during the so-called American
phase between 1965 and 1968. This subject has been covered already
by several authors, the best known of which is probably Thomas J.
Cutler who served as a naval advisor in Vietnam during 1972 prior to
his appointment to the Naval Academy. His history—Brown Water, Black
Berets published in 1988—drew on his personal experience supplemented
by extensive interviews with others who had served in theater.
The current work is published by the Naval History and Heritage
Command. Its predecessor organizations, the Naval History Division
and the Naval Historical Center, published two official histories in
1976 and 1986 written, in part, by Edward J. Marolda, Dr. Sherwood’s
predecessor as senior historian.
All this Dr. Sherwood makes clear in his preface and
acknowledgements. What he has been able to do, however, is to take
advantage of material recently released from the Command’s archives—
Vietnamese documents and interviews conducted personally with
former Viet Cong. He makes no claim to have unearthed new evidence
sufficient to force a change in the accepted assessment of how the river
and coastal wars were executed nor of the experiences of those who
conducted them. This is in no way a revisionist account. Moreover, while
it draws general conclusions about the Vietnam riverine conflict, the
book stops well before the US withdrawal from South Vietnam and
therefore does not touch upon the significant SEALORDS campaign or
the hand-over to the Vietnamese. The author admits that together these
topics are too large in scope to cover in the current volume and deserve
separate book-length treatments.
The approach adopted is to integrate illustrative vignettes of crucial
actions into a larger operational history; eschewing, in other words, the
often-unsatisfactory editorial practice of isolating “action sequences”
into sidebars. Space has also been found to address the humble but
essential issues of selection, training, base operations, intelligence and
engagement rules that made the US role successful; belatedly so, it must
be admitted, in the light of the perspicacity of the 1965 Bucklew Report
and the slow implementation of the measures it recommended (27–28).
The book makes no attempt to disguise the shortcomings of South
Vietnam’s own forces and the roots of their problems in national (and
inevitably service) politics and corruption. Sherwood rightly highlights
how these shortcomings often placed US advisors in positions of great

Washington, DC: Naval
History and Heritage
Command, 2015
425 pages
Free Online

124

Parameters 47(3) Autumn 2017

peril and how bravery and dedication of outstanding individuals won the
respect of the frontline fighters they were trying to help.
It should therefore be regarded not perhaps as a standard history but
as an examination and eventual confirmation of the existing evidence.
The author does not make clear when he found deviations from the
existing record. It is therefore fair to assume if any were uncovered they
were not egregious.
One opportunity that has been missed is to place US riverine
operations in two contexts: in the thinking of Westmoreland and
subsequently Abrams and their staffs and against the background of
lessons learned (or ignored) from French riverine operations during
the preceding Indochina War. The author touches upon the latter but
only briefly.
Even though French riverine operations took place largely in the
Red River delta in the north, where the geographical and meteorlogical
conditions were quite different, the enemy’s tactics were similar to those
employed subsequently in the south. For example, it was the French who
stood up the precursor to the Mobile Riverine Force, the dinassauts
(short for division d’infanterie naval d’assaut), a concept Bernard
Fall complimented back-handedly as “one of the few worthwhile
contributions of the Indochina War to military knowledge”(6). However,
any dismissal of the dinassauts’ achievements (like everything else in the
French commitment) cannot ignore they were severely underresourced
due to France’s straightened circumstances post-World War II, one thing
America’s intervention unquestionably did not lack.
What the author does confirm, however, is two things: first, after
decades of what Naval War College professor John Hattendorf described
as a focus on the “care and feeding of machines,” officers and bluejackets
alike renewed the acquaintanceship with close quarter battle that had
been such a large part of the naval service of their predecessors in the
nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries. It was not until after World
War I that landings and land service had become the preserve of the
Marine Corps. The Navy, individually and collectively, adapted to the
unexpected demands of this vicious war with courage, imagination, and
skill. Second, however brutal and unpredictable the fighting was on the
rivers, in the swamps, and around the coasts of Vietnam, coastal and
riverine operations retained their essentially naval character.
Wars are often dominated by logistics, and Vietnam was no
exception. Naval warfare is predominantly about securing safe access
to resources and communications while denying the same to the enemy.
The Viet Cong depended on water transport. “Market Time,” the
coastal interdiction operation, virtually closed this route, increasing the
Communists’ dependence on the Ho Chi Minh trail. The great battle of
the rivers was also an interdiction battle. How successful the Navy and its
Vietnamese allies were in cutting the movement of material and cadres
is hard to quantify, but without doubt, they introduced inefficiencies
into the Viet Cong supply chain, which hampered and disrupted their
operations. If US policymakers had agreed to use such measures to inject
similarly persistent inefficiencies into the Viet Cong’s overland routes, it
is conceivable the war’s outcome may have been different.
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Doing What You Know: The United States and
250 Years of Irregular War
By David E. Johnson
Reviewed by J.P. Clark, Army Strategist and author of Preparing for War: the
Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815-1917

T

he United States military has conducted irregular warfare since its
inception. Yet, there is no consensus as to whether this legacy is
one of triumph or failure. Those with a positive view generally look to
either the earliest days when the influence of the country’s first way of
war was strong or to the present narrative of a combination of brainy
soldiers and fearless special operations forces defeating insurgents and
terrorists. Critics focus more on the intervening period, portraying a
hidebound officer corps unwilling or unable to adapt to unconventional
foes from Native American warriors to Viet Cong guerillas. In this
brief monograph published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, David E. Johnson (who has since returned to the RAND
Corporation) argues the United States has never been so good nor so bad
in practicing irregular warfare as either caricature suggests, but instead
has a long tradition of mixed results.
Doing What You Know consists of three parts. The first examines
irregular warfare from the American Revolution through the Vietnam
War; for their length, the overviews of operations in the Philippines
(1899–1913) and Vietnam are particularly good. This, however, is a
work of policy advocacy rather than history, and so those seeking a
comprehensive account will be disappointed. There is no mention of
irregular warfare in the Mexican-American War, and little on antebellum
frontier campaigns or irregular warfare in the Civil War. Also, there
is no discussion of independent Marine Corps operations; the “United
States Army and 250 Years of Irregular Warfare” would be a more
accurate subtitle.
Yet it is likely that even a fuller historical account would only
reinforce Johnson’s theme of continuity. The late nineteenth-century
frontier army is often caricatured as too inflexible and hidebound, while
the Philippine-American War is regarded as a great success. But Johnson
notes many officers served in both places and that contemporaries
felt they were applying hard-won knowledge from their frontier
experience to colonial counterinsurgency. Unfortunately, one thread
of this continuity was a hard-hand mentality expressed in method (e.g.
“water cure” interrogations) and in operational approaches, notably
the use of “re-concentration” camps and scorched-earth destruction in
Batangas Province.
In the second section, which examines “21st Century U.S. COIN,”
Johnson notes a break with the more ruthless past; one of the defining
characteristics of recent campaigns has been increased “constraints
on what are acceptable methods in COIN” (71). Although Johnson
attributes this shift to factors outside military control—the 24/7
media cycle and a change in societal values—his narrative suggests
the military on the whole willingly accepted the more restrained,
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population-centric counterinsurgency approach as expressed in the
2006 edition of Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM) 3-24. Johnson does
not claim the military has completely abandoned violence; he notes, for
instance, similarities between kill and capture efforts like the Vietnamera Phoenix Program and the US Joint Special Operations Command
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, Doing What You Know notes the
balance between carrot and stick has tilted dramatically toward the
former in comparison to previous eras.
In the final section, Johnson offers two overarching conclusions.
The first is that failing to plan for transitions after a major conflict
can lead to insurgency. To avoid large-scale irregular warfare, the
Army should be ready to fill the postconflict security and governance
vacuum. In this regard, Johnson approves of current thinking, citing the
discussion of consolidating gains within the Army Operating Concept
as a promising start.
In contrast, Johnson’s second conclusion—“large-scale irregular
warfare and COIN are a brutal business that requires coercion”—goes
against the present organizational grain, which is still shaped by FM
3-24 (82). Johnson advocates a greater willingness to “ruthlessly and
violently” pursue and separate the enemy from indigenous support as
was the case in earlier successful irregular warfare (85). Unfortunately,
the history presented in the first section is too cursory to demonstrate
conclusively that earlier hard-hand approaches were necessary for
victory. Indeed, the overall record of mixed results suggests complex
causal relationships.
Nonetheless, there is a reasonable case for the necessity of coercion.
Irregular warfare often occurs within a strategic context in which meeting
national policy objectives requires some reordering of deeply ingrained
political, social, or economic patterns in a foreign land. Such changes
are bound to be resisted by a wide range of actors, from those with a
significant vested interest to those who simply resent external influence.
The more significant the change—and changes of strategic importance
are likely significant—the less benevolence, cultural understanding, and
force of argument are likely to be sufficient.
Yet Doing What You Know stops short of advocating any particular
coercive measure. Indeed, Johnson notes even the uncomfortably coercive
edge of seemingly benign projects such as education; a superintendent of
the Carlisle Indian School saw education as a means “to kill the Indian
in him” (15). Elsewhere, Johnson ominously notes the brutal Sri Lankan
campaign against the Tamil Tigers is one of the few examples of a recent
counterinsurgency. Perhaps the worst outcome is that Johnson is correct
in three of his assertions: the United States will again engage in irregular
warfare, irregular warfare requires some degree of “ruthless and brutal”
measures, and structural factors within the US and the military have
caused a turn away from such measures. If so, then the problem is deeper
than military tactics and doctrine and so foretells something even worse
than the mixed results of the past.
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War Neurology
Edited by Laurent Tatu and Julien Bogousslavsky
Reviewed by Andreas Kuersten, US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

T

he editors of War Neurology, Laurent Tatu and Julien Bogousslavsky,
lament the fact that “war and neurology are two themes that are
rarely linked, and war neurology is not a subject in its own right” (vii).
While this statement must be caveated since the neurological effects of
war on humans and the history of such ailments and their treatment
have not escaped consistent attention, the editors are correct that the
unification of war and neurology under a single subfield of study
has thus far not occurred. As such, “this book intends to lay the
foundation” for such a subfield (vii). Commensurate with this goal, Tatu
and Bogousslavsky have put together an expansive volume delving into
the history and practice of war neurology from antiquity to today.
The book begins with a general overview of the historical
development of neurological practice during wartime. The ancient
Egyptians were the first to record connections between battle wounds
and neurological deficits approximately 5,000 years ago. “It was
recognized early that head wounds were especially dangerous,” and in
the close-quarter, direct combat of antiquity, “warriors tended to focus
on striking their enemies’ heads in order to defeat them” (3, 1). Beyond
the head, spinal cord and peripheral nerve damage suffered during
combat were also given special attention. As far as mental disorders
arising from battle experiences, mentions of “mental stress produced by
warfare” are found in ancient literary works, but not more widely (7).
Building on this foundation, War Neurolog y covers advancements
in neurological science from the Napoleonic Wars to the campaign in
Afghanistan. There is also a chapter on the modern history of neurotoxic
weapons, including details on their individual characteristics.
Broadly, War Neurolog y is an illustration of the intimate link between
warfare and progress in medical science and practice. It has been noted
that “it is paradoxical that through war, a concerted effort to annihilate
man, we have learned more and better ways to preserve him” (62). But
such a relationship is in fact logical. This is because the devastation of
human bodies wrought by war provides “the opportunity of making
uncomplicated clinical observations,” which “is rare in civil life” (43).
Accordingly, “throughout human history, war and the subsequent need
for treatment of war wounds has provided a fecund environment for the
development of medicine as a whole. The origin of surgery is particularly
rooted in the treatment of injured participants of war and combat,” and
the subfield of neurosurgery emerged and rapidly developed as a result
of twentieth-century wars (22).
Further cementing the link between war and medical advancement
is the fact that personnel are arguably the most important weapons
in the arsenal of a military force, and this makes their treatment a
critical component of warfighting. Avenues of warrior degradation must
be countered in order to maintain military strength and capability most
effectively. Neurological impairments are some of the most pernicious
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harms suffered by fighting men and women. Sides that are better able
to treat and recycle injured personnel gain a meaningful advantage
over opponents. As such, “while war influenced the development of
medicine, and neurology in particular, medicine also helped to shape the
outcomes of wars” (93).
War Neurolog y provides two excellent examples of this phenomenon.
The first is the American Civil War. On top of advantages in funding,
equipment, and manpower, Union forces also employed a superior
military medical complex to that fielded by the Confederacy. This meant
that “a greater proportion of the Union army was healthy than of the
opposing Confederate force,” and “it can be argued that the advantages
provided by medical science were a significant factor in determining
the eventual victory of the Union” (105). The second example is the
German military, the Wehrmacht, in World War II. Its remarkable
success at the beginning of the conflict was due in part to highly
mobile forward-operating medical units and streamlined methods
for moving and treating wounded, including specialized neurological
units and procedures. These facilitated the Wehrmacht’s quick strike
blitzkrieg method of attack and “became viewed as ‘indispensable’ for
the war effort” (126).
War and neurology are also connected through the use of neurological
knowledge to devise weapons, enhance soldiers, and gain intelligence.
War Neurolog y addresses the first of these areas in a chapter on
neurotoxic substances and their effects. The book, however, provides
no coverage of the latter two—like the contributions of neurology
to research techniques, substances, and devices intended to heighten
soldier cognition or induce captives to speak to interrogators—nor the
ethical implications of these pursuits. A chapter considering these topics
would have been a welcome addition.
That shortcoming notwithstanding, War Neurolog y offers an
engaging, far-reaching examination that successfully lays a foundation
for war neurology as a distinct subfield of study. While time will tell if
this foundation is built upon, the volume is valuable in its own right
and will find an appreciative audience in readers interested in military
medicine specifically or seeking to add depth to their understanding of
the many facets of war.

How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization
in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950
By Seth Johnston
Reviewed by Joel R. Hillison, Professor of National Security Studies, US Army
War College
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A

fter NATO added its twenty-ninth member state, Montenegro,
in July 2017, institutions in Europe remain under significant
strain with challenges such as economic weakness in the eurozone,
renewed assertiveness from Russia, persistent terrorist attacks, and
a wave of “eurosceptism” emboldened by the Brexit. Any of these
challenges conceivably could threaten the existence of NATO and the
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European Union. To survive, these organizations will need to adapt.
How NATO Adapts provides useful insights for shaping that adaptation.
While organizational adaptation is not always an interesting topic, Seth
Johnston does a masterful job of providing pertinent details while
avoiding the minutia. His compelling historical analysis illustrates the
institution’s adaptations—in terms of mission, organization, size, and
strategy—arising from changes in the European and global security
environment. Under this approach, institutions such as NATO, are often
path dependent, meaning history has significant and lasting impacts on
an organization’s trajectory. This book selects cases and identifies critical
junctures where changes in the external strategic environment disrupted
current institutional paths and presented alternatives to the alliance.
Johnston argues in each of these instances that NATO successfully
adapted its organization and strategic approach.
The first section of the book, which contains a literature review,
will interest international-relations scholars. Policy oriented readers,
however, may get hung up in the theoretical discussions. The case
studies that follow will interest policymakers and senior members of the
defense community.
The chapter on early adaptation is the most enlightening. During
this period, the institution was still new and faced existential threats.
Discussing the critical juncture of the Korean War, Johnston explains
the history of the alliance, its gradual turn to nuclear deterrence, the
rearmament of Germany as a member of NATO, and the alternative,
but ultimately unsuccessful path, of establishing a European common
army: the European Defense Community. The army was an attempt by
European states to create their own collective security capability at a time
when the United States was distracted by a more global confrontation
with the Soviet Union. Although defeated by France—the very country
that had proposed its creation—the case study in the European Defense
Community provides a useful guide for how the contemporary EU
Common Security and Defense Policy might be adapted. The original
intent for the Community nested it within the alliance framework,
which allowed France and its European allies to influence German
rearmament more closely while simultaneously extending the nuclear
umbrella to Germany, which had no independent defense capability
at the time. While this effort failed, it demonstrated the possibility of
greater European military autonomy from the United States and NATO.
Brexit has already reignited talks of a European army. These efforts
might not only encourage greater EU burden-sharing for security but
also encourage closer ties with non-NATO countries.
The case study of the French withdrawal from the Integrated
Control and Command Structure is also insightful. France was leery of
further subordination to US dominance and resented increased nuclear
cooperation between Britain and the United States. France’s departure
enabled the elimination of some outdated organizations within NATO
and a more rational command structure created from the military
headquarters in Mons, Belgium, the military committee, the Defense
Planning Group, and the Nuclear Planning Group—a new NATO
Headquarters with all international staff in Brussels. During the French
crisis, NATO remained neutral and avoided exacerbating tensions
between the United States and France. As a result, France remained
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in the alliance, but outside of the military structure allowing needed
organizational reforms and strategic adaptations such as the creation of
a “two-tiered political structure” and the strategic concept of Flexible
Response, to proceed (115). This institutional approach might be useful
in dealing with contemporary issues such as an illiberal Turkey. As with
France in the 1960s, NATO has the ability to adapt to these challenges
without rupturing the alliance.
The later chapters look at the immediate post-Cold War and postKosovo adaptations of the alliance. These chapters are also relevant
and equally persuasive. While not the primary tool of choice for the
United States initially, NATO actively sought a role in Afghanistan and
provided needed support to a stretched US military during the surge in
Iraq in 2007 and subsequent surge in Afghanistan in 2010. Despite its
flaws and limitations, NATO adapted and contributed substantially to
these operations.
Overall, Johnston makes a persuasive argument and adds to the
literature on path dependence and critical junctures. More important,
How NATO Adapts provides historical context needed as the United
States recommits to deterring Russian aggression and continues to play
a role in European security and stability.
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regional StudieS
Security Forces in African States: Cases and Assessment
By Paul Shemella and Nicholas Tomb
Reviewed by Diane E. Chido, author of Chaos to Cohesion: A Regional Approach
to Security, Stability, and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

E

ditors Paul Shemella and Nicholas Tomb have presented an
interesting assessment tool in their Security Forces in African States:
Cases and Assessment. The tool is intended to evaluate “how well security
institutions are designed, governed and operated with the institutional
mix” (2). The authors note armed forces can be a valuable partner in
stabilization, especially in a developing country or one recovering
from war, fragility, or natural disaster, but this is not their primary role.
Shemella and Tomb focus comprehensively on the security sector from
the perspective of effective governance and civil-military relations for
attaining “traditional” national and more importantly, human security.
The authors intentionally created an assessment tool that can be
presented and used quickly, acknowledging there are other more
complex tools to apply and implement. The process is for “government
officials, working with key personnel in each security institution (and
perhaps international technical partners)” to “generate tables for each
. . . security institution” to include armed forces, law enforcement,
intelligence services and institutions as necessary. (19–20)
Recommending two levels of assessment to identify qualitatively
how a nation distributes resources and roles and provides civilian
institutional control over its security sector, Shemella and Tomb identify
areas for Level 1 assessment as national branding, national security
threat identification, institutional roles vis-à-vis the armed forces and
the police, and the strength of the political system prevailing in the state.
The conceptual model of “national branding” is particularly useful
and could be deconstructed as an entire chapter or book on its own. The
idea of branding typically involves an intentional campaign to present a
product or service to a selected audience. In this case, the authors suggest
the audience is other governments, who will consider these “brands” as
a shorthand to determine their own bilateral and regional strategies and
alliances, whether this brand has been developed “deliberately or not.”
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Shemella and Tomb’s Representation of National Branding
1. Warfighter

Initiate conflict with other states.
Prevail militarily.

2. Defender

Repel invasion and obtain assistance from other
countries. Defend against transnational threats.

3. Peacekeeper

Organize, train, and deploy armed
forces specifically for international
peacekeeping missions.

4. Fireman

Use armed forces to perform any domestic
mission that other government institutions
cannot be trusted to accomplish.

5. Policeman

Use armed forces to enforce laws. Police
in support.

6. Troublemaker

Allow armed forces to determine when to use
coercive force against other states.

Their Level 2 assessment rates governance and capacity of the armed
forces, law enforcement, intelligence, and civilian institutions responsible
for overseeing them on a Likert Scale of 1–10 according to a set of
desired outcomes for each based on a Western view of effective civilmilitary relations. They then apply the framework to 10 African nations
with a full assessment presented on Mali.
There are a number of obvious challenges associated with qualitative
assessment in any context. As the tool is intended to affect policy
formulation and implementation, and the method for populating the
matrices is based on input from officials inside and outside the target
government, participants must be carefully selected and encouraged to
provide bias-free inputs as far as possible to safeguard the integrity of
the process. This could perhaps be accomplished under an independent
inspector general construct to avoid parochial responses.
The authors recommend open discussion among the chosen panel of
experts but a better model might be the Delphi Method, in which experts
are assigned to respond to a set of questions during the intelligence
analysis process. This method is typically repeated in a preset number
of rounds with the panelists made aware of each anonymized member’s
prior round responses and supporting arguments. It is assumed that
the panelists will be informed by their peers’ arguments and coalesce
around a very few common responses. These converge into a singular
assessment by a moderator selected to lead the process to ensure there is
an efficient and valuable final result.
Any such collaborative process has proven merit in combining
expert judgments but can have dubious value when such a group is called
to assess its own organization and can result in a collection of individual
resource- or prestige-based interests at the expense of the collective
good. The additional danger with any such converging method requiring
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a single final “answer” is degeneration of the process into groupthink,
which pares the final result into a “lowest common denominator”
response that is often too broad or too simplistic to be of value. The
authors do not discuss the process of bias reduction, particularly when
assessing nations with histories of corruption and cronyism.
One additional concern for the assessment process is that the Level
2 matrices for armed forces, law enforcement, and intelligence each
include a final “outcome” described as the “culmination of efforts listed
above.” Once all the outcomes are averaged to determine the Likert
score for each, inclusion of this element seems to skew the results, as this
item adds an aggregation of those preceding it, potentially reducing the
reliability of the score itself.
Shemella and Tomb have applied the tool to ten cases in Africa with
a complete set of Level 1 and 2 matrices for Mali. This case indicates that
since the 2012 coup and ongoing insurgency, Malian security forces have
accepted civilian control and do not pose a threat to the government;
however, Mali must develop a formal national security policy with
enhanced oversight and appropriate administration, training, and
resource allocation to this sector to achieve sustainable national and
human security.1

Thabo Mbeki and Julius Nyerere
By Adekeye Adebajo and by Paul Bjerk
Reviewed by Diane E. Chido, author of Chaos to Cohesion: A Regional Approach
to Security, Stability, and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

T

he Ohio University series of Short Histories of Africa promises to
offer “lively biographies” as concise introductory guides to general
African topics. In the case of both volumes reviewed, the series delivers.
Adekeye Adebajo fleetingly compares former South African
President Thabo Mbeki’s life and legacy with that of former Ghanaian
President Kwame Nkrumah, noting the outsized role each played in their
country’s move toward postcolonial independence and development but
each failed “to deliver the economic kingdom in the end [which] led
to the political crucifixion of both prophets” (164). Tanzania’s Julius
Nyerere can also be counted among such prophets, as his nation’s
independence held such promise but his economic policies had similarly
disastrous outcomes.
It is clear that Adebajo admires Mbeki and wishes his story was one
of complete success, frequently describing him as “the most important
political figure of his generation” both in South Africa and across the
continent. Adebajo emphasizes Mbeki’s personal integrity and “total”
commitment to end Apartheid through an entire life of service to that
cause, but admits that Mbeki’s contentious yet technocratic manner, as
1 As the publisher of the volume is the US Naval Post-graduate School, the authors note on
page 14 that this institution began educating Malian officers in 2016, while the Army War College
began accepting Malian students in its Master’s program in 1998 and has since hosted seven.
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well as decades spent in exile and his Western-influenced intellectual
perspectives and polish, alienated him from his own people.
Mbeki tried to enhance independent Africa’s self-image through
an African Renaissance that would unite South Africa and the entire
continent, making him a more effective continental leader than a
national one. His legacy is likely to be marked more by his Pan-African
achievements in developing regional communities, particularly the
Southern African Development Community, the Organization of
African States and its successor, the African Union.
Paul Bjerk stresses that Nyerere’s commitment was to a nonviolent,
inclusive transition to independence, which resulted in a statist economy
engendering widespread corruption. Bjerk describes Nyerere’s talent for
appealing to his mainly rural constituency in a multinational country
with earthy, universal themes.
Nyerere expanded the concept of “family unity” or Ujamaa to
indicate a Tanzanian and more broadly African identity embracing a
unified diversity with a socialist but classless core, which included use of
Swahili as a national indigenous, noncolonial language. This philosophy
also enabled Nyerere to enact autocratic policies through one-party rule
without fear of dissent and evading Cold War power plays in the context
of a national ethic preserving its interests. The approach also managed
to unite not only those in the territory of Tanganiyka, but to incorporate
the islands of Zanzibar into the United Republic of Tanzania.
Bjerk’s characterization of Nyerere is a leader wholly devoted to
his people, no matter how unfortunate the outcomes of many policies,
while Mbeki appears devoted to the cause of independence and policy
formulation for its own sake. Nyerere ironically claimed shortly before
independence in 1960: “When hunting there is no problem. . . . Problems
start when the animal has died, that’s when the fighting starts” (53).
His claim anticipated that various factions tearing apart the colonial
corpse could destroy the chance for a unified independent country. The
claim also underscores an intrinsic understanding of the thorny issues of
governance with which Adebajo does not imbue Mbeki.
Mbeki is often criticized for maintaining an economic system that
continued to benefit white South Africans and empowering an elite,
educated black class, while Nyerere’s 1967 Arusha Declaration raised
alarm bells about an urban elite gradually overtaking the Tanzanian
government while the rural majority remained exploited and oppressed,
without an internal socialist revolution. As a result, such elites continue
to control the majority of South Africa’s wealth and the rural poor of
Tanzania have remained so.
Nyerere’s devotion to Maoism led to his disastrous “villagization”
program, which forced people to relocate to new farmland in “modern”
villages. The country’s inability to develop a robust industrial base
left Tanzania increasingly reliant on tea and tobacco production to
the detriment of locally-grown food, which had sustained traditional
villages. This resulted in famines, squandering of foreign exchange on
food imports, and an impressive array of illicit trade.
On social issues, Nyerere did expand the reach of health care and
education in Tanzania, with nearly the entire adult population literate
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by 1980. Mbeki’s “policy of denial” in the face of Africa’s AIDS crisis is
often considered his greatest failure with some critics claiming hundreds
of thousands of lives could have been saved had he supported robust
programs to make antiretroviral medications accessible.
One of the most interesting messages in both books is the widely
held belief that no country could be truly free until all of Africa was free,
which motivated African leaders and organizations across the continent
to work toward independence, especially after the British relinquished
control over India in 1947. These early activities have defined bilateral,
regional and continental alliances and enmities to the present day.
In a message for us across time and space, after Tanzania’s successful
invasion of aggressor Uganda, Nyerere stated of the resulting occupation,
“We don’t want to get too involved in Uganda because we know they’ll
end up resenting us. It’s an irony that no matter how careful we are, at
the end of the day, they’ll resent our help” (115).
The historical context presented through the lens of key actors
provides the broad and human perspective without which African
politics cannot be fully understood, especially to Ohio University’s
intended audience newly discovering this complex continent.
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he study of leadership has become an industry, and researchers
and authors have partitioned this broad subject area into several
categories such as political, business, and corporate leadership; civic
leadership; and military leadership. While some researchers may argue
that each type of leadership is unique, it may be that all are cut from the
same cloth. Examining parts may provide a better understanding of the
whole of collective human interactions to achieve common goals.
The editors of Negative Leadership: International Perspectives, Lieutenant
Colonel Daniel Watola, an associate professor at the US Air Force Academy,
and Commander Dave Woycheshin, of the Personnel Selections Branch
of the Canadian Armed Forces, have gathered papers from a diverse
group of military scholars and practitioners working at professional
military education and defense research organizations in multiple
nations. These researchers are participants in the annual International
Military Leadership Association Workshop (IMLAW) which, since
2006, has resulted in the publication of an edited volume. Woyschesin
has served as coeditor for three previous volumes. For 2016, the theme is
negative leadership—a timely topic given recent interest and scholarship
on toxic leadership. (See a review of “Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the
US Military” in the Winter 2015–16 issue of Parameters).
Comprised of 15 chapters, the book provides international
perspectives on the phenomenon of leadership, specifically in the
military context. While it is encouraging so much energy is devoted
to the subject, it may be disheartening to acknowledge that military
leadership, as leadership in the civilian domain, has many facets and
presents itself along a continuum of good to bad, including military
leaders who range from competent to incompetent and dysfunctional.
Leadership may be defined generally as a process to influence others to
accomplish tasks or goals. How this process is applied by individuals
can have a “dark side” and, hence, a negative impact on followers and
organizations. Indeed, each chapter attempts to define the nature of
leadership and categorize its manifestations. In doing so, there is overlap
among some chapters in the literature reviews of leadership theories,
models, and competencies. The commonalities, however, allow for the
designation of a cluster of individual and organizational behaviors under
the umbrella of negative leadership.
The opening chapters, “Toxic Leadership” and “Why Negative
Leadership Matters” provide the foundation and military context, albeit
from a predominately US perspective, for the remaining contributions.
The authors cite seminal and emerging research (that have added
adjectives such as abusive, destructive, tyrannical, despotic, unethical,
and laissez-faire to the lexicon of leadership) and contend that militaries
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are uniquely vulnerable to negative leadership, which emanates from
the “toxic triangle” of destructive leaders, susceptible followers, and
conducive environments. As Stanford University professor Philip
Zimbardo explores in The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People
Turn Evil (Random House, 2007), readers will ponder whether negative
leadership is an either-or proposition of “bad apples” or “bad barrels.”
Subsequent chapters provide case studies and anecdotes of negative
leadership that exist within principally democratic national militaries.
Chapter 4, “Negative Organizations: Antecedents of Negative
Leadership,” posits that attributes generally associated with individuals
can be extended and applied as organization-level attitudes and behaviors.
Resource scarcity and lack of staff training can result in organizational
anorexia. Likewise, organizational greediness can “exact high demands
[of] employees” for loyalty, time, and energy (61). Organizational
narcissism demonstrated in self-aggrandizement, sense of entitlement,
and rationalization can result in failure to meet the needs of stakeholders
(59). Such organizational pressures would create an environment (i.e.,
bad barrel) conducive to generating negative attitudes and behaviors of
leaders as well as followers.
Accordingly, Chapters 5, 6, and 9 (written by authors from Sweden,
Canada, and New Zealand) explore what makes leaders—innate
personality, learned behaviors, or organizational context—bad apples.
Chapter 10 from South Africa examines military leader failures caused
by incompetence or lack of character, cognitive abilities, professional
knowledge and skills, and the ability to influence others. The combination
of bad apples and bad barrels results in organizational cynicism, which
is explored in Chapter 7 by authors from the US Air Force Academy.
While the chapters provide multiple perspectives of negative
leadership, readers would have been better served by a concluding
chapter from the editors with their assessment and derived insights. As
such, the existing volume is an interesting and informative collection
of papers, representative of the IMLAW, but without synthesis. This
reviewer ponders questions that were not addressed by the editors. Are the
constructs of leadership as presented in the 2004 Global Leadership and
Organizational Behavior Experiment study useful for the examination
of negative leadership? More importantly, are there cultural differences
in the perception of negative leadership among militaries?
The IMLAW does offer a valuable forum for military researchers
to examine in depth specific topics with implications for military
professions. The workshop’s past publications on strategic leadership
development (2007), military ethics (2010), and adaptive leadership
(2014) are important investigations and presentations of research
findings. Accordingly, Negative Leadership: International Perspectives is
essential reading for anyone who studies and seeks to understand the
practice of military leadership. Positive and negative leadership are two
sides of the same coin. While the profession of arms seeks to promote
positive leadership as the vehicle to serve its stakeholders (i.e., its
governments and citizens), the military has the obligation to develop
institutional approaches to preclude or militate negative leadership in
its ranks.
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